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ABSTRACT 
States collaborate to achieve common goals. In the interest of advancing nuclear 
security globally, states have previously formed bilateral partnerships that allow two states 
to cooperate in germane areas of the nuclear industry such as safeguarding nuclear 
material, securing nuclear weapons, and advancing peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. 
Specifically, some states collaborate in establishing state-level strategies on nuclear 
security measures in order to protect against possible non-state adversaries (e.g., the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 
Programs between the Russian Federation and the United States). In an attempt to quantify 
utilities, a methodology has been developed within this work that uses game-theoretic 
models to measure the value of cooperation. In certain bilateral regimes, the opportunity 
for influence arises due to asymmetry between the partners. The developed methodology 
has the potential to identify circumstances under which one state might influence another 
in securing the latter’s nuclear assets against possible non-state actors by virtue of a 
potential collective benefit in a bilateral cooperative nuclear security regime.  
The methodology employs three different, but related, game-theoretic models – 
two using non-cooperative approaches and one using a cooperative approach. Determining 
the existence and magnitude of utilities between uncorrelated and correlated strategies 
provides the opportunity to study various cooperative strategies between states. The 
bargaining solutions of the cooperative game that models agreements providing a net 
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benefit to both parties were then used to evaluate utilities of each such viable cooperative 
strategy, and the results compared. This process was applied to four case studies exhibiting 
a temporal progression of cooperation between the Russian Federation (as successor to the 
Soviet Union) and the United States and a fifth case study assessing possible cooperation 
between modern-day Pakistan and the United States. A result of applying the methodology 
to the former bilateral regime illustrated the use of nuclear insecurity as a potentially 
profitable commodity (a stated concern of nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation 
scholars). Two notable conclusions include 1) the level of investment for independent 
action by the states can impact the nature of a collaborative regime and 2) the collective 
total (investment and consequential) costs of a bilateral regime can be reduced but will 
require additional investment by at least one state. We conclude that the methodology 
developed here has the potential to assist future decision makers and analysts in 
quantifying the value of state-level cooperation for nuclear security.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
During the 2008 U.S. presidential race, then-Senator Barack Obama promised to 
“lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within four 
years” in an effort “to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb.”1 This promise 
continued under the President’s term in the form of numerous Nuclear Security Summits 
where significant progress had been made with numerous nations around the world.2 
States with nuclear weapons and other special nuclear materials have expressed an 
understanding of the necessity for protecting against potential threats or misuse and, in 
their efforts, have defined their respective nuclear security postures to consist of robust 
material control and accounting systems as well as border defense systems.3,4 States form 
regimes which can be defined as “specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined 
activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the 
members of international society.”5 Additionally, states have formed and are still forming 
bilateral and multilateral regimes that could help achieve their goals of enhancing their 
nuclear and national security (examples include the U.S.-Russia Material Protection, 
Control, and Accounting Program and the U.S.-Kazakhstan BN-350 Blend Down 
Program).6 Understandably within these regimes, it is not always guaranteed that a state 
acts in the best interest of the regime or of the other state(s). This work focuses on 
assessing state-level strategies and actions using game-theoretic analysis with an eye 
specifically for influencing nuclear security implementation against potential non-state 
actors. Historically, game theory that is based on classical, discrete zero-sum, non-
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cooperative games has been used as an assessment tool for evaluating strategies regarding 
nuclear deterrence. The present work models relationships as cooperative, continuous non-
zero sum games. Cooperative game strategies model the terms of the agreement that define 
and maintain a bilateral cooperative nuclear security regime to counter the external threat 
of non-state actors. If nuclear terrorists cannot be dissuaded by traditional direct 
deterrence, perhaps state-level suppliers can be deterred from facilitating the acquisition 
of a nuclear asset by a non-state adversary (by influencing the state’s nuclear security).  
 
1.1. Objective  
The objective of this research is to develop, test, and analyze a two-player game-
theoretic methodology for identifying both: (a) the circumstances under which one state 
might be influenced by another in securing its nuclear assets against non-state actors by 
virtue of a collective benefit from the formation of a bilateral cooperative nuclear security 
regime, and (b) the nature of such a regime as might result from bargaining between the 
two states. The regime mentioned in the objective refers to the bilateral arrangement 
between the aforementioned target and source states. Initially, we use non-cooperative 
game theory to determine the respective utility of each player’s independent (or 
uncorrelated) strategies and the potential additional utility (otherwise referred to as a 
“surplus”) they would receive if they were to coordinate their strategies. Starting with a 
set of uncorrelated strategies for two players,  if a second strategy set can be agreed upon 
by both where at least one player benefits and the other is not made worse, then this is the 
definition of a Pareto improvement.7 The magnitude of the Pareto improvement helps 
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define the utility surplus for both players. Within this context, if the surplus utility is 
divided among the players as a way to compensate the player who gains lesser benefits, 
this is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.8 In the present work, we determine how a surplus 
can be distributed by quantitatively defining bargaining solutions of the surplus between 
the players.  
 Herein, both players are nation-states looking to define nuclear security with non-
negative costs (a combination of one state’s security measures and the other’s interdiction 
investments). A hidden but vital component to this work is the non-descript, non-state 
actor that serves as the impetus of the bilateral arrangement. Though this work does not 
identify or specify non-state actors, it is essential to the understanding of the work to 
accept the threat the non-state actor poses to both the target and source state and, therefore, 
the reason why both states would enter into such an arrangement.  
Calculating utilities in game theory requires a common metric for evaluating 
strategies. Therefore, in an attempt to assign a common measure of utility, this work uses 
estimated total incurred costs (in USD) to a nation-state in both securing and interdicting 
nuclear assets. This concept is further touched upon in Section 3.5. 
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for forming a partnership is that 
coordination of strategies between the two states will provide more total utility to the 
bilateral nuclear security regime than if each state were to seek maximum utility without 
such coordination. In addition to the bargaining solutions, this work discusses relevant 
data issues and results for prototypical problems as well as historically representative cases 
where coalitions have been utilized for the benefit of nuclear security within a bilateral 
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regime. Overall, the developed approach uses non-cooperative game theory to determine 
the existence and the division of a surplus utility and co-opts certain aspects of cooperative 
game theory to define an appropriate bilateral nuclear security regime.  
 
1.2. Research Motivation  
The intent of this work is to develop and explore a quantitative method of 
evaluating the attainability of a bilateral nuclear security engagement between two 
advanced nuclear states. The resources expended on two primary manners of engagement 
(securing and interdicting) comprise the states’ strategies and the methodology discussed 
within this document provides a method by which the net benefit of collaborative actions 
by nation-states can be assessed. For instance, even Cold War adversaries (the United 
States and the Soviet Union) entered into agreements that benefited the greater good.9,10 
In these cases, both states saw benefit from entering into bilateral accords with the other. 
Perceived as a symmetrical relationship in terms of nuclear capabilities and relative 
position in the global community, the U.S. and the Soviet Union both aspired to become 
the world’s nuclear super-powers and were able to invest national resources to accomplish 
this. However, asymmetrical relationships are another paradigm that introduce a less clear 
list of benefits to both states (with a potential clearer benefit to one side over the other). 
Historically, many bilateral relations between two asymmetric states have occurred 
because the “lesser” state power has possessed something of value to the “grander” state 
power: economic commodities such as fossil fuels or political leverage. Determining a 
method to quantify the benefits and costs of bilateralism is the intent here and to answer 
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the question: when will two states come to terms on a mutually beneficial bilateral nuclear 
security regime? Potentially in future work, the author has interest to expand this 
consideration by proceeding beyond influence and entering the area of coercion or 
punitive actions (e.g., economic sanctions) between the states.11 
Bilateral, regional, and multilateral regimes have previously been used to address 
arms control, nuclear material safeguards, and nuclear security. For example, New 
START between the U.S. and Russia for arms control and the safeguards inspection 
regime between Argentina and Brazil provide references for studying the benefits of 
establishing bilateral regimes between adversarial states (which shared an initial lack of 
trust).12,13 The eventual bilateral regimes that resulted have since created a pronounced 
level of trust in nuclear weapons control and material safeguards, respectively.14 
Regional regimes, in the forms of safeguards inspectorates and geographical 
nuclear weapon free zones, have united regions with common goals such as applied 
nuclear material safeguards and prohibiting the presence of nuclear weapons within the 
vicinities. These accords have proven the capability of states to unite over nuclear 
activities. Examples include the regional ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material) or EURATOM (European Atomic Energy 
Community) safeguards inspectorates (where France and the United Kingdom are 
subjected to EURATOM-administered safeguards).13,15 However, as exhibited with the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments of the Western European Union, regional solidarity 
can break down.16 Until 1987, the Agency of Western Europe was a regime where nations 
collected their conventional military forces declarations into a collective pool and then 
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inspections would occur with all players. If this paradigm were applied to all declared 
nuclear-armed states (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, 
India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), disparities would exist 
in the quantity of reported sites. As it occurred with the Agency of Western Europe, this 
disparity could create animosity between states whose sites would be randomly chosen for 
inspection more frequently than others with fewer sites. For example, where Russia could 
declare twenty different facilities, the DPRK would report two; and therefore, would get 
their sites selected ten times less frequently than Russian sites. 
Multilateral regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Regime or 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have also been established and 
are being maintained well beyond bilateral partnerships and regional consortia. Of 
particular interest are the Safeguards regime of the IAEA and the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).17  The CPPNM focuses on nuclear 
security of civilian-use material, and both India and Pakistan adhere to it. The IAEA 
Safeguards regime is a system of numerous documents and over 140 states with 
agreements for declaring, inspecting, and monitoring special nuclear material.18  
There is a long-documented history of states collaborating for meeting the 
comprehensive global nuclear weapon threat – consisting of weapons disarmament, 
establishing nuclear weapon free zones, safeguarding civilian nuclear material, countering 
nuclear threats, securing nuclear material around the world, controlling the international 
trade of nuclear weapons relevant technologies, and more. In addition to multilateral 
accords such as the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
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Additional Protocol, and regional accords for establishing nuclear weapon free zones 
(such as the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Raratonga, and Pelindaba), there have been many 
bilateral arrangements which have come into existence for the collective benefit of the 
partnership (a subset is included in Table 1.1). Notably, many such engagements involved 
(at least) one of the parties gaining other benefits unrelated to nuclear weapons and 
material.  
 
Table 1.1. Bilateral and multilateral engagements addressing nuclear threats 
Date Engagement/Treaty Parties 
1972  Signing of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and 
SALT I 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 
force 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
1991  ABACC is established (Argentina and Brazil) Argentina-
Brazil 
1991  Cooperative Threat Reduction authorized by Congress U.S.-Russia 
1994  U.S.-China Statement on Missile Proliferation U.S.-China 
1994  Agreed Framework between U.S./DPRK U.S.-DPRK 
1994  Project Sapphire: 0.5T of HEU from Kazakhstan to 
U.S. 
U.S.-
Kazakhstan 
1996  START II (reduction to 3000-3500) U.S.-Russia 
1998  Russian security upgrades under U.S. MPC&A 
Program 
U.S.-Russia 
1999  Lahore Declarations reduce tensions after nuclear tests India-Pakistan 
2003  Megatons to Megawatts eliminates 175T HEU U.S.-Russia 
2005  Russia and Canada deconstruct nuclear submarines Russia-Canada 
2009  New START talks begin between U.S. and RF U.S.-Russia 
 
States have shown that their actions can either be made independently of any other 
partner state or in conjunction with another. Bilateral alliances such as those shown in 
Table 1.1 have exhibited various similarities as well as differences – each has benefits and 
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disadvantages that depend on several issues. The present work sets out to study the 
circumstances under which such benefits do or do not exist under bilateral actions. 
In Verdier’s treatise of the relationship between bilateralism and multilateral 
regimes, nuclear nonproliferation via multilateral instruments (such as the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty) is primarily achieved with “superpower bilateral (or dyadic) 
diplomacy.”19 He implies that without bilateralism, any attempt at an eventual multilateral 
arms and material control regime would be unsuccessful. Furthermore, bilateral regimes 
provide the opportunity to customize offers to reflect each state’s specific circumstances 
as opposed to enforcing adherence to uniform terms across all participants. The present 
work can be seen as an attempt to quantitatively study the use of bilateralism in addressing 
nuclear security. 
 
1.3. Background  
Until the fall of the Soviet Union, in an essentially bipolar world, securing nuclear 
assets ready to be used at a moment’s notice comprised applied nuclear security. However, 
post-Cold War, concerns were elevated by the potential of nuclear terrorism as economic 
strife affected Soviet nuclear security.20 These concerns were magnified and brought to 
the forefront by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. The previously-held strategies for 
deterring nuclear attacks needed to be modified to meet the growing threat from terrorists: 
“traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed 
tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.”21  
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1.3.1. Influencing Strategies  
Statesa have endeavored to influence others’ strategies in the nuclear realm for 
many years. As an example, the study of deterring a state from using nuclear weapons 
against another (nuclear deterrence) has benefited from the development of numerous 
analytical methods. Studies of the “waves” of deterrence theory study began with simple 
cost-benefit analyses by Brodie and Wolfers and more analytical approaches developed 
by Schelling, Kaplan, Dresher.22,23,24,25,26 The latter wave weighed costs and gains in state-
level strategies and determined the feasibility of influencing states by the credible threat 
of punishment or balancing influence via punishment (increasing costs) or denial 
(decreasing gains). Modern scholarly work (such as from Knopf) has grown as a response 
to the fall of the Soviet Union where non-state adversaries must be dissuaded from action 
as well.27 Scholars have applied deterrence theory to nuclear terrorism – namely as a viable 
strategy against asymmetric threats, but disagreement lies in its implementation: 1) 
directly deter terrorist organizations themselves and 2) indirectly deter potential supplier 
states.28 In the former case, some claim there exists a semblance of rationality in the 
leadership of terrorist organizations who care about the longevity of their organization, 
the long-term prospect of their message, and “high-valued targets including family 
members and supporters.”29  
In the latter implementation (indirect deterrence), researchers rely on rationality as 
the reason by which deterrence works. Castillo details numerous scenarios in which a non-
                                               
a “States” in this context refers to sovereign nations under a single system of government as opposed to federated 
states under partial sovereignty as a member of a federal union. 
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state actor acquires such a nuclear capability through a ‘nuclearly’ capable (and amoral) 
state and concludes that deterrence against rogue states is a feasible option.30 With the 
concern of WMD proliferation by new states, Colby argues that outside a conventional 
defensive posture, deterring states from transferring weapons is the strongest strategy 
available to the nuclear powers.31 Moreover, scholars such as Lieber and Press argue that 
deterrence is only as effective as the forensics capabilities of the regime: if material that 
is used against or interdicted by a deterring state can be attributed back to its source, the 
likelihood of a state knowingly supplying a nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization 
decreases.32 Though discussed and written about, quantifying deterrence strategies 
(admittedly, indirectly) against non-state actors has not been studied as thoroughly as 
against states.33 Thus, the discussion within this work is focused on using a game-theoretic 
model as a tool for assessing potential influence over state-level nuclear security strategies 
against an unspecified, non-state threat. 
 
1.3.2. Nuclear Material Security  
With lessons learned from post-Cold War joint U.S.-Russian activities, it was 
concluded that inhibiting terrorist activities included restricting their access to weapons 
grade material and nuclear assets in general.34 Moreover, denying the acquisition of 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material is paramount to deterring terrorist actors. 
Particularly, nuclear terrorism was a large concern after the end of the Cold War while the 
newly-formed Russian Federation had thousands of sites with little to no protection, 
control, or accounting measures to ensure the security of such material.35,36 This 
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circumstance changed with the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program in which the U.S. collaborated with the Russian government to, among other 
activities, secure their nuclear material and assets.37  
Securing weapons-usable material is vital to a responsible nuclear weapons control 
regime. Existing nuclear-weapon states (as defined by the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty or NPT) have adhered to numerous international and bilateral treaties and 
agreements to assure the security of their arsenals and material (with some deficiencies 
still in existence). A problem lies in the nuclear-armed states that are not NPT nuclear 
weapon states, where information is neither open for scrutiny nor even shared with a 
reliable partner. How secure are the assets in those states? How can a state ensure these 
assets do not find their ways into the hands of terrorists or groups wishing to do harm? By 
securing nuclear assets, a state can convey its commitment to the responsibility of having 
such items within their boundaries. The state’s verifiable strategy of applied security 
against theft or non-authorized use is essential to the bilateral approach considered in the 
present work. 
The concept of material control and accounting is well-known in international 
safeguards. The process of establishing state systems of accounting and control and the 
formulae for calculating material unaccounted for, material balance areas, material 
balance periods, and significant quantities (SQ) are well-established.38 The concept of 
continuity of knowledge is essential in controlling high-valued material/assets such as 
nuclear weapons. Much can be gleaned and applied from the aforementioned concepts for 
securing nuclear assets.  
   
12 
 
Through international engagements and current events, the culture of nuclear 
security is growing stronger.39,40 Current international and bilateral endeavors led by 
states/organizations such as the U.S., the Russian Federation, Japan, and the IAEA have 
contributed to the overall global nuclear security culture by raising awareness and 
understanding among the countries’ current and future nuclear workforces. Programs such 
as the Partnership for Nuclear Security at the U.S. State Department, the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear 
Security of the Japanese Atomic Energy Authority, and the IAEA’s International Nuclear 
Security Education Network all facilitate interaction between nuclear professionals in 
various countries for the sake of enhancing nuclear security awareness, understanding, 
education, and application.41,42,43,44   
 
1.3.3. Assessing State-Level Strategies 
Many studies have been conducted to determine metrics for assessing state-level 
nuclear security strategies.45,46,47 Tools for measuring effectiveness of collaborations have 
mostly been qualitative.48,49 Some, however, attempt a quantitative approach. A 1992 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office report discusses the potential for evaluating the use of 
economic sanctions by describing the goals looking to be achieved and the difficulty in 
assessing incurred costs to a state with gross gains for that state.50 In evaluating methods 
to assess border security metrics, Rosenblum and Hipsman define four ways to measure 
the effectiveness of border security and present nine various methods used to calculate the 
metrics.51 To determine the number of unauthorized immigrants entering between ports 
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of entry, the authors of that study explored a deterministic approach in utilizing a 
recidivistic model, a survey-based assessment, and observational data collecting. To 
evaluate a second metric (the number of unauthorized immigrants entering through official 
ports of entry), the authors referenced a program used by the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (but no reports on the result are available). They lastly use the number of 
immigrants overstaying their visas (gleaned from third-party and exit data) and the number 
of unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S. (calculated by using Census data between 
legal non-citizens from total non-citizens). Admittedly not precise, these methods 
comprise a comprehensive approach used for evaluating the effectiveness of border 
security and immigration control for the entire U.S. by today’s government researchers.  
Some have endeavored in ranking state-level security strategies thus introducing 
controversy such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) Nuclear Security Index (NSI).52 
In this index, states with nuclear materials are evaluated against each other in terms of 
adherence levels regarding nuclear security. Researchers at NTI have compiled multiple 
data points on relevant states to construct grades for states based on various nuclear 
security elements. Opening controversy with their analysis, NTI researchers attempt to 
quantify factors by assigning discrete numbers to how well a state’s adherence is or how 
many accords the state has signed.53 Though considered faulty by some in the international 
nuclear security industry, the NSI at least exhibits an initial attempt at evaluating state 
nuclear security efforts that can be further refined with time.52,53   
1.4. Chapter Overviews 
A summary of the remainder of this document follows. Chapter 2 provides a
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detailed discussion on game-theoretic analysis with a section each on how game theory is 
used, previous applications of game theory relevant to the nuclear industry, and 
a discussion consisting of combining some useful aspects of both non-cooperative 
and cooperative game theory analysis in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Chapter 3 breaks 
the methodology into three sections: a top tier-level explanation of defining the 
model and players’ strategies and how they are applied to the five case studies detailed 
in Chapters 4-8;  a decomposition of the cost functions into terms and factors for 
which at least approximate state-level data might be available; and an explanation of how 
the functions are to be used in solving for the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies 
in each case study. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 focus on caveats of the present work 
including trust/commitment between nation-states, metrics of the game models, 
and the incommensurability of results. Chapters 4-8 detail five case studies meant to 
illustrate the use of the developed methodology: U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations during the 
height of the Cold War circa 1985, U.S.-Russia relations in three different historical 
contexts (1995, 2008, and 2015) and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in 2008. For each 
case study, each chapter begins with a section that uses publicly available data to evaluate 
the necessary parameters for the threat cost functions. The second section consists 
of replicating observed characteristics of the relationship between the two states. 
Using a non-cooperative approach, we determine both uncorrelated and correlated 
solution concepts as a means to analyze and gain insight into the bilateral relationship 
for nuclear security. The third section uses the difference between both solution 
concepts to illustrate bargaining solutions between the states. The fourth section
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of each chapter provides a discussion of the results. After all case studies are 
presented, Chapter 9 includes a discussion on the methodology itself in three parts: 
summarizing results (particularly on the four Russia/USSR-US partnerships), 
defining performance indicators, and addressing the sensitivities of input parameters 
to the results defined in the first section of each case study. Chapter 10 closes with potential 
future work that falls outside of the current scope, as well as conclusions regarding the 
methodology.
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2. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
 
Game theory is the process of modeling strategic interaction between two or more 
players. We introduce it in this chapter so as to ensure a common understanding of 
terminology, concepts, and expectations prior to showing its application in the 
methodology described in Chapter 3. Specifically, game theory models the interaction, 
preferences, strategies, and outcomes of self-interested players. A game of one player 
reduces the model to a decision problem – where the decision maker defines a set of 
strategies and their respective outcomes.54 The latter is often defined by devising a 
function that quantifies outcomes of strategies. Mapping choices to real numbers for 
appropriate strategy building requires using an objective utility function, u: it might 
represent a gain (in which case it is to be maximized) or a cost (in which case it is to be 
minimized). The preceding point makes a common assumption of rationality: choosing 
strategies that optimize utilities (i.e., optimizing a cost-benefit difference).  
A game-theoretic model exhibits some similarities with decision theory but the 
primary difference includes accounting for the effects of other players’ decisions on each 
other’s outcomes. For example, a player using expected utility theory to determine their 
payoff from a certain strategy must also account for the strategy of another and its effect 
on his own utility. Therefore, the player assumes the strategy that seems as the best 
response to the most likely strategy of his counterpart. Following this paradigm, a game 
theorist can then construct strategy sets between the players (also referred to as solution 
concepts). Various types of games have been theorized and used for analyzing numerous 
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types of scenarios in several different fields of research: biology, computer science, arms 
control, psychology, and economics. Some scholars posit the benefit of using game theory 
to model for terrorism applications over decision theory because of the nature of defining 
strategies in light of an active counterpart.55 Solution concepts for both decision theory 
and game theory can exhibit either discrete or continuous utilities. Most simple 
introductory game-theoretic models, as featured in the remainder of this chapter, are 
discrete. By contrast, the strategy spaces of the models used for the case studies of 
Chapters 4-8, are continuous. 
The work discussed herein uses elements of both non-cooperative game theory 
(NCGT) and cooperative game theory (CGT). The former is concerned with the analysis 
of strategies where each player is making choices out of their own interest. The latter 
focuses on the analysis of cooperation between players where outcomes are bargained. To 
be clear, cooperation can, and often does, occur in NCGT models but only when a clear 
benefit is perceived by the players. Subsection 2.4 includes some considerations regarding 
how CGT is being applied in this developed methodology. 
Firstly, we introduce basic elements of NCGT including solution concepts to 
define strategy spaces and previous applications as well as certain useful elements of CGT 
(e.g., solution concepts, bargaining theory, and utility transferability among players).  
 
2.1. Elements of Game Theory 
Modern game theory was born out of Von Neumann’s 1928 seminal publication.56 
Since then, various game theoretic concepts have risen from numerous scholars and other 
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published works. Historically (and still in use today), the most common method of 
representing basic games is exhibiting them in strategic (or normal) form. In this manner, 
each player’s choices are shown in rows or columns with the outcome of their choices 
conveyed as payoffs or utilities respectively. Figure 2.1 below conveys the normal form 
of a simple, two-player game.   
 
 
 Player 2 
Pl
ay
er
 1
  L R 
T (a,-a) (b,-b) 
B (c,-c) (d,-d) 
Figure 2.1. Simple 2-player game in normal form. 
 
 
Players 1 and 2 have strategy sets with respective choices of T or B and L or R, 
respectively. The chosen strategies then yield four outcomes (a,-a), (b,-b), (c,-c), and (d,-
d) where each variable represents the magnitude of the players’ utilities. In this game, the 
utilities are of opposite magnitudes. This implies a zero-sum game of limited utility: what 
is won by one player is lost by the other. Non-zero sum games are when a player’s payoff 
is not bounded by the other player’s. In normal form, the temporal component is not 
included: the respective timing of players’ decisions is not incorporated into the game. 
This means that the game is not specific for either simultaneous or sequential games. For 
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this aspect, we change to a more detailed depiction of a game using the extensive form or 
a game tree as shown in Figure 2.2 below.  
Figure 2.2. Simple 2-player game in extensive form 
In Figure 2.2, the sequence of moves by the players is explicitly shown. Each node 
represents a player’s choice between the letters over each branch and the final terminal 
nodes show the outcomes with respective payoffs for each player. This form of analysis 
allows for the modeling of the order of players’ decisions as well as the information known 
to them at the time of their decision. Both forms can model sequential and simultaneous 
games but the displayed outcomes of the extensive form are limited to discrete payoffs 
whereas the normal form can model continuous payoffs by being able to incorporate a 
utility or objective function based on the players’ strategic decisions. It is with this latter 
form, we devise the methodology in Chapter 3.  
2.2. Solution Concepts 
In game theory, a solution to a game is merely a prediction of the players’ strategies
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and resultant payoffs. A player’s array of rational choices forms the strategy set with his 
associated payoffs (which can be calculated using a utility function, u). A solution concept 
is the pairing of the most likely strategy of each player that often exhibits certain 
desirable properties. Some commonly-mentioned properties include the existence of a 
solution (such that the solution exists for all games which it is applied); the uniqueness of a 
solution (only one set of strategies forms the solution concept); an element of self-
enforcement (where the players choose not to deviate from their strategies due to receiving 
higher payoffs); and the limitation of pareto optimality (in that collective improvement of 
utility is not achievable).57 Though there are no universally-accepted methods in 
determining solutions for either simple matrix or repeated games, theorists can apply 
different strategy-defining principles so as to predict solution concepts within the game.57 
Assume the simple, 2-player game presented in Figure 2.3 where each player has two 
choices and they know their payoffs for each strategy set – e.g., [𝑇𝑇 , 𝐿𝐿 ] results in (5,5).  
Player 2 
Pl
ay
er
 1 L R 
T (5,5) (10,0) 
B (0,10) (1,1) 
Figure 2.3. Normal form game with payoff structure 
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Player 1’s strategy set is {T,B}. If he knows what his payoff is with either of his 
choices based Player 2’s strategy set {L,R}, he can plan his strategy accordingly. The 
outcomes presented in Figure 2.3 are listed respectively for Player 1 and 2. Using these 
payoffs, Player 1 deduces that strategy T will always yield a greater payoff than B. 
Therefore, strategy T is the dominant strategy. Reciprocated from Player 2’s perspective, 
strategy L is the dominant strategy because regardless of Player 1’s strategy, Player 2 
receives a payoff of 5 or 10. Hence, based on dominant strategies, the solution concept is [𝑇𝑇, 𝐿𝐿] with an outcome of (5,5).  
Maximin and minimax strategies form the basis of the next two solution concepts. 
The maximin strategy of Player 1 consists of the choice whereby Player 1’s worst-case 
payoff is maximized. Assuming a worst case scenario, the maximin strategy is a 
conservative choice that results in the best case minimal payoff. The minimax strategy of 
Player 1 is more of a defensive posture whereby Player 1 chooses the strategy which would 
limit Player 2’s maximum payoff. Applying the maximin strategy to his strategy set in 
Figure 2.3, Player 1 would review his minimum payoffs and choose the strategy that would 
provide him the higher minimum: strategy T with a higher payoff of 5 over 0). Conversely, 
Player 2 would also review his payoffs and choose L with a higher payoff of 5 over 0. If 
Player 1 adopts the minimax strategy, he would choose the strategy that would limit Player 
2’s payoffs the most: strategy T. Vice versa, Player 2 would reciprocate and choose his 
own strategy L. Thus, the solution concept of [𝑇𝑇,𝐿𝐿] occurs with each type of strategy: 
dominant, maximin, and minimax.   
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Additionally, two of the most fundamental solution concepts are the Pareto 
Optimum (PO) and the Nash Equilibrium (NE).57,58 Both solution concepts are based on 
different principles than the aforementioned three. The PO solution concept is a strategy 
pair where there exists no other pair such that the payoff to at least one of the players is 
better and that to neither is worse. The only pair that exhibits this is [𝑇𝑇,𝐿𝐿] again. Lastly, 
if each player reviews the outcomes and aims to choose the strategy that shall benefit them 
the most in light of a rational assumption for the other player’s chosen strategy, the 
resulting solution concept is the NE (which is also referred to as the best response strategy 
set). Notable for the NE is the implication that this solution concept is self-enforcing in 
that each player prefers this strategy for their respective outcome based on the kind of 
counterpart they are playing against. For Figure 2.3, the NE is [𝑇𝑇,𝐿𝐿] again.   
The five previously discussed solution concepts are limited as pure strategies for 
explanation purposes only. The outcomes for each strategy pair are strictly discrete in 
Figure 2.3. However, in analysis of more realistic games, payoffs can reside on a 
continuous spectrum. For that reason, probabilities are incorporated into solution concepts 
as a way of deviating from strictly pure strategies to mixed strategies. By using mixed 
strategies, one can always determine a NE – this is referred to as the Mixed-Strategy Nash 
Equilibrium (MSNE).  
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 Player 2  
Pl
ay
er
 1
  L R  
T (8,2) (1,6) p 
B (3,5) (4,1) 1-p 
  q 1-q  
Figure 2.4. Solving for the MSNE 
 
 
Consider the game specified, in normal form, by Figure 2.4 above. Assume the 
game is played once, the players make their choices simultaneously, and they both know 
the other’s payoffs. When Player 2 chooses L, it behooves Player 1 to choose T. When 
Player 2 chooses R, it would behoove Player 1 to choose B. Conversely, when Player 1 
chooses T, Player 2 should chose L. And when Player 1 chooses B, then Player 2 should 
choose L. Assuming only pure strategies, the NE is not a solution concept. However, by 
assuming the game is repeated with mixed strategies, every game has a Nash Equilibrium. 
Generally, probabilities are assigned as frequencies of a strategy being selected in an 
infinite number of trials. Specifically, in Figure 2.4, p and q represent how frequently 
Player 1 chooses T and Player 2 chooses L, respectively. Therefore, as Player 2 defines 
his best response strategy, he must first compute Player 1’s expected payoffs from his pure 
strategies T and B in terms of Player 2’s strategy choice based on q: 
 ( )8 1 1T q q= × + − ×   (2.2.1) 
 ( )3 1 4B q q= × + − ×   (2.2.2) 
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With his strategy set {T,B}, Player 1’s highest expected payoff depends on which 
strategy Player 2 chooses. Plotting both Equations (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) in Figure 2.5 shows 
the relationship between Player 2’s strategy frequency q and Player 1’s payoff.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Expected payoffs for player 1 
 
 
 
When Player 2 chooses strategy L more than 37.5% of the time, it behooves Player 
1 to have chosen T. Conversely, it Player 2 chooses strategy L less than 37.5% of the time, 
Player 1 would receive a higher payoff if he chooses B. Therefore, in an effort to minimize 
Player 1’s payoff, Player 2 chooses strategy L 37.5% of the time.   
Conversely, to determine his best response mixed strategy, Player 1 would pursue 
Player 2’s expected payoffs for his strategy set {L,R} per the expected utility Equations 
(2.2.3) and (2.2.4): 
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 ( )2 1 5L p p= × + − ×   (2.2.3) 
 ( )6 1 1R p p= × + − ×   (2.2.4) 
Solving for Player 1’s best strategy yields 𝑝𝑝 = 1 2� . Plotting Equations (2.2.3) and 
(2.2.4) as shown in Figure 2.6 below convey the relationship of Player 2’s utilities with 
the probability of Player 1’s strategy. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Expected payoffs for player 2  
 
 
Similarly conveyed in Figure 2.5, Player 2 should choose L if Player 1 chooses T 
under 50% of the time or, vice versa, should choose R if Player 1 chooses T over 50% of 
the time. If this game will only be played once and Player 1 is interested minimizing Player 
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2’s payoff, he should play T with a probability of 50%. Conclusively, the NE solution 
concept is (1 2� ,3 8� ).  
 
2.3. Applied Game Theory on Nuclear Issues 
 Game theory has been used in the past as an analytical tool for analyzing hybrid 
technical-political problems by evaluating and assessing real-world situations such as gun 
control, war games, and safeguards inspections.59,60,61 More specifically, previous game-
theoretic studies have been conducted to help understand nuclear-related situations, such 
as state-level economic coercion, arms verification/nuclear safeguards inspections, and 
the Cuban Missile crisis.62,63 These assessments employ non-cooperative games which are 
analyzed to identify the Nash Equilibrium and other solution concepts.64 More so, on the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Fraser and Hipel argue the benefits of advanced game-theoretic 
models for analyzing “games where information is incomplete or misleading.”65 In their 
1996 work, Avenhaus and Canty apply game theoretic analysis for nuclear material 
safeguards inspections within the international safeguards regime.61 They construct a 
game-theoretic model for determining the number and frequency of a state’s safeguards 
inspections. They optimize the number of these inspections by finding the NE where the 
gains of both the inspector and the inspectee are maximized. In later work, they invoke 
Diamond in identifying minimax policies of players in a 2-player, zero-sum inspections 
game.66   
Dresher provides an assessment of a structure for an arms inspection regime that 
gives maximum insurance that an agreement is not violated.26 He frames the problem as 
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“unlike sampling in manufacturing, sampling for arms control must take into account that 
the statistical population may be altered to conceal a violation” – this is where the “game 
of strategy (exists) between the inspector and the inspected.” He continues by defining the 
situation as a two-person (Inspector and Inspectee) zero-sum, repeated, non-cooperative 
game where v is the payoff to the inspector and, due to the zero-sum nature of the game, 
–v is the payoff to the Inspectee (in Figure 2.7, the payoffs are from the perspective of the 
Inspector). As per Avenhaus, if n is the number of inspection opportunities and m is the 
number of inspections the Inspector chooses to conduct, then 𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑛𝑛. If a violation is made 
by the Inspectee and the Inspector had chosen to inspect, the payoff to the Inspector 
increases by 1. Contrarily, if a violation is made and the Inspector had chosen not to 
inspect, the payoff to the Inspector is −1. Conversely, the Inspectee who had violated and 
the inspector would have received −1 and +1, respectively. If the Inspectee had acted 
legally and not violated in either case, the change to the payoffs would have been that the 
number of inspection opportunities, n, would have decreased by one and, if the Inspector 
had inspected, the number of inspections, m, would have decreased by one as well 
(otherwise, with no inspection occurring, m does not change). The design of this game 
allows for the termination after a detected violation (where the Inspector would have 
received −1 payoff) or after the n periods (where the Inspector would have received a 
payoff of 0).  
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Inspector 
Inspectee 
Legal 
Action 
Violation 
Inspection v(n-1,m-1) +1 
No inspection v(n-1,m) −1 
Figure 2.7. Dresher’s bimatrix game showing inspector’s payoffs 
 
 
Avenhaus then calculates a mixed-strategy equilibrium by employing probabilities 
p and q (similar to Section 2.2 where probabilities are more accurately defined as the 
frequency in an infinite amount of trials) to find the equilibrium value of the payoff, v, for 
the Inspector. Using the same approach as the previous section, the values for the Inspectee 
are based on p: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1, 1 1 1,legalv p v n m p v n m= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ −   (2.3.1) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1violationv p p= ⋅ + + − ⋅ −   (2.3.2)  
And the value for the Inspector are based on the probability q: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1, 1 1 1inspectv q v n m q= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ +   (2.3.3) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1, 1 1notv q v n m q= ⋅ − + − ⋅ −   (2.3.4) 
To find the equilibrium of their strategies, the values, v, for each must be equal. 
Hence, for the Inspectee, Equation (2.3.1) must equal Equation (2.3.2) to determine p: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1, 1 1 1, 1 1 1
1, 1 1, 1, 2 1
2 1, 1, 1 1, 1
2 1, 1, 1 1, 1
p v n m p v n m p p
p v n m v n m p v n m p
p p v n m p v n m v n m
p v n m v n m v n m
⋅ − − + − ⋅ − = ⋅ + + − ⋅ −
⋅ − − + − − ⋅ − = −
+ ⋅ − − ⋅ − − = − +
⋅ + − − − − = − +  
  
 
( )
( ) ( )
1, 1
2 1, 1, 1
v n m
p
v n m v n m
− +
=
+ − − − −
  (2.3.5) 
 
And for the Inspector, Equation (2.3.3) must equal Equation (2.3.4) to determine q: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1, 1 1 1, 1
1, 1 1, 2 2
1, 1 1, 2 2
q v n m q q v n m q
q v n m q v n m q
q v n m v n m
⋅ − − + − = ⋅ − + −
⋅ − − + ⋅ − − = −
− − + − − = −  
 
 ( ) ( )
2
2 1, 1 1,
q
v n m v n m
=
− − − − −
  (2.3.6) 
 
By combining Equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.6), Avenhaus and Dresher calculated the 
NE for the Inspector as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1, 1, 1
,
2 1, 1, 1
v n m v n m
v n m
v n m v n m
− + − −
=
+ − − − −
  (2.3.7) 
 
In his more recent body of work (2011, 2012, and 2013), Avenhaus (with Krieger) 
analyzes unannounced interim inspections for safeguards, spent fuel storage facilities 
inspections in Europe, and pathways states may use to divert nuclear material for military 
purposes from declared civilian facilities.67,68,69 In the latter publication, Avenhaus and 
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Krieger solve for the MSNE in a number of models consisting of an inspectorate and a 
state considering a path for material diversion. They form non-cooperative games with 
strategy sets of discrete payoffs for each player and incrementally complicate their simple 
form models to include real-world factors such as additional strategies, frequency of 
inspections, false alarms, and non-detection probabilities. Avenhaus and Krieger then 
conclude that determining how the equilibria of strategies affects the state player can be 
an effective model of deterrence of illegal activity under a comprehensive safeguards 
system. 
In 1984, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sponsored a feasibility 
study for a strategic analysis of safeguards systems by A.J. Goldman.70 This work 
investigates the use of game theory for nuclear material accountancy at a generic nuclear 
facility under the NRC. Goldman aims to set alarm thresholds for inventory differences in 
accounting by defining applied safeguards as a zero-sum, non-cooperative game between 
the facility and a generically-defined intelligent “diverter.” The study continues to expand 
the potential for game theory in regulatory settings to become more complicated as more 
players and more options are assumed. Furthermore, Goldman expands on the possibility 
that these such games should not be considered zero-sum (what the diverter gains is what 
the defender loses) but more so should be studied further to understand the potential value 
of certain outcomes through analytic, though subjective, methods such as multi-attribute 
utility theory. Goldman also introduces the concept of ordinal payoffs as a way to remove 
subjectivity from determining a proper payoff function and states that they can be used as 
a “fallback position if the cardinal approach flounders.” The problem of defining an 
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appropriate utility function to determine payoffs is a common theme in game theory and 
is approached in the present work via financial costs to a state.  
 
2.4. Non-Cooperative Game Theory: Cooperative Solution Concepts 
 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 discuss non-cooperative game theory (NCGT), its elements, 
and its solution concepts. As stated in the preamble to this chapter, NCGT has commonly 
been used for conducting state-level analyses assuming states act in their own best interest 
and they do not know their counterparts’ strategies. However, herein, we begin to consider 
how things change when players are able to cooperate. Nash explicitly states that in order 
for cooperation to exist, players must be able to communicate their strategies and intent.71 
Hence, by incorporating communication between players, we can refine aforementioned 
non-cooperative games into cooperative ones. Under NCGT, solution concepts for games 
with cooperation can be attained in two ways: players reach an equilibrium through 
repeated play of the game or a third-party arbiter or ‘umpire’ prescribes an achievable 
equilibrium point to the players. The latter would include the possibility of the third-party 
serving as an enforcer and would necessitate communication (bargaining, negotiation) 
between the players.  
Summarily, cooperative actions are not prohibited in NCGT as long as there exists 
an individual payoff to justify it as well as an agreement between the players. Solution 
concepts (as introduced in Subsection 2.2) such as the Nash Equilibrium, the Pareto 
Optimum, the minimax and maximin strategies can describe potential “solutions” of non-
cooperative games. However, determining “solutions” (i.e., unique equilibrium points) of 
   
32 
 
cooperative games has not proven to be as straightforward. Particularly, Shubik (pg. 3) 
alludes to the worthwhile yet eventually unsuccessful efforts by Harsanyi and Selten to 
“select a single equilibrium point that would be an appropriate solution for any game.”72 
In sum, the segue into CGT from NCGT is not as seamless as one might hope. 
To convey how one can arrive at a cooperative solution concept in a non-
cooperative game, we present the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as shown in Figure 2.8. The 
solution concept in this game is made up of each player choosing from his strategy set of 
{Silence, Confess} so as to provide an agreeable benefit to himself. The payoffs presented 
herein (i.e., the length of their jail sentences) refer to what each prisoner receives after 
they are apprehended for a crime and interrogated separately. In other words, if both 
players had previously coordinate their strategies and stay silent, they will each be 
sentenced only 2 years in prison. If one confesses in order to receive 1 year, then the other 
will be blamed for the crime and consequentially receive a full 10 years in prison. If both 
confess to the crime hoping to receive lighter sentences, they will equally be punished as 
accomplices to the other and both be sentenced to six years.  
 
 
  Player 2 
  Silent Confess 
Player 
1 
Silent 2,2 10,1 
Confess 1,10 6,6 
Figure 2.8. Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoffs for both players 
33 
Each solution concept discussed below encompasses some properties mentioned 
in Subsection 2.2. Table 2.1 summarizes these concepts and whether they exhibit various 
properties such as uniqueness, existence, optimality, and self-enforcement. It is beneficial 
to consider these while discussing each solution concept. 
Table 2.1. Summary of concepts and properties 
Property 
Concept 
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Nash Equilibrium (NE) Y Y Y N N 
Pareto Optimality (PO) Y N N Y Y 
Maximin Y Y Y N N 
Minimax Y Y Y N N 
Kaldor-Hicks (K-H) Optimality Y N N Y Y 
The first non-cooperative solution concept we consider is the Nash Equilibrium 
(NE). If each player acts independently to maximize their own utility (i.e., minimizing 
their costs), each player chooses to Confess. Hence, the NE solution concept is (Confess, 
Confess). Particular to the NE solution concept is that neither player can improve their 
payoff by merely changing their own strategy – this adds the element of the strategies 
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being self-enforced – where strategies are selected as the best response to the other 
player’s perceived strategy. Hence, the strategies are self-enforced in that the players will 
not deviate for their own benefit. Due to the NE being the concept resulting from unilateral 
responses, it is neither pareto efficient nor meets Kaldor-Hicks criteria (meaning that one 
player receives enough benefit to bribe the other into this solution concept). 
Let us assume the players have a pre-negotiated understanding where, if caught, 
they agree to remain silent – resulting to a solution concept of (Silent, Silent). Compared 
to the NE solution concept, both players receive less jail time. This is the Pareto Optimum 
(PO) where there exists no other strategy pair such that the payoff to at least one of the 
players is better and that to none is worse. This solution concept requires a great amount 
of trust, or some enforcement mechanism to ensure each player is compliant to the 
agreement because of assurance the other does not act selfishly and thereby condemn the 
compliant first player to a 10-year jail sentence. Per Table 2.1, the PO does exist but is not 
unique nor self-enforcing due to a PO solution concept lying on the efficiency frontier 
where any solution point can be agreed upon and that there is no guarantee that either 
player would not deviate from their stated strategy. However, the PO is pareto efficient 
(implying that whatever is gained by one player is lost by the other) and can meet Kaldor 
Hicks criteria of one player receiving enough of a payoff to provide to the other (explained 
in more detail later in this section).  
In this particular game, both the maximin and minimax approaches yield the NE 
solution concept. When the players both choose to maximize their minimum utilities, the 
solution concept is (Confess, Confess) – each player considers the payoffs of their strategy 
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set {Silent, Confess} and chooses the strategy that will result in the better worst-case 
scenario. Similarly, if the players choose to minimize the other’s maximum, the solution 
concept is also (Confess, Confess) – each player considers the other player’s potential 
maximum utility and chooses that which yields the lesser best-case scenario for the other 
player. It makes sense that in Table 2.1, both the maximin and minimax solution concepts 
exhibit the same properties as the NE. 
The final solution concept, the Kaldor-Hicks (K-H) concept (where one player 
would receive enough utility to transfer to the other while still providing both a better 
result than the NE) is achieved by the (Silent, Confess) solution concept which yields a 
payoff of (10, 1) and where one player can transfer his entire utility to the other (if he 
wants). Hence, in that situation, with (Silent, Confess), one player would be able to 
ultimately bribe the other to an outcome of (0, 11) which would yield a more favorable 
payoff for player 2 than the NE (from Table 2.1). Furthermore, a K-H solution concept 
can include any amount of transferred utility ranging between (10, 1) and (0, 11) including 
the outcome of (5.5, 5.5) where one player transfers enough utility to the other so that both 
players receive an equal benefit. The K-H and PO solution concepts are not self-
enforceable and are susceptible to a player’s deviation from their initial strategy. 
Therefore, both solution concepts require a substantial amount of trust and a level of 
commitment between the players that may not reside in a typical prisoner’s dilemma 
bimatrix game. This concept is paramount to a bilateral nuclear security regime between 
states however and is discussed more in Section 3.4. 
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The intent of presenting the PO in the aforementioned discussed Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game is to introduce the precariously placed potential of players’ cooperations 
which can serve as motivator for cooperative game theory (CGT). In CGT, players may 
collaborate by coordinating their strategies in order to gain a higher total payoff than if 
they were to play non-cooperatively. Scholarly research in CGT has been extensive in 
operations research, political science, computer science, maritime operations, and other 
such areas but not as much in nuclear policies and strategies.73,74,75,76 There exist two 
important concepts necessary for a cooperative game: 1) the existence of a perceived 
additional benefit (i.e., surplus) by cooperating and 2) the players’ pre-negotiations of that 
surplusb. Past scholars have studied the latter as an important issue in coalition formation 
and stability.77,78,79,80 In a two-player cooperative game, the two players can form one 
coalition and negotiate between themselves to receive a higher payoff than if they were to 
act independently (e.g., when one player can transfer some or all of his utility to the other 
player in the form of a side payment). This concept is referred to as utility transferability 
and is expanded upon in Subsection 2.5.2.  
 
2.5. Assessing Cooperation in Game Theory 
 Modern scholars in cooperative game theory (CGT) have focused substantially on 
alliance-building between players to form coalitions. As the number of players increases, 
so does the complexity of the potential solution concepts. However, by reducing a game 
                                               
b In other words, an important concept necessary for a cooperation game is that for all NE solution concepts, there 
exists a strategy pair that is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement on that NE, as well as a way to share the utility of that 
improvement. 
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to a simple bi-matrix game of two players, we can describe bargaining strategies for when 
players cooperate. Furthermore, in this document, we co-opt terminology commonly used 
in CGT to fit the needs of explaining our methodology (particularly in the following two 
subsections, in Section 3.2, and in each case study’s third section of chapters 4-8). This is 
necessary due to the lack of a clear segue from NCGT to CGT. Shubik and Powers 
comment on this as recently as 2016 by stating there has yet to be a constructed theory 
that would “unify both types.”81 The methodology presented here does not fit this need 
per se but, rather, the intent of this work is to provide a way to gain insight from applying 
the logic described in Chapter 3.   
 
2.5.1. Bargaining Strategies 
In the aforementioned (preceding section preface), two-person, bi-matrix game 
with cooperation, we assume communication is made between the players so that both can 
achieve a mutually-agreed upon result that proves favorable for each. Within this section, 
utilities from correlated strategies are identified with a COR superscript and utilities from 
uncorrelated strategies are identified with a UNC superscript. Determining the solution 
concepts for both types of strategies allows the opportunity to identify the existence of any 
benefit from correlating strategies, by reviewing the difference in utility (as discussed in 
the beginning of this chapter) between the payoffs for the COR and the UNC strategies. 
The division of any additional benefit (otherwise referred to as the surplus) is negotiated 
between the two players is how one defines a player’s bargaining strategy. The collection 
of bargaining strategies is then the game’s (bargaining) solution concept.  
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Assume vi is the payoff for player, i, which is the result of evaluating a non-descript 
utility function, u, based on strategy µi. Strategy µi is either uncorrelated (player i acts 
regardless of the other players’ strategies) or correlated (player i uses the cooperative 
strategy in conjunction with the other players’ strategies). Equation (2.5.1) conveys the 
general formula for the total payoff to the regime of n players, vr.  
 = ∑
n
r i
i
v v   (2.5.1) 
Where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖) and u is the utility function used for defining payoff, vi. A utility 
function is specific for each player i and reflect those players’ interests. Hence, it is more 
accurate to use 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖). For the case of only two players, the total payoff of the regime 
using the correlated strategies, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , is vr as shown below: 
 ( ) ( )µ µ µ µ= + = +1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2, ,COR COR COR COR COR CORrv v v u u   
For uncorrelated payoffs where players do not cooperate, the payoffs are computed 
via utility functions defined by independent strategies looking to merely maximize the 
player’s utility: 
( )µ= maxUNCi i iv u  
Each player’s bargaining strategy is determined by 2 values: the total payoff for 
the regime when they correlate their strategies, vr, and the respective uncorrelated payoffs 
for each player: 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 . For n players, the total payoff within the cooperative solution for 
each player is defined by Equation (2.5.2) with di denoting the percentage of the difference 
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between the regime’s payoff and the sum of the individual players’ payoffs the player 
receives (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = {0,1}). 
   = ⋅ −  
  
∑
n
UNC
i i r i
i
v d v v   (2.5.2)  
When two players are present, 𝑑𝑑3−𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖. For a Nash Bargaining Solution or NBS, n 
players receive an even split of the surplus (i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑛𝑛� ). Hence, for the two player 
game, Equation (2.5.2) is modified to show the NBS for both players: 
( )
( )
 = ⋅ − + 
 = ⋅ − + 
1 1 2
2 1 2
0.5
0.5
NBS UNC UNC
r
NBS UNC UNC
r
v v v v
v v v v
 
 
The bracketed quantity in Equation (2.5.2) is referred to as the surplus payoff, 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  
– the difference in payoffs for the regime between the payoff when players correlate their 
strategies, 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , and when they do not, 𝑣𝑣𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 . Using the superscripts described above, the 
surplus is defined as Equation (2.5.3): 
 SUR COR UNCv v v= −   (2.5.3) 
Here 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 and 𝑣𝑣𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  from Equation (2.5.2). Varying di provides 
different distributions of the surplus or bargaining strategy concepts – otherwise referred 
to as imputations of the game. The collection of all imputations across the range of values 
for di makes up the cooperative game’s core (as the blue-shaded region in Figure 2.9).c 
                                               
c Both imputations and core are used in traditional cooperative game theory to describe divisions among n-players and 
their various solutions but, herein this methodology, they are used to describe characteristics of the bargaining solution 
between two players. 
   
40 
 
The core represents the area of negotiations for both players where each player gains 
something and, hence, any solution concept residing therein is a viable outcome of the 
cooperative game.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Solution space on surplus axes 
 
 
Figure 2.9 exhibits various characteristics of bargaining solutions in cooperative 
games. Assume the normalization of all payoffs in regard to the uncorrelated payoffs – 
i.e., the uncorrelated payoffs (𝑣𝑣1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 ,𝑣𝑣2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶) are set at the figure’s origin (0, 0). Any positive 
amount of payoff to either player from the correlation of strategies leads to non-negative 
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payoffs along the horizontal and vertical axes that which represent each player’s correlated 
payoff 𝑣𝑣1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  and 𝑣𝑣2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  respectively. When either player receives the full surplus, points (𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 , 0) and (0,𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶) are identified. The line segment between these two points can be 
referred to as the efficiency frontier of the game’s solution space. Within this triangular 
area resides the game’s core. The NBS is shown as the arrow with a +1 slope from the 
origin to exhibit the equal split of the surplus to each player. Any solution concept that 
resides within the core or falls on the efficiency frontier would be a Pareto improvement 
over the uncorrelated solution concept because both players would receive an increase in 
their respective payoff. The green-shaded regions below the x-axis and to the left of the 
y-axis signify solution concepts which would be an improvement for one player but not 
the other. When this happens, the potential exists for one player to supplement the other’s 
loss – this is the definition of a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over the uncorrelated solution 
concept. 
The applied methodology in each case study (Chapters 4-8) allows for other 
bargaining solution concepts that are within the game’s core (beyond the NBS). In other 
scholarly work, the NBS bargaining solution is assessed from various solution concepts.82 
Conversely, in this work, we use a single uncorrelated solution concept for each case study 
in Chapters 4-8 and assess multiple bargaining solutions. 
 
2.5.2. Visualizing Utility Transferability  
In the two-player, bi-matrix game with cooperation, we begin to include the option 
of players making side payments to each other. This concept is essentially transferring one 
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player’s utility to another. Herein, we convey how the methodology assists in visualizing 
this concept. Assume an uncorrelated solution concept results in a solution placed at point 
(α,β), as shown in Figure 2.10 as point P at (2,3). Recalling Equation (2.5.3), the surplus, 
vSUR, is the difference between a correlated payoff, vCOR, and the uncorrelated payoff, vUNC. 
Players A and B then negotiate vSUR into fractions (r for A and s for B where r + s = 1). 
The ratio r:s defines an allocation of the surplus (otherwise referred to as an imputation). 
Therefore, the total amount each player can receive is x and y, respectively, as shown 
below: 
 ( )α α β − = − + 
SURx r v   (2.5.4) 
 ( )β α β − = − + 
SURy s v   (2.5.5) 
Equations (2.5.4) and (2.5.5) can be reduced to Equation (2.5.6) shown in Figure 2.10: 
 
s sy x
r r
β α = + − 
 
  (2.5.6) 
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Figure 2.10. Nash Bargaining Solution at Q0.5 where r:s = 1:1 
 
 
To use the entire surplus, x and y must also satisfy x + y = v. The line (Qi) – 
Equation (2.5.6) in point-slope form – is the utility transferability (UT) line. Moreover, 
this line exhibits the solution’s Pareto Optimality for both players (meaning one player 
can only do better at the expense of the other).78 Moreover, with a solution concept 
residing on line Qi between α and β, the outcome therefore gives each player more or as 
much as they could have attained by acting alone – thus meeting a desirable characteristic 
of a solution concept referred to as individual rationality (page 6 in Leyton-Brown).57 
Specifically, Figure 2.10 conveys the Nash Bargaining Solution at Q0.5. When the 
imputation is 0.5 (r:s ratio is 1:1 or when r = s), the collective payoff is 8 (A receives 3.5 
and B receives 4.5) and the initial uncorrelated solution concept resides at point P: (2, 3).  
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Figure 2.11. Nash Bargaining Solution with blue-shaded core 
 
 
Figure 2.11 exhibits a general set of solution concepts to convey other imputations 
(allocations) which are shown as grey lines as they intersect the UT line as a ratio between 
r and s. As the fraction of 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  approaches zero, the distribution of the surplus becomes 
more favorable for player A (conversely as well). Any additional side payments that fall 
outside the blue-shaded region (i.e., 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ < 0) implies that a player will have to sacrifice a 
portion of his payoff from the initial uncorrelated point, P. When 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  is negative, the 
strategy set meets the criteria for a Kaldor-Hicks solution where side payments from one 
player to another is possible. As an imputation approaches zero (i.e., 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ → 0), the 
distribution of the surplus becomes more favorable for player A (and vice versa). The 
coalition’s total utility, v, is not exceeded. Any additional side payments that fall outside 
the core (i.e., Qi<0) imply that a player will have to be made whole so as to return the 
cooperative strategy set back into the game’s core. Making one player whole would 
   
45 
 
require the other to provide a side payment to achieve a fair division of the surplus 
(Leyton-Brown, p. 14).57 This ex post transfer of wealth leads to the possible questioning 
of credibility of this bargaining solution (or even the coalition’s viability). 
As will be shown, each case study begins solving correlated strategies as Kaldor-
Hicks solutions. Then, as part of each case study, we vary the r:s ratio and generate 
variations of Equation (2.5.6) to devise different imputations exemplified graphically by 
the grey lines in Figure 2.11. When side payments between players are permitted, the 
strategic point P (α, β) can change to (α+d, β-d) where d is positive when player B makes 
a payment to player A (and vice versa if d is negative). By limiting d and assuming its 
value is seen equally by both players, the UT line exhibits a slope of -1.     
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3. GAME THEORETIC METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING BENEFITS 
  
A foundation of game-theoretic analysis was included in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, 
we use this foundation to discuss the developed methodology used to assess sets of 
strategies in various bilateral nuclear security regimes. These strategy sets are otherwise 
referred to as solution concepts and can be either cooperative or non-cooperative (as 
discussed in Section 2.4). as they pertain to the bilateral nuclear security regimes used in 
this work. Specific considerations of the described methodology include using 
characteristic or objective functions to compute players’ utilities based on their strategies. 
The functions are defined in the Section 3.1 and, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the utilities 
they yield are continuous. Moreover, in this methodology, players’ utilities are defined as 
costs, can be bargained, and are treated as transferable.  
Both cooperative and non-cooperative game theories can be used to determine 
solution concepts, a distinction between both is the level of cooperation that is imposed 
on the bilateral regime. In conventional cooperative game theory (CGT), the cooperation 
is enforced by an unbiased third-party or by legal bindings. In assessing cooperation under 
non-cooperative game theory (NCGT), the players see the benefit in cooperating and, thus, 
set their strategies jointly through communication. It is this latter approach that is used 
herein.  
The methodology will show how to determine the existence of a mutual benefit 
that would provide the incentive for both states to coordinate their strategies. If determined 
to exist, the surplus is then the bargaining chip between the states so that both are enticed 
   
47 
 
to negotiate possible entrance into a bilateral regime. A cooperative game model is 
presented on how the surplus can be divided by the states. Furthermore, in the paradigm 
presented in this work, monetary investment or cost is the metric which inherently is a 
negative utility for the states (the terms “investments” and “strategic costs” are used 
interchangeably within this document). Therefore, the term “surplus”, in this game model 
actually implies how much a state can save in its investments.  
The following four sections describe various details of the methodology: its 
framework and operational flow as used in the case studies in Chapters 4-8, input 
parameters used to help discern the various regimes, both non-cooperative and cooperative 
solution concepts, and considerations of the methodology as it stands in this composition 
such as players’ commitment issues and commensurability of results. Each chapter 
presents a snapshot in time of a bilateral relationship between states with the focus on 
nuclear security by using input parameters found for each case study’s year (the first four 
case studies center around US-Russia/Soviet relations): 1985, 1995, 2008, 2015, and a 
US-Pakistan partnership with 2008 input parameters. These snap shots in time were used 
due to the availability of the relevant data for those years in scholarly publications. 
 
3.1. Methodology Framework and Operational Flow 
For this methodology, the two players of the three game-theoretic models are a 
source state securing its nuclear assets (State A) and a target state interdicting the use of 
assets against itself (State B) . The utility for each state is defined by the characteristic 
function introduced here and developed in more detail in Subsection 3.1.2. It is based on 
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annual investments for achieving their respective goals and the consequential costs from 
the inadequacy of achieving those goals. 
The characteristic function is used to define each state’s utility based on the state’s 
strategy set. As stated in this chapter’s preamble, the utilities of chosen strategies are in 
terms of cost due to the expense of nuclear security and any consequences that could arise. 
Therefore, the characteristic function used to calculate utilities for states’ strategies can 
also be referred to as the objective cost function which computes continuous costs as part 
of determining solution concepts. States make annualized financial investments to achieve 
their strategic objective (i.e., strategic costs, Ci) and then bear the consequential costs (i.e., 
threat costs, Ti) of that investment. All costs are non-negative (though in future work, this 
assumption can be relaxed). For both states, as the strategic costs increase, the threat costs 
decrease (arguably approaching zero). This inverse correlation and their additive nature 
for determining a state’s total costs (i.e., TCi) provide the opportunity for optimizing 
strategic and threat costs in order to minimize each state’s respective total cost. Moreover, 
the characteristic function exhibits reductions in threat cost per unit strategic cost as a 
negative slope as well as diminishing returns of investment. This implies that after the 
initial strategic investment, each subsequent additional investment produces less reduction 
in the threat cost. 
The methodology’s three game-theoretic models of each bilateral regime include 
determining two solution concepts by a non-cooperative game theoretic approach (where 
the states act unilaterally and then communicate their strategies) and one solution concept 
defined by a bargaining approach. First, the unilateral approach yields an initial solution 
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concept where states’ strategies are not communicated and, hence, are uncorrelated. This 
solution concept is an initial point where both states choose the independent, uncorrelated 
strategies in order to minimize their total costs based on assumptions of the other’s strategy 
(otherwise, each state’s best response strategy which in turn results in the Nash 
Equilibrium). Second, the next solution concept assumes communication occurs and both 
states correlate their strategies so as to gain a collective super-additive benefit (i.e., a 
surplus) if one exists. This resulting solution concept is a Pareto improvement over the 
initial Nash Equilibrium (where at least one state improves its payoff). This is 
mathematically represented in Equation (3.1.1) where u represents a generic cost function 
based on each i’th state’s cost, xi. 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ ≥ +  
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2,
max max max
x x x x
u x u x u x u x   (3.1.1) 
 
Last, using bargaining strategies, the methodology provides the visualization of forming 
a coalition between the two states where the surplus can be divided between the two. Fair 
division of the surplus introduces the concept of utility transferability and can be 
accomplished ex post by way of side payments between the players.83  
 
3.1.1. Defining the Game  
The game consists of two states, A and B, serving in the following roles: State A 
is a potential source of a nuclear weapon being confiscated by a non-state adversary and 
State B is the potential target state against which said nuclear weapon would be used. As 
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the source state, State A concentrates its annual strategic nuclear-security costs, CA, on 
securing its nuclear weapons and State B, as the potential target state, invests its annual 
strategic costs, CB, into a system for interdicting any potential nuclear threat at its borders. 
As a function of these investments, threat costs, TA and TB, represent the effect of said 
investment and the financial consequences of CA and CB. The total annual cost of the 
state’s nuclear security strategy, TCi, is the sum of the strategic, Ci, and threat costs, Ti. In 
looking for a minimal total cost, each state must optimize the balance between these two 
constituents. Herein this work, all costs are non-negatived and continuous for both states. 
Contrary to discrete games, continuous games allow for numerical strategies to consist of 
any real number (not just integers). The levels of commitment are defined by a set of all 
non-negative real numbers, ℛ+ = [0,∞), signifying annualized costs interpreted as 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ∈
ℛ+.e Each state seeks to minimize its total cost, TCi, based on Equations (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) 
below. 
 ( ) ( )= +A A A A ATC C C T C   (3.1.2) 
 ( ) ( )= +, ,B A B B B A BTC C C C T C C  (3.1.3) 
It is both useful and reasonable to assume the threat costs have certain properties – these 
are discussed in the following Section 3.2.  
                                               
d Strategic costs of either state can be negative. For example, if the source state chooses a strategy consisting of 
negative strategic costs, this would imply a decision to de-invest in its own security. If the target state chooses 
negative costs, it would be ensuring less interdiction capabilities for itself. It can be implied that the financial shortfalls 
resulting from the negative strategic costs can come from elsewhere outside the bilateral regime’s structure but the 
model is not designed for this situation currently. 
e Ostensibly, the cost to a state of a nuclear attack is substantial. A future modification to the methodology could 
annualize the costs of an attack (e.g., have the consequential costs pro-rated for a decade or one generation) but in the 
current incarnation of this methodology, we make a conservative assumption by front-loading the entire threat cost as 
a generic, worst possible scenario.   
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When considering State A’s total cost, both strategic costs, CA, and threat costs, 
TA, are used. As shown in Figure 3.1, the profile of TCA is based on Equation (3.1.2). The 
initial point, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 0) = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, reflects a worst-case scenario of the highest 
potentially realizable threat cost (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 an as-yet undefined maximum threat value when 
nothing is spent on securing nuclear material). Other characteristics of TCA are 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(0,∞) ={𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 0}; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴)𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 < 0; and 𝑑𝑑2𝑑𝑑(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴)𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴2 > 0.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Total cost profile for State A 
 
 
State B’s threat cost is not only the cost of an inadequately funded interdiction 
system (financially defined as CB) but it is also dependent on State A’s level of investment 
in their security considering an asset from A can be used against B. It is for this reason 
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that B’s threat cost is not independent of A’s strategy of securing its nuclear assets. 
Plotting an indicative trend for State B’s threat cost based on both CA and CB would require 
the addition of a third dimension on the z-axis that would represent State A’s investment 
(as shown in Figure 3.2 for illustrative purposes only).  
 
  
 
Figure 3.2. Trend of TCB (z-axis) based on CA and CB (x- and y-axis) 
 
 
Analogously for State B, Figure 3.3 shows the three-dimensional plot of B’s total cost 
function, per Equation (3.1.3). 
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Figure 3.3. Total cost profile for State B 
 
 
As stated in the preamble of this section, the first task is identifying the solution 
concept of the uncorrelated strategies between the states where each state determines the 
required strategic costs needed to minimize the total annualized costs, TCA and TCB, as 
shown in Equations (3.1.2) and (3.1.3). Below, Equations (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) show both 
summed to form the aggregate TCAB – to be discussed in more detail in Subsection 3.2.1. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )= +, ,AB A B A A B A BTC C C TC C TC C C   (3.1.4) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )= + + +, ,AB A B A A A B B A BTC C C C T C C T C C  (3.1.5) 
. 
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The uncorrelated solution concept is based on the assumption that each states 
seeks independently to minimize its individual total cost, without any regardf for the total 
cost of the other. This consists of defining each state’s strategic cost (when acting 
independently) that would minimize their total cost. For State A, this is shown as Equation 
(3.1.6). Due to State B’s threat cost being dependent on State A’s strategy, State B should 
assume State A will set its strategy point at 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  and define its own strategy, 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ , in response 
a la Equation (3.1.7).  
 ( )
≥
=   
0
' argmin
A
A A A
C
C TC C   (3.1.6) 
 ( )
≥
=   
0
' argmin ' ,
B
B B A B
C
C TC C C   (3.1.7) 
Strategy set (𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵) is a Nash Equilibrium because State B’s response is the best 
response to State A’s own best strategy. This is the initial focal point for study in the 
included case studies in Chapter 4-8. Inserting (𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵) into Equation (3.1.4) yields the 
solution concept 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵) as shown in Equation (3.1.8): 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )= +' ' , ' ' ' ' ' , 'AB A B A A B A BTC C C TC C TC C C   (3.1.8) 
 
An alternative solution concept is when State A decides to change its strategy 
causing State B to reconsider its own strategy. For example, given that State B is the U.S. 
                                               
f “Without regard” refers to neither state having intent to help the other by decreasing its costs or harm it by increasing 
those costs. 
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and State A is a nondescript state with nuclear assets needing to be secured, the U.S. can 
adopt a strategy under the assumption that State A does not invest in its own security, 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 0. Conclusively, State A seeks to minimize the U.S.’s maximum utility and 
therefore, causes the U.S. to redefine its own strategic cost, 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 (where the superscript ‘m’ 
refers to the minimax strategy) as such: 
 ( )
0 0
argmin argmax , ,
B A
m
B B B A B B
C C
C TC TC C C C
≥ ≥
  =       
  (3.1.9) 
  
Conversely, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 = 0 so Equation (3.1.9) is reduced to Equation (3.1.10): 
 ( )
≥
=   
0
argmin 0,
B
m
B B B
C
C TC C    (3.1.10) 
Therefore, State B’s strategy at the minimax focal point as shown in Equation 
(3.1.10) results from its potential partner, State A, investing nothing in nuclear security. 
The resulting strategy set (0,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚) is the minimax strategy.  
Another solution concept results from States A and B correlating their strategies. 
This solution concept is determined by summing the two states’ total cost objective 
functions and then determining the values of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 that minimizes the regime’s total 
cost. Equation (3.1.11) conveys this by solving for the cooperative solution concept, 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵
∗ (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) where 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗  are the correlated strategies. 
 ( ) ( )
≥ ≥
=   
* * *
0, 0
, min ,
A B
AB A B AB A BC C
TC C C TC C C    (3.1.11) 
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Within this methodology, Equation (3.1.11) can be solved analytically as well as 
by using a number of readily-available computational tools: Microsoft Excel’s solver or 
MatLab’s suite of optimization functions (including fminsearch, fminunc, and fmincon). 
In the case studies of Chapters 4-8, the fmincon function in MatLab is used to determine 
the minimum TCAB (in Chapters 4 and 5, the solution is first completed by hand). As shown 
in Figure 3.3, a minimum exists when the first derivative near 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗  are negative and 
the second derivative of the characteristic function is positive. – this is discussed in more 
detail in Subsection 3.3.2. Figure 3.4 is an illustrative example of 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗ (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Global minimum of TCAB using MATLAB’s fmincon function 
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As discussed in Section 2.3, the difference between 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵′  and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗  is referred to 
as the “surplus.” But actually establishing a cooperative bilateral regime requires the 
division of said surplus via bargaining solutions between the players. The negotiation of 
the division of the surplus, v, is the metric by which either state will maintain or forego 
the bilateral regime.  
 = − *'AB ABv TC TC   (3.1.12) 
 
How this surplus is distributed through negotiations segues into the concept of 
utility transferability between the states (discussed in more detail in Subsection 3.2.2). 
Depending on how this is achieved, transferability can impact whether a bilateral 
arrangement is established as well as successfully maintained. Furthermore, transferring 
utility is a vital component in cooperative game theory (specifically in coalition games) 
but is reliant on trust and commitment between the players (discussed later in Section 3.3).  
 
3.1.2. Parameters of the Threat Cost 
Before delving into more detail of the solution concepts, let us first discuss how 
the characteristic functions are formed. The threat cost, Ti, used in Equation (3.1.2) is 
deconstructed to adequately define the game models. With the understanding that Ci is the 
cost of the state’s security or interdiction, the realized threat cost, Ti, is based on that 
investment, Ci. The threat cost term of that equation is based on a conventional risk 
equation used in the nuclear safety industry comprised of the product of the frequency of 
a catastrophic safety event per unit time and the consequence of said event in terms of its 
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magnitude.84 Additionally, a conditional probability is included to signify the potentiality 
of an attack against a state. Overall (as previously alluded to in Section 3.1.1), the threat 
cost is characterized by the law of diminishing marginal utility: as a state invests in the 
security of its nuclear assets or the interdiction methods at its borders and after the initial 
benefit of a non-zero investment is realized, the impact of each additional unit of 
investment is reduced. State A’s primary objective from the first game model is to secure 
the nuclear asset so as to prevent a potential attack on itself or B. State A’s annual threat 
cost (deconstructed in Equation (3.1.13)) is based on a loss rate function, 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) which is 
dependent on the cost of securing State A’s nuclear assets, CA. In addition, the conditional 
probability of an attack on State A once an asset is out of its control (PA), and the 
subsequent consequence to A (KA) are also present. The parameters shown below are 
values obtained and determined from real-world data.  
 ( ) ( )= ⋅ ⋅A A A A AT C L C P K   (3.1.13) 
State B’s threat cost, TB, is displayed in Equation (3.1.14) below. Here, CB is the annual 
amount State B invests in its interdiction capabilities. PB is the non-interdiction probability 
for State B’s functional nuclear material interdiction system (which is dependent on the 
investment of State B in its interdiction capabilities, CB). KB is the expected cost to State 
B of a nuclear attack against it by a terrorist organization (regardless from where the 
weapon is attained). L(CA) is the same aforementioned loss function (notice the 
dependence on State A’s investment in security). The gamma parameter, Γ, conveys an 
attempt at considering other potential sources of a weapon for the non-descript, non-state 
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adversary acquired outside of State A (otherwise, referred to later in this work as the asset 
source balance).   
 ( ) ( ) ( )= + Γ ⋅ ⋅  ,B A B A B B BT C C L C P C K   (3.1.14) 
Arguably, Equation (3.1.14) could incorporate the antithesis of PA from Equation 
(3.1.13) as a way to signify that State B would face the threat of any probable nuclear 
attack not committed against State A, but this would be an unrealistic assumption in the 
real world and therefore is not considered in any model presented herein. This assumption 
however can be a modification encompassed an area of future work beyond the scope of 
this presented work. 
It is necessary to discuss the parameters of the threat costs because they contribute 
to the total costs for each state and the regime per the first two game models respectively. 
The parameters are presented with various assumptions and example estimations in this 
section. Though numbers in the following subsections are shown with multiple significant 
digits, numbers in the actual case studies must be read as estimates valid to no more than 
two significant digits at best (Section 3.5 includes a more detailed discussion).  
 
3.1.2.1. Loss Function  
States with nuclear weapons invest substantial efforts in developing and 
maintaining such a capability. It is reasonable to assume that the state would therefore 
protect these high-valued assets (nuclear weapons or special nuclear material) against 
threats to some level of physical security above and beyond the baseline level that would 
be provided by prudent owners of any similarly valued objects and the general level of 
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law and order prevailing in the state.  This baseline would depend upon characteristics that 
fall outside our model, such as the state’s economic situation, level of openness as a 
democracy, overall form of government, etc.  
The loss rate, L(CA), as it appears in the threat cost formulae, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) and 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) as shown in Equations (3.1.13) and (3.1.14), exhibits the following four 
properties that, in reality, also satisfy requirements of the threat cost formulae (included 
in Subsection 3.1.1).  
1) lim
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴→0
𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) = 𝛼𝛼 – as the annual investment into State A’s nuclear security 
(resources devoted to A’s strategic cost) decreases towards 0 (no additional 
investment outside the baseline cost), the annual loss approaches a certain limit of 
α (in terms of 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
 or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
 , as is discussed in more detail in Subsection 3.2.1.1); 
2) lim
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴→∞
𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) = 0 – as investment into State A’s security increases to infinity, the 
“perfect” case of no loss is approached (hence, TA = 0); 
3) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴
< 0 – as State A invests in its strategic costs, the loss rate is always being 
reduced; and 
4) 𝑑𝑑
2𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴
2 > 0 – as State A devotes more resources to security, the magnitude of the 
marginal reduction in threat costs is reduced (i.e., exhibiting the law of diminished 
returns). 
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Various functions can meet the assumptions outlined above. In the case of this 
work, the loss rate function is exponential and has units similar to α: 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
 or 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
. 
 
 ( ) ACAL C e λα − ⋅= ⋅   (3.1.15) 
 
Specifically for this work, L(CA) is in terms of an annual loss rate of a nuclear asset 
from State A’s control. As mentioned in Subsection 1.3.2, the term “asset” implies a 
nuclear weapon under State A’s control as part of State A’s nuclear weapons program or 
an amount of special nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) where the 
fact of assembling a nuclear weapon cannot be discounted (i.e., a significant quantity or 
SQ).38 Τhe loss rate as seen by State A in a year when CA = 0 is α – otherwise considered 
the maximum loss. As presented in Equation (3.1.15), lambda, λ (in terms of $M-1) is the 
reduction in loss rate per unit increase in strategic cost – otherwise, considered the relative 
marginal loss rate. A negative exponential trend conveys the concept that when funding 
for securing weapons suffers (i.e., decreases), the loss rate (and hence the total cost to the 
regime) increases.  
In order to convey how α could be estimated, 1994 nuclear trafficking data are 
presented in Table 3.1, with Russia as State A and the United States as State B. This is the 
value of α used for a later case study modeling U.S.-Russian relations in 1995. Values of 
α for other case studies are specifically discussed in each respective case study in Chapters 
4, 6, 7, and 8.  
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Table 3.1. Nuclear trafficking events in 1994 
Month  Location of Confiscation Material Mass [g] SQ 
March St. Petersberg, Russia HEU (90%) 2972 0.107 
May Tengen-Wiechs, Germany Pu 6.2 0.000775 
June Landshut, Germany HEU (87.7%) 0.795 2.788e-5 
July Munich, Germany Pu 0.24 0.00003 
August Munich Airport, Germany Pu 363.4 0.045425 
December Prague, Czech Republic HEU (87.7%) 2730 0.095768 
TOTAL    0.249 
 
 
The total SQ value shown in Table 3.1 was determined by tallying nuclear material 
trafficking data (for anything over 20% 235U, 25kg of 235U = 1 SQ; 8kg plutonium = 1 SQ) 
confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in terms of SQs. By 
modifying Equation (3.1.15) into Equation (3.1.16) below, we are able to estimate α for 
1994 and use this value for the subsequent case study year of 1995 to be discussed later in 
Chapter 5: 
 ( ) λα ⋅= ⋅ iCiL C e   (3.1.16) 
 
We assume C94 = 0M USD due to published conclusions stating that American 
assistance programs for nuclear security in Russia had not yet produced tangible results 
and the claim that accounting for and storing nuclear materials was in need of substantial 
improvement after “a series of highly publicized incidents of theft and smuggling of 
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Russian nuclear materials.”34,85 The total recorded loss, α, attributed to Russia from that 
year then was 0.249 SQ
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
 per the modified Equation (3.1.16): 
 
94
94
(0)0.249
SQ0.249
CL e
e
yr
λ
λ
α
α
α
⋅
⋅
= ⋅
= ⋅
 
=  
 
  
 
This value of α was estimated for 1994 as well as for Case Study 2 in Chapter 5.  
 
Furthermore, when 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 > 0, the value for λ must also be considered. As previously 
mentioned, λ, as shown in Equation (3.1.15) represents the relative marginal loss rate of 
State A’s additional investment in its security – i.e., the reduction in loss rate per unit 
increase of strategic investment. This is completed in Chapter 5 (the 1995 case study) and 
moreover, as computed in Subsection 5.1.1, both α and λ are computed with 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 0. 
Mathematically, λ is defined in Equation (3.1.17): 
 
 
( ) ( )A A
A
dL C
L C
dC
λ= − ⋅    
 
( )
( )1 A
A A
dL C
L C dC
λ
 
= − ⋅  
 
  (3.1.17) 
 
Conceptually, Equation (3.1.17) conveys the definition of λ as the absolute 
marginal loss rate per 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴); otherwise, the relative marginal loss rate. Modifying 
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Equation (3.1.15) (shown as Equation (3.1.18) below) provides the manner in which 
specific values of λ were determined for each case study in Chapters 4-8.  
 
 
( )
λ
α
 
 = ⋅
−   
1 ln
ACT
A
ACT
A
L C
C
  (3.1.18) 
For this, actual values of 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴were gleaned from publications and, with 
an estimated α value, λ was computed. This particular value of λ per case study was used 
because the assumption was made that this was the state’s own best assumption for its 
relative marginal loss rate. By using the state’s estimated λ, strategy sets and solution 
concepts were computed and evaluated per the methodology for each case study in 
Chapters 4-8.  
In Section 9.2, a re-assessment is made for the various Russia-US case studies 
where 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 > 0. Both α and λ are estimated simultaneously by plotting data points for 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 
and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 and fitting a non-linear regression line to the data using the least-squares method. 
Results are discussed there and compared with the initial engineering judgement of the 
author as presented in this subsection. 
 
3.1.2.2. Conditional Probability of a Successful Attack 
Recalling Equation (3.1.13), PA, appears as the conditional probability of a 
successful attack on State A by a non-state adversary assuming an asset was removed from 
State A’s control. State A’s competency in securing the asset itself is not factored into PA 
– the security system in place is conceptually under the loss rate which includes the 
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concept of an adversary gaining access into an asset’s storage site and acquiring the asset 
itself (as presented in Subsection 3.2.1). The focus of PA is what the non-state adversary 
is able to accomplish once the asset is under his/her control. From here, there are two 
considered scenarios. The first consists of the adversary attaining control of the asset but 
does not remove it (due to a physical security system component such as the detection 
system or the response force or to the adversary’s preferred intent of making a statement 
by detonating an asset on site). Subsequently, they then detonate while on site. The second 
scenario consists of the adversary gaining control of the asset, successfully removing it 
from the site, transporting it successfully to the final target for detonation and detonating 
it. In both scenarios, each mentioned step has a probability of success for the adversary. 
In scenario 1 (on-site detonation), fewer steps are involved and hence, the value for PA can 
be more than that of for scenario 2 (where more uncertainty occurs due to the number of 
steps that must take place). The consequence of such a detonation, however, would 
arguably be less than a transported weapon to a highly populated area due to the 
assumption that sites storing nuclear materials are more likely to be in sparsely populated 
areas with a nearby military presence.86 In scenario 2 (at-target detonation), the asset must 
be removed successfully from the site (in light of the military presence and remote location 
of most nuclear asset storage sites) and transported to the final detonation point. The latter 
step would require an inadequacy of State A’s recovery (and defensive) effort that 
associates another layer of uncertainty for the non-state adversary. If successful, however, 
the potential consequence of a detonation in a highly populated area can be substantially 
higher than that of the first scenario. The parameter value for PA in both scenarios is highly 
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dependent on State A’s competency of either addressing the threat on site or recovering 
and preventing its eventual use in an attack.  
 
Other factors incorporated into the value of PA depend on the non-state adversary 
and present more uncertainty in the computation of the total probability of an attack when 
combined in some form: 
• The adversary’s intent in either making a statement or causing death and 
destruction 
• The site’s security system detecting the adversary’s incursion 
• The site’s security system correctly assessing the adversary’s incursion 
• The adversary’s level of collusion with a potential insider 
• The adversary gaining control of the asset 
• The site’s security system responding to the adversary’s incursion in time 
• The site’s security system neutralizing the adversary 
• The adversary’s ability to detonate the asset (if a weapon) on site 
• The adversary’s ability to remove the asset from the site 
• The adversary’s ability to transport the asset away from the site 
• The site’s and state’s abilities to recover the asset 
• The adversary’s ability to weaponize the asset (if bulk fissile material) 
• The adversary’s willingness in using its first attained asset 
• The adversary’s ability to transport the asset to the target point 
• The adversary’s ability to detonate the asset at the target point 
67 
First discussed in 2003, Bunn et. al. listed nine fundamental steps along the 
terrorist’s pathway to a nuclear device where each one had its own associated probability 
of the terrorist completing that step, Pi.87  
Table 3.2. Nine steps to nuclear terrorism 
Steps Action 
S1 Form a highly capable group with extreme objectives 
S2 Decide to escalate to the nuclear level of violence 
S3 Steal nuclear weapons material 
S4 Acquire nuclear weapons material 
S5 Smuggle material to safe haven 
S6 Construct nuclear explosive device 
S7 Smuggle nuclear explosive device into target country 
S8 Transport nuclear explosive device to target location 
S9 Detonate nuclear explosive device 
Using the nine steps in Table 3.2, Maerli devises a simple multiplicative method 
for combining each probability, Pi, into P.88 In 2006, Bunn revisited the steps and 
incorporated, among others, concepts of collusion with an insider and black market 
acquisition into Ps(k) or the probability that any given acquisition attempt k will be 
successful and ultimately lead to a terrorist nuclear attack.89 Interestingly, he also devised 
two further probabilities that are used within this methodology: the success of converting 
“the acquired items to a nuclear capability” and “delivering and detonating the bomb once 
acquired.”89 His formula for Ps(k) in Equation (3.1.19) includes the probabilities Po(j), Pi(j), 
   
68 
 
Pb(j), and Pn(j) for a nuclear terrorist group j attempt a theft as an outsider from a facility, a 
theft with a facility insider, an acquisition of a nuclear asset on the black market, and the 
provision of the asset from a nation state. Each attempt k has some probability of being 
successful, s: Pos(j,k), Pis(j,k), Pbs(j,k), and Pns(j,k). Pw(j,k) is the probability of converting the 
asset into “a workable nuclear explosive that would in fact detonate” and Pd(j,k) is the 
probability the adversary will “decide to, and be able to, deliver the bomb to its intended 
target and detonate it” (Bunn, p. 105).89  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )s k o j os j k i j is j k b j bs j k n j ns j k w j k d j kP P P P P P P P P P P= × + × + × + × ⋅ ×   (3.1.19) 
Bunn’s 2006 work provides the opportunity to draw differences between the on-
site and at-target probabilities for the methodology described in this work.89 Whereas 
Equation (3.1.19) explicitly deconstructs various acquisition attempts through an outsider 
attack, an insider attack, a black market acquisition, or a state provision, the methodology 
herein reduces this probability to merely gaining an asset from a facility/site. Only the 
outsider/insider difference can affect this probability. This, echoing some of Bunn’s 
parameters and indices (a terrorist adversary j attempts an attack k), we simplify PA(j,k) as 
such: 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )A j k a j k s j k r j k w j k d j kP P P P P P= × × × ×   (3.1.20) 
Equation (3.1.20) uses Pa(j,k), Ps(j,k), Pr(j,k), Pw(j,k), and Pd(j,k) for multiplicatively determining 
PA(j,k) where  
• Pa(j,k) is the probability of an attempt, k, to attack a facility with an asset by a 
terrorist j;  
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• Ps(j,k) is the probability of a successful acquisition of a nuclear asset from attempt 
k by terrorist j;  
• Pr(j,k) is the probability of terrorist j removing an acquired nuclear asset from the 
facility that has been attacked in attempt k;  
• Pw(j,k) is the probability that terrorist j will weaponize the asset taken during attempt 
k into a nuclear capability able to detonate on command (echoing Bunn’s 2006 
description); and 
• Pd(j,k) is the probability that terrorist j will decide to, deliver to, and detonate the 
weaponized asset taken during attempt k. 
 
Therefore, referring to the two aforementioned scenarios, PA(j,k), defined by 
Equation (3.1.20), can be modified to reflect either an on-site (where only Pa(j,k) and Ps(j,k) 
are of importance) or an at-target (where all five probabilities matter) nuclear terrorist 
attack. The consideration between probabilities for the on-site and at-target scenarios is 
discussed in more detail in Subsection 9.4. In sum, the PA values used in Chapters 4-8 are 
estimates for the methodology to produce quantitative results that are intended to evoke 
more discussion. 
 
3.1.2.3. Cost of Detonation  
The parameter Ki appears in both Equations (3.1.13) and (3.1.14) and occurs in 
either the on-site or the at-target scenario introduced in the previous subsection. The 
former is discussed after the latter in this subsection. Overall, Ki is the expected 
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consequences (in terms of cost) of a successful attack on a state. Specifically, KA is the 
consequence of a successful (on-site or at-target) attack on State A using an asset obtained 
from State A and KB is the consequence of a successful attack on State B using an asset 
obtained from State A. Generally, calculating Ki necessitates parsing the parameter into 
smaller, more manageable constituents as shown in Equation (3.1.21) – specifically for a 
successful at-target attack.90 
 = + +hu ec ini i i iK K K K   (3.1.21) 
The individual costs from the loss of lives (Khu), the economic impact (Kec) of such 
losses, and the loss of national infrastructure (Kin) contribute additively to the overall 
consequences. For example, assuming State B is the U.S., an at-target attack on the current 
largest impact target (read: highest population density) would be on Manhattan, New York 
City (with a maximum population density of 25,846 people per square kilometer)91 This 
is used as an example for calculating Khu. With an estimated yield of 10 kilotons (kT) for 
an improvised nuclear detonation comprised of highly enriched uranium, a surface 
detonation could create an air blast of 5 psi of overpressure at a radius of 0.77 km.92 This 
is enough for widespread fatalities due to collapsing buildings especially in a highly 
populated area such as New York City (0.77-km blast radius is shown in yellow in Figure 
3.5 on Manhattan Island – used herein as part of Google Earth’s fair use copyright 
policy).93  
 
   
71 
 
 
Figure 3.5. 5-psi blast radius of 10-kT device on Manhattan 
 
 
According to a medical study on nuclear war by Daugherty et al., the number of 
fatalities from the 15kT Hiroshima detonation was 50% at approximately 7.5 psi (as shown 
in Figure 3.6).94  
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Figure 3.6. Hiroshima casualty rates 
 
 
 [ ] [ ]π   = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
2
2
ppl 50% fatality VSL
km
hu
bK r   (3.1.22) 
Using 7.5 psi as the peak blast pressure limit with a 10kT detonation produces a 
radius with a blast range, rb, of 0.77km.95 Using this value for rb and the 2016 value of 
human life set at $9.6 million, the consequence of the immediate loss of life in 2016 
assuming NYC’s maximum population density, Khu, is computed at 96.84B USD per 
Equation (3.1.22).96  
( ) [ ]π     = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =       
2
2
ppl $9.6M25,846 0.77km 0.5 $231,081M
km person
huK  
For the same year, the associated economic loss (Kec) from losing that number of 
people, in $M, is computed by taking the population density and multiplying by the area 
at that blast radius, a 50% fatality rate, and the gross domestic product per capita. Inputting 
   
73 
 
similar values from the example above into Equation (3.1.23) and with 2015 GDP per 
capita in the U.S. as $56,115 yields 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 1,351M USD.97 
 [ ]2 per capita2
ppl 50% fatality GDP
km
ec
bK rπ
     = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅     
  (3.1.23) 
 
Effects on a state’s infrastructure (Kin) depend on the location of an attack and can 
include replacing telecommunications, resurrecting homes, reestablish electricity 
distribution, rebuilding transportation means, mitigating societal fears, and, in general, 
recovering to normalcy. Quantified values of such critical infrastructure reestablishment 
were found by studying losses from and reconstruction costs after (both natural and man-
made) catastrophic events: the 2015 Nepal earthquake, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 
2008 Sichuan earthquake, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the 2008 Hurricane Ike, the 2012 
Hurricane Sandy, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident, and the 2011 Fukushima-Daichi 
incident. Numbers for recovery and reconstruction range drastically depending on 
infrastructure capabilities prior to any event, number of people displaced or otherwise 
impacted, the severity of the event, and more. For example, as of March 2016, the 
reconstruction and recovery costs associated with the Fukushima-Daichi incident in Japan 
has been estimated to exceed $250 billion.98 However, for the reconstruction and recovery 
of the island nation of Haiti after its 2010 earthquake, the estimated amount was stated as 
$14 billion.99  
Case studies 1-5 presented in Chapters 4-8 use computed values for Ki that are 
based on published literature. An example estimation for an at-target Ki uses a 10kT 
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nuclear terrorist’s device (either a stolen 10kT device or a manufactured one using stolen 
fissile material) to attack 2016 NYC and consists of 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑢𝑢 = 231,081M USD, 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =1,351M USD, and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 67,600M USD (based on a recovery estimate from the 2012 
Hurricane Sandy natural disaster in NYC). Therefore, 𝐿𝐿16 = 231,081 + 1,351 +67,600 = 300B USD. 
For estimating Ki for a successful on-site attack, the measure of the adversary’s 
success is lower than that of the former discussion. Particularly, a non-state adversary 
infiltrating a site with nuclear assets, gaining control over at least one asset, and detonating 
it requires fewer steps than physically removing the asset and transporting it to a target. 
For this reason, the on-site consequence is estimated at 10% of the consequence for the 
at-target attack. Various reasons for this assumption are that if an adversary were to 
detonate an asset located at a site (either storage or military), the potential impact would 
be arguably less because usually sites with nuclear assets are located away from heavily 
populated areas (assumed at about 1%). Moreover, the investment in the proximate 
humans to a storage or military facility would increase that value by at least one order of 
magnitude due to the increased investment in handlers, operators, and/or soldiers located 
at the site. Hence, the supposed impact on human life, economic loss, and infrastructure 
can be relaxed to roughly 10% for computation purposes in Chapters 4-8.   
For each case study, the at-target consequence is used to evaluate TA. Subsection 
9.4 provides a comparison between the consequence on State A of an on-site detonation 
and an at-target detonation.  
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3.1.2.4. Non-interdiction Probability and µ Value 
The parameter for non-interdiction probability, PB(CB) (cf. Eq. (3.2.1), is based on 
two factors: the invested cost on interdiction, CB, and the marginal reduction rate from 
each investment, µ. The form of the relationship is shown in Equation (3.1.24).  
 ( ) BCB BP C e µ− ⋅=   (3.1.24) 
In an assumption taken from a similar field (i.e., international safeguards), the non-
interdiction probability, PB, is set at 5%.100 This threshold is chosen following many 
instances in similar industries where a 95% probability is accepted and stated as a 
reasonable goal: the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Authority guide on nuclear material physical 
inventories and the Australian safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office’s publication on 
how the IAEA safeguards measures support detecting undeclared nuclear activities.101,102 
The range of PB is 0 to 1 and relates to the CB range of infinity to 0, respectively. With 5% 
set as a plausible non-interdiction probability and an actual annual investment cost gleaned 
from published literature, the value of µ for year y is determined via Equation (3.1.25) 
below. 
 ( )µ −  = ⋅  
1 ln ACTy B BACT
B
P C
C
  (3.1.25) 
For each year of a case study, µ will be estimated using published values of CB and 
a plausible assumption for PB explained in each chapter. Additionally in Section 9.2, a 
reassessment of the final strategies will be discussed with adjusted values of µ as 
determined by a non-linear regression line similar to what was mentioned in Subsection 
3.2.1.  
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3.1.2.5. Expanding the Potential Source of the Asset 
When concerned with the defined threat cost for State B, the parameter Γ 
represents the potential for a source of a nuclear asset to originate from beyond State A 
(i.e., to expand the source from where the asset comes). Though the bilateral arrangements 
discussed throughout this document express the primary source is State A, in reality, State 
B should support an interdiction system independent of the asset’s source. If only State A 
should be considered the origin of a threatening asset to State B, Γ = 0. If it is to be 
assumed that an asset threatening State B can originate equally from State A as not State 
A, then Γ = L(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) – this implies the likelihood from State A still outweighs the likelihood 
from all other nuclearly capable nation states. If the origin of the asset is more likely to 
come from outside State A, then Γ > L(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴). The discussion for each case study includes 
more details for parameter Γ per year.  
 
3.1.3. Results in Terms of Percent Utility Gained 
The methodology developed in this dissertation lends itself to the creation of a 
basic method for evaluating utility gained or lost through correlating strategies.  Assume 
the Nash Equilibrium solution concept (exhibiting uncorrelated strategies) as a baseline 
from which to compute players’ utilities and the received utilities of any subsequent 
solution concept is compared to that. In an effort to quantify the change of utilities, results 
for each case study are presented near the end of each chapter’s case study as a percent 
additional utility received by each state and the regime. The uncorrelated total cost from 
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the NE is used as a baseline, TCUNC. Any subsequent strategy, TCx, is then evaluated 
against TCUNC as shown in Equation (3.1.26): 
 
∆ = −
∆
=
−
=
%
%
UNC x
UNC
UNC x
UNC
U TC TC
UU
TC
TC TCU
TC
 
 = −% 1 x
UNC
TCU
TC
  (3.1.26) 
As will be shown in the final sections of Chapters 4-8, when the utility dynamics 
calculated via Equation (3.1.26) above are positive for both states, then both states could 
receive a positive benefit in the regime. A negative number represents when no benefit 
results and, furthermore, a state may then experience an increase in its total costs.  
 
3.2. Determining the Solution Concepts 
 As was discussed in Chapter 2, the bulk of traditional game theory consists of non-
cooperative game theory (NCGT) – analyzing players’ decisions and utilities in response 
to other players’ actions. Assuredly, NCGT does not imply that players never cooperate 
in a game – only that they will cooperate if there is something to gain. Cooperative solution 
concepts arise when players decide to coordinate their strategies to achieve a mutually 
beneficial Pareto Optimum that is not a Nash Equilibrium (recalling the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game of subsection 2.4 where either player is tempted to change their strategy 
to increase their payoff). The present work begins by determining two solution concepts 
in a two-state game (consisting of uncorrelated and correlated strategies) and then 
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determining a bargaining solution concept that evaluates the benefits of cooperation for 
both players.  
In section 3.1 we describe the frame upon which the methodology is based (the 
concept of strategic and threats costs), the objectives guiding the use of the methodology, 
the construction of the characteristic functions for both states, and a method used in each 
case study on how one could convey results. Within this section, we discuss the 
determination of solution concepts. Below are six assumptions for State A’s characteristic 
function for computing its utility:    
1. The threat cost of State A, TA, is a function of State A’s strategic cost, CA – 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
2. TA is in terms of positive cost – with these models, cost is positive  
3. The derivative of TA is negative – this signifies that for each incremental 
investment made, there is a reduction in threat 
4. The second derivative of TA is positive – this signifies the nature by which with 
each subsequent increment of strategic cost, the observed reduction in threat 
decreases (otherwise, subjected to diminishing returns) 
5. If there is no strategic investment, the threat cost, TA, will exhibit a maximum cost 
6. As the level of strategic investment approaches infinity, the threat cost will 
asymptotically approach 0. 
 
Conversely, State B’s utility characteristic function assumes much the same as above 
except for two elements: 
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1. The threat cost of State B, TB, is a function of State B’s strategic investment, CB, 
and of State A’s strategic investment, CA.  
2. The addition of an asset source expansion parameter, Γ, signifies the potential for 
a source of the nuclear threat against State B and leads to a possible positive slope 
for TB (as 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 → ∞ but not as 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 → ∞).  
With the above assumptions in mind, the uncorrelated and correlated strategies for States 
A and B are described in Subsection 3.2.1. Subsection 3.2.2 includes the bargaining 
solution that utilizes a cooperative game theoretic approach.  
 
3.2.1. Uncorrelated and Correlated Solution Concepts  
As discussed in Subsection 3.1.1, within non-cooperative game theory, two players 
in a game will evaluate and decide strategies to maximize their own payoffs while 
assuming the other player will do the same. If a player’s individual payoff can be increased 
by coordinating a strategy with the other player, then cooperation may result. The former 
solution concept resulting from both players choosing their respective best-response 
strategies (to the other player’s assumed strategy) yields the Nash Equilibrium. In the 
methodology described herein, this is referred to as the uncorrelated solution concept. The 
latter results from the presence of an additional benefit that can be had by the players 
coordinating their strategies – i.e., the correlated solution concept.  
Specifically in this work, the first defined game model consists of state-level 
players, States A and B, coming to a Nash Equilibrium by considering their options and 
adopting a respective uncorrelated strategy that would provide the highest expected 
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utility. The second game model is defined as both states correlating their strategies to 
attain a potential additional payoff (a decrease of total costs). When the surplus is present, 
the states’ correlate their strategies within the bilateral regime and then proceed to the 
bargaining solutions discussed later in Subsection 3.2.2. Below, we step through the 
process of solving for the uncorrelated and correlated strategies for both State A (the 
source state) and State B (the target state) focuses on interdicting any asset used for an 
attack at its borders.  
Computing the uncorrelated solution concept requires recalling Equation (3.1.6) 
and solving for the minimized strategic cost for State A, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  by solving when 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴
𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴
= 0. 
Based on State A’s threat cost (Equation (3.1.13) in the previous Subsection 3.1.2), the 
following derivation begins with Equation (3.2.1):  
 ( ) ACA A A A ATC C C P K e λα − ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅    (3.2.1) 
'
'
'
'
1 0
1
1
1ln '
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A A
A
A
CA
A A
A C C
C
A A
C
A A
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A A
dTC P K e
dC
P K e
e
P K
C
P K
λ
λ
λ
α λ
α λ
α λ
λ
α λ
− ⋅
=
− ⋅
− ⋅
= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
 
= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
                                 
 ( )1' lnA A AC P Kα λλ= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
  (3.2.2) 
Equation (3.2.2) is the specific solution to Equation (3.1.6) and is only valid when 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
′ > 0. As the four-factor term (𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝜆𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) decreases to 1, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ → 0. Therefore, when 
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(𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝜆𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) < 1, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  should equal zero. Conceptually, this implies that within the 
bilateral structure, State A is the only investor in its uncorrelated strategy of securing its 
assets and when it invests nothing, the four-variable term to be less than 1. Hence, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ =0. Conclusively, the two values for 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  can be written as 
 ( )α λ
λ
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 
1' max 0, lnA A AC P K   (3.2.3) 
Solving for 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′  requires using Equation (3.1.7) and determining at which point is 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ ,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) at a minimum over 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 > 0 (unless 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ = 0):  
 ( ) ( ), B AC CB A B B BTC C C C e K eµ λα− ⋅ − ⋅= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ   (3.2.4) 
 ( )µ λµ α− ⋅ − ⋅
= =
= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ =' '
' , '
1 0B A
A A B B
C CB
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B C C C C
dTC e K e
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µ α
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− ⋅ − ⋅
− ⋅
− ⋅
− ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ
=
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ
 
 − ⋅ =
 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ 
  
 ( )λµ α
µ
− ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ 
'1' ln ACB BC K e    (3.2.5) 
 
Similarly to Equation (3.2.3), 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 0 if �𝜇𝜇 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 ∙ �𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆∙𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + Γ�� < 1 due to the fact that 
this methodology currently assumes only non-negative values of costs (as discussed in 
Subsection 3.1.1). Therefore:  
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 ( )1' max 0, ln ACB BC K e λµ αµ
− ⋅  = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ   
  (3.2.6) 
Inserting the corresponding minimum values for  𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′  into Equations (3.3.1) 
and (3.3.4) yields the total costs for State A and State B, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵, respectively (with 
the two possible values of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ ).   
( )
( ) ( )
α
α λ α λ
λ λ λ
= = ⋅ ⋅
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
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− ⋅
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'
' (0,0)
1 1 1' 0, ln lnA
B B
C
B B B
TC K
TC K e K
 
( )
( ) ( )'
1' ln ,0
1 1 1 1' ln , ln lnA
B
B A A B
A A
C B
B A A B B
A A
KTC P K K
P K
KTC P K K e K
P K
λ
α λ
λ λ
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− ⋅
 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅Γ  ⋅ ⋅ 
   ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ = + + Γ ⋅ ⋅    ⋅ ⋅   
 
The sum of 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′  is the total cost, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵′  (shown in Equation (3.2.7)), of the 
regime’s uncorrelated strategies: State A securing its assets while State B invests in its 
interdiction methods. Values of parameters λ, PA, KA, KB, Γ, and µ (based on various 
literature findings for each case study described in Chapters 4-8) are needed to adequately 
evaluate 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  , 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ , and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵′ .  
 = +' ' 'AB A BTC TC TC    (3.2.7) 
To determine the states’ correlated strategies, the individual objective utility (cost) 
functions, Equations (3.2.1) and (3.2.4), are combined into one function (Equation (3.2.8) 
based on Equation (3.1.5)) and values of CA and CB are solved for when the aggregate 
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TCAB (first referenced in Subsection 3.1.1 and shown in Equation (3.2.8)) is at a minimum 
– otherwise, when the total derivative, 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 0 and when 𝑑𝑑2𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴2 > 0 and 𝑑𝑑2𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴2 > 0 
as shown in Equation (3.2.9) below. 
 ( ), A B AC C CAB A B A A A B BTC C C C P K e C e K eλ µ λα α− − −   = + + + + Γ      (3.2.8) 
And the function to solve for CA and CB as the minima: 
 ( ) ( )λ µ λα α− − −
≥ ≥
= + + + + Γ      
* * *
0, 0
, min A B A
A B
C C C
AB A B A A A B B
C C
TC C C C P K e C e K e    (3.2.9) 
 
If 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗) = 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) = 0, then strategy set 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗ (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) can be a 
global minimum when the second partial derivatives are also positive. If neither partial 
derivative equals zero, then the minimum probably occurs at some location where either 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 or 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 are negative. If this occurs, then the correlated strategy set is defined at the x- or 
y-axis for the strategic cost that is 0 and the non-negative value of the other state’s strategic 
value. The minima of these models, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗ , were assumed as the global minima due to the 
simplicity of the objective functions. Within the methodology for each case study, the 
difference between 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗  and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵′  is the surplus, v: 
 = − *'AB ABv TC TC    (3.2.10) 
Dividing the existing surplus between the two players provides the opportunity to visualize 
and consider various bargaining solutions between the players – the subject of the 
subsequent subsection.  
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3.2.2. Bargaining Solutions and Utility Transferability 
The existence of a surplus (as computed by Equation (3.2.10) above) provides an 
opportunity for the players to negotiate their expected utilities and plotting the optimal 
divisions of the surplus creates a linear utility transferability line in this case with a slope 
of -1 (i.e., a Pareto optimal efficiency frontier).103 With the cooperative game theoretic 
approach, States A and B act as two players who may form a solution concept consisting 
of their correlated strategies. This solution concept may yield a surplus that must be 
divided under some pre-negotiated terms to attain a bilateral nuclear security regime. The 
simplest example of a pre-negotiated bargaining solution is to simply share the surplus 
evenly to ensure fairness – otherwise, referred to as the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). 
In order to achieve the correlated solution concept though, one player may have to invest 
more strategic costs than required with their initial uncorrelated strategy. If a player cannot 
afford the investment, an idea is for the other player to subsidize or partially contribute to 
their cost via prepayment for a larger percentage of the eventual surplus (invoking the 
concept of utility transferability or side payments). This concept (not unlike Myerson’s 
analysis of the “threat game” discussed in Section 2.4) is discussed more within each case 
study but in this section, is described generally.  
Under the uncorrelated solution concept (i.e., the Nash Equilibrium of both states 
acting independently), State A contributes a certain financial cost for securing its nuclear 
assets, CA, and State B concerns itself with investing in interdiction of assets, CB. If A and 
B correlate their strategies, the need may arise for State B to contribute to State A’s cost 
of nuclear security. This leads to the strategic cost of securing State A’s assets, referred to 
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now as CS, to be separated into that contributed by State A, CA, and that contributed by 
State B, CAB.  
 = +S A ABC C C   (3.2.11)  
This also leads to the investment that is made for State B’s strategy of interdiction, 
now referred to as CI, to be the remainder of State B’s total investment after its contribution 
to State A’s security, CAB.  
 = −I B ABC C C   (3.2.12) 
Within the discussion in subsection 3.1.1 where CA and CB are introduced, a further 
distinction should be made to define costs of a strategy for a state (CS and CI) and costs to 
a state for a strategy (CA, CB, and CAB). Reformatting Equations (3.2.1) and (3.2.4) with 
CS and CI to define the total costs of these strategies leads to Equations (3.2.13) and 
(3.2.14) below.  
 ( ) SCS S S A ATC C C P K e λα − = +     (3.2.13) 
 ( ), SI CCI S I I BTC C C C e K e λµ α −−  = + + Γ    (3.2.14) 
Using both equations here and recalling Equation (3.1.5) provides the opportunity 
to define the new total amalgamated cost of the securing and interdicting state strategies, 
TCSI:   
 ( ), S SIC CCSI S I S A A I BTC C C C P K e C e K eλ λµα α− −−   = + + + + Γ      (3.2.15) 
Substituting CS and CI with Equations (3.2.11) and (3.2.12) yields 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )λ µ λα α− + − − − +
=
   + + + − + + Γ   
, ,
A AB B AB A AB
SI A B AB
C C C C C C
A AB A A B AB B
TC C C C
C C P K e C C e K e
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Which is simplified to yield Equation (3.2.16): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , A AB B AB A ABC C C C C CSI A B AB A A A B BTC C C C C P K e C e K eλ µ λα α− + − − − +   = + + + + Γ   
  (3.2.16) 
 
Equation (3.2.16) results in a third variable not present in 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵: CAB or the 
contribution to State A’s security borne by State B. This variable is important for 
determining the correlated solution concept because through CAB can State B hope to 
persuade State A in adopting certain strengthened applied security strategies. Moreover, 
in the cooperative game model, CAB can come from the calculated surplus and therefore, 
defines a bargaining solution. Specifically, when 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 0, then 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 = 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 = 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 
meaning each state bears the cost for security and interdiction independently. If 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 =
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
∗ − 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
′ , then State B bears the additional amount of State A’s security that is needed to 
reach the correlated strategy set (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗). State A then only contributes at the level of its 
uncorrelated strategy (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′) yet receives the full benefit of the correlated threat cost (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴′) 
while State B bears all strategic costs no borne by State A. Furthermore, the portion of 
State B’s contribution to State A can be either taken from State B’s portion of the surplus 
or, if the amount is greater than State B’s portion, from side payments outside the surplus. 
Case studies included in Chapters 4-8 show a range of bargaining solutions (in terms of 
utility transferability) beyond what is introduced in this subsection.  
In sum, within each case study, parameters (e.g., α, KA, KB, etc.) for both States A 
and B will be determined using available data form literature. Furthermore, actual 
investments from contemporary years in security (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑) and interdiction (𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑) for A and 
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B respectively will be used to calculate values such as λy and µy which will then be used 
as estimates for computing appropriate uncorrelated and correlated strategies for both 
States A and B. Once the uncorrelated and correlated solutions are determined, the ways 
by which the surplus can be shared between State A and B help visualize various options 
for cooperation. As shown in the case studies in chapters 4-8, the defined boundaries of 
the surplus divisions provide the opportunity to study State B’s potential to influence State 
A’s security strategy. 
 
3.2.3. Computational Tools for Solving for Solution Concepts  
To calculate the strategy sets, costs are calculated using a MATLAB script and the 
bargaining solutions were determined via MSExcel.g Input parameters for each case study 
are specified in Subsection 3.1.2 and are set within the code. The parameters were 
collected from various government and scholarly publications and used to define specific 
circumstances of the various case studies. Once input into each case study, the 
methodology computed the Nash Equilibria for each state’s uncorrelated strategy per 
Equations (3.1.6) and (3.1.7). The MATLAB minimization routine fmincon was used to 
solve for the correlated strategies where the process requires determining the minimized 
total regime cost (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗ ) based on two independent variables: CA and CB. The MATLAB 
results were then inserted into the pre-programmed MSExcel spreadsheet that visualized 
the various correlated solution concepts and computed the associated bargaining solution 
                                               
g The MATLAB script and MSExcel spreadsheets are included in Appendix A.  
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strategy sets which divided the surplus between the states and the percent changes in 
utilities for the three entities (State A, State B, and the regime between States A and B).  
 
3.3. Trust and Commitment Issues  
Game theory provides a way to analyze strategies made by rational players. With 
no guarantees of players’ actions, overall trust between the players can be a potential issue 
when trying to determine equilibria and solution concepts. Furthermore, in cooperative 
games, actions can include the formation of coalitions or partnerships. Therefore, with 
both non-cooperative and cooperative type games, trust is a vital element for calculating 
utilities and is especially significant in simultaneous, single-play games when players lack 
knowledge of others’ intentions, utilities, or strategies. Furthermore, communication is 
key to countering this lack of knowledge. Either overt (or indirect) communication 
between players is vital to game theory. Lacking overt communication methods, single-
play games present a challenge of uncertainty between the players. Therefore, overcoming 
uncertainty to establish cooperation requires pre-emptive communications or “a leap of 
faith” between the players. After establishing a series of repeated games however, players 
are able to observe actions and use them as a means of continued communication which 
provides a better understanding of the type of counterpart they are playing against. Given 
time, the ability of predicting strategies can segue into a semblance of confidence and 
potentially trust between players.104 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game presented in Figure 2.8, the Pareto Optimum is 
not the Nash Equilibrium. This conveys a trust issue with the Pareto Optimum: a unilateral 
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change, without response from the other player in a single-play game, can result in a more 
favorable payoff for the changing player but a worse payoff for the opposing player (which 
results in a worse collective payoff for both). This implication shows there lies a moral 
conundrum: despite the incentive for an originating player to change their strategy, will 
they do so if it negatively impacts the collective payoff?  
A game theorist can mitigate the impact of any lack of trust by introducing a 
“nature” component that provides a probability for the “type” of player playing the 
game.105 This adds a passive a third “player” that can impact game results. However, 
actions by (and imposed on) players themselves can also mitigate the impact of any such 
moral conundrums. For example, instead of utilizing a passive third “player” to estimate 
variability in the type of players, there exists an option of utilizing an active third player 
that would serve as an enforcer of any game play. If trust and commitment are issues 
among players, there exists the option of (creating and) using a third party actor to monitor 
the game play. Historically, this has been accomplished through the establishment of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1967 or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action with Iran which defines the IAEA as the third party enforcer.  
Another action indirectly alluded to by Schelling as he details the necessity of 
communicating commitment in order to make a credible threat: “if a threat is anything 
more than an assertion that is intended to appeal to the other player by power of 
suggestion… it must involve some notion of commitment – real or fake – if it is to be 
anything.”25 He alludes to establishing a red line in order to compel a player to act. 
Examples of this include the U.S. government establishing the quarantine line for the 
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Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the large U.S. military presence on the 
Korean Peninsula poised to stand against North Korean aggression, or President Obama 
setting a red line on chemical weapons in Syria in 2012.106,107,108 Another method alluded 
to by Snyder consists of communicating a threat of simple denial to an aggressor of his/her 
accomplishment – it “is more likely than reprisal action to promise a rational means of 
defense in case deterrence fails.”109 These various actions taken by players in game theory 
rely on the credibility of their communicated intentions.  
Presented within this work, the game models consist of two players where there is 
no guarantee of trust. Hence, various trust and commitment issues do arise in the 
assessments in Chapters 4-8. Firstly, we address that the game players are states seeking 
strategies to address nuclear security concerns. Second, the states’ utility metrics are in 
the form of financial investment/savings. When the states decide on strategies, they do so 
with the expectation that the other state acts rationally. This forces the states to compute 
utilities so as to select their preferred decision – otherwise known as expected utility theory 
(EUT). Based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem, EUT is the general 
method by which a decision is made in order to maximize the expected utility from the 
potential outcomes of various options.80  
Referring to the second step in the preceding paragraph, computing utilities can be 
accomplished through devising a utility function by which the value of decisions are made. 
In the models used in this work, the states’ expected utilities were solely measured with 
costs because of the dearth of publications in quantifiable measurements of security and 
interdiction.110 Though this introduced a potential lapse in connecting monetary 
   
91 
 
investment to effectiveness of a state’s nuclear security posture, it was the most logical 
assumption to make in terms of establishing a metric. Related to the defined metric, in 
each case study, an assumption was made that states had interest in reducing costs and 
therefore, were amenable to cooperation. Furthermore, connecting investments with 
achieving state objectives also implies the lack of government corruption. According to 
the 2015 global corruptions perceptions index, some bilateral regimes discussed herein 
include two states that fall at opposite sides of the spectrum of perceived government 
corruption.111  
Regarding cooperation enforcement, no case study in Chapters 4-8 have a third-
party arbiter with punitive powers to enforce agreements. Ostensibly, this lack of enforcer 
opens the game to be abused by one or both the states and, thus, does not imbue either 
player with a sense of commitment through fear of reprisal. Primarily, this work assumes 
the existence of potential mutually beneficial results is what drives the states to cooperate 
and correlate their strategies. However, a third-party entity could be utilized to convince 
the states of said benefit or to provide a contingency surplus to be shared by both.   
Specific to the game models presented in each case study, a state’s lackluster 
commitment to strategic objectives could raise red flags. Specifically, if a state’s total 
uncorrelated costs do not surpass a certain threshold, there exists a potential for the overall 
decrease in costs (achieved through correlating strategies) to exceed those uncorrelated 
costs and cause the state’s strategy to consist of a negative total cost. This leads the state 
to potentially receive a positive utility from cooperating with the other state – a position 
described in 2005 by Corr that explains how a state can hold the lack of security as a 
92 
commodity and by which it receives a profit.33 He continues by identifying a growing 
concern first applied to Russia but later to North Korea: the “threat of insecure storage [of 
nuclear assets] as a resource or commodity to sell.” Illustrating this theory quantitatively 
could serve the community and future decision makers when analyzing the benefits and 
costs to entering bilateral arrangements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
between the P5+1 states and Iran or the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North 
Korea.112,113 As is conveyed in Section 9.6, this potential outcome can result from a state’s 
inadequate investment which conversely conveys a lack of commitment to nuclear 
security (i.e., if the state is not committed to the idea of nuclear security, it may rely on 
the partner to pay for it).   
Overall, within some of the case studies discussed in Chapters 4-8, the mere 
existence of a benefit of cooperation is not the sole basis upon which the players should 
correlate their strategies.  Obviously, by considering the aforementioned limitations to the 
methodology as well as other outside political and economic factors, cooperation between 
players can easily be inhibited. Specific cases are discussed in more detail in Section 9.1. 
3.4. Incommensurability and Plausibility of Data 
Before each case study is discussed individually, it should be noted that the 
obtained utilities presented in each should be considered evocative, not definitive. One of 
the primary challenges of applying the above methodology was computing utilities based 
on acquired and calculated parameters that were an attempt to adequately represent the 
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real-world situation of each case study. Ostensibly, the parameters inserted into each 
state’s total cost function should not be considered absolute but should still be considered 
plausible enough to gain insight into the bilateral nuclear security regimes. This concept 
of relying on logic rather than values for assisting decision makers understand and assess 
complex situations is explained by Snyder in that “the factors involved [are] highly 
intangible, unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive 
way.”105 He expounds on the concept of “the essential logic of deterrence” instead of the 
potentially intangible values by which decisions can be set. He continues on the need for 
developing and understanding the underlying logic “to predict, to measure, and in some 
sense, to make incommensurable factors commensurate if [decision makers] are to reach 
wise decisions.” He closes with the proposition: “logic is just as applicable to imprecise 
quantities as to precise ones; to express it in mathematical terms can provide a useful check 
on intuitive judgment and may bring to light factors and relationships which judgment 
would miss.”105  
Therefore, this methodology strives to provide insight into bilateral nuclear 
security regimes (specifically in various bilateral regimes formed in the latter half of the 
20th century) regardless of the precision of the various parameters. Ascertained through 
openly-available literature, state-determined investment values in Chapter 4-8 were used 
to define a focal point that represented the actual investments made by both states. This 
focal point was used to compute the α and λ parameters which were then used to determine 
the next focal point which represented the uncorrelated solution concept. This solution 
concept is the Nash Equilibrium per Equations (3.1.6) and (3.1.7). From this latter focal 
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point is where the eventual correlated solution concept (i.e., the Pareto Optimal solution) 
would be calculated. The location of the three aforementioned focal points relied heavily 
on the data we attained through openly-available publications. Some data proved difficult 
to acquire due to the level of sensitivities associated with nuclear security measures and 
costs. Ostensibly, the computed focal points could differ with other sources of data and, 
therefore, some conclusions could change. However, an honest effort was made to 
replicate observed strategies between two states during particular times in recent history 
per each case study. Assuredly, with more (accurate) data beyond what was currently 
openly available, focal points could be defined differently and credibility in the results 
could increase.  
 
3.5. Introducing the Case Studies 
Particular parameters of five case studies are modeled in Chapters 4-8. Initially, 
only nuclear weapons were considered. However, loss rate data and other relevant 
information for weapons-usable material are more readily available in open-source 
searches and literature reviews. Therefore, in the interest of connecting the methodology 
to citable data, the case studies included after this chapter consist of aggregate data of 
relevant security information for both nuclear weapons and special fissionable material 
(uranium, plutonium, and thorium) in units of significant quantities.h Significant quantities 
are used herein as a common metric for identifying assets for nuclear-armed states that 
                                               
h 1 SQ = 8kg Plutonium = 8 kg Uranium-233 = 25kg Uranium-235 (HEU) = 75kg Uranium-235 (LEU) = 10t 
Uranium-235 (natural) = 20t Uranium-235 (depleted) = 20t Thorium 
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also include weapons-usable materials per the definitions used by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Safeguards Glossary.38  
1) Case Study 1: United States – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1985) – This case 
study is modeled to replicate the American-Soviet state-level relationship during the 
height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s when both states had no collaborations in 
nuclear security. Furthermore, at this point, the perceived threat from the Soviet Union 
did not include any non-state adversary or terrorist obtaining a nuclear weapon from 
the U.S.S.R. and using it against the U.S. or its allies. The main threat in 1985 consisted 
of the state-level threat from the U.S.S.R. in launching the barrage of nuclear weapons 
to the U.S. For that, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. entered into many arms control and 
disarmament agreements but none addressed applied security of the other nations’ 
assets. This case study was chosen to confirm assumptions in the model and replicate 
a quintessential historical bilateral relationship (which essentially was non-existent 
regarding securing nuclear weapons or materials). Data from this “snap shot” in time 
was acquired through U.S. Congressional testimonies, Soviet Duma publications 
regarding federal budgets, news articles, and published historical analyses by both 
Russian and American scholars. The conclusions from this case study convey the 
potential for a large benefit to both sides if cooperation had occurred. However, due 
to the obvious external circumstances between the rivals, state-level collaborations 
(especially coordination of nuclear security strategies) were minimal regardless of the 
potential benefit. Furthermore, Soviet society was so heavily restricted and policed 
that not many scholars nor government officials seriously considered the thought of 
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nuclear assets escaping from Soviet control. This concept is discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 4. 
2) Case Study 2: United States – Russian Federation (1995) – This case study exemplifies 
the infancy stages of the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program between the U.S. 
and Russia that began with the Nunn-Lugar Act in assisting the newly-emerging state 
of Russia to regain control of its nuclear arsenal. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a 
perceived threat emerged among U.S. policy makers recognizing the lack of adequate 
security measures protecting Russian special nuclear material and nuclear weapons. In 
addition to addressing the security of special nuclear material through collaborations 
led by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 
(MPC&A) Program Office, the U.S. Department of Defense worked closely with the 
Russian Ministry of Defense in regaining control of and re-securing its arsenal of 
nuclear weapons.114 This case study incorporates a strong sense of collaboration 
between the partner states as well as the understanding that Russia was potentially the 
main source of any nuclear weapon that would have been used against the United 
States. Moreover, at that time, Russia’s economic struggles lent credibility to the 
perception that a terrorist threat would most likely attain a nuclear weapon from Russia 
rather than from another nuclear-weapons state. Data for this case study was acquired 
through numerous publications released by both American and Russian legislatures, 
scholars, and other reports. The year of 1995 was selected as the high point of 
collaboration between the former Cold War rivals – especially for nuclear security. 
After various reports of loose nuclear materials were interdicted in 1994, the push for 
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collaboration from both states was heightened. As will be shown in Chapter 5, the 
potential for correlating nuclear security strategies for the benefit of both states was 
high.  
3) Case Study 3: United States – Russian Federation (2008) – This case study exemplifies 
the relationship between the U.S. and Russia in the midst of the MPC&A and CTR 
where the U.S. was heavily invested in nuclear-related collaborations with Russia. 
This case study recognizes the existing bilateral arrangements between both for such 
things as cooperating against the common threat of nuclear terrorism (e.g., via the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism) but that the Russian Federation 
continued to receive financial assistance from the U.S. to support nuclear security 
endeavors.115 Notable in this case study is the continued level of cooperation between 
the two states, the growing Russian economy, and the advent of other nuclear threats 
in the world. Beyond a representative year of complex collaboration between the 
states, this year was chosen for the easily accessible data gleaned from scholarly 
publications on government expenditures for nuclear materials smuggling and 
interdiction for both Russia and the U.S. from academia, government, national 
laboratories, and non-governmental organizations such as think tanks and other 
research entities. As conveyed in Chapter 6, a waning interest in collaboration began 
to take hold between the two state governments for various reasons: a strengthening 
Russian economy, the existence of other nuclear terrorist threats, and appropriations 
fatigue expressed by some U.S. legislators. These points are described further in 
Chapter 6. 
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4) Case Study 4: United States – Russian Federation (2015) – This case study 
incorporates more recent developments between the U.S. and Russia – particularly, 
the dissolution of the joint MPC&A Program between the states in 2013 as well as the 
annexation of Crimea by the Russian military which led to the eventual suspension of 
all nuclear security activities between the countries. With this in mind, it is assumed 
in the U.S. that Russia has assumed many nuclear security responsibilities and 
understand the necessity of appropriate nuclear security and therefore, is continuing to 
properly secure all potential targeted materials and assets. However, the U.S. is not 
familiar with exact measures in Russia because of the lack of collaboration between 
the states. This factor is included in this case study – as is the fact that the number of 
potential sources of a nuclear weapon being commandeered by a non-state actor and 
used against the U.S. has increased. Though previously Russia was the only security 
concern, in modern times, other states such as the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea or Pakistan have become nuclear concerns as well. This year was chosen as the 
most recent year (at the time of this writing) of available data through scholarly 
publications, official American and Russian government records, and various other 
news articles. As is conveyed in Chapter 7, the potential for benefit from collaboration 
still existed but due to other domestic and external issues, the interest in cooperative 
strategies waned on both sides.  
5) Case Study 5: United States – Pakistan (2008) – This case study incorporates a very 
collaborative nature between the two states due to the continued relationship both 
states have in the particular interest of jointly meeting the terrorist threat. Of interest 
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with Case Study 5, the U.S. provides financial contributions specifically for enhancing 
the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.116 Furthermore, in spite of regional 
influences and interests, the U.S. and Pakistan maintain a strong collaborative 
relationship beyond mere nuclear security. Importantly, it is considered that in today’s 
world, Pakistan is not the only potential source for a nuclear weapon to be appropriated 
and used against the U.S. The data from the U.S. on nuclear security (i.e., interdiction) 
stems from the same 2008 data acquired for Case Study 3. The data for Pakistan 
securing its nuclear assets in 2008 was retrieved from various news articles and a small 
number of scholarly publications. Despite this limitation, the conclusions show that 
cooperation proves at least somewhat beneficial to both sides of this nuclear security 
regime.  
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4. CASE STUDY 1: U.S.S.R. – U.S. (1985) 
  
This case study consists of the relationship between the United States (U.S.) and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) during the final years of the Cold war, 
circa 1985. Under the party leadership of Mikhail Gorbechev and his policies of 
Perestroika and Glasnost, the U.S.S.R. was inching closer towards an open society by 
allowing more international trade and influence from the rest of the world.117 During this 
time, the bilateral relationship, though adversarial, consisted of actions and strategies in 
the limited scopes of space exploration, nuclear disarmament, weapons testing, and others. 
The largest inventories of nuclear weapons were in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and, 
specifically for securing weapons, there was no interaction between the two. The lack of 
cooperation embodied the nature of the relationship for this case study. However, this case 
study also provides whether any collective benefit could have been achieved if the 
U.S.S.R. and/or the U.S. had they correlated their nuclear security strategies. We detail 
the parameter evaluations of the model in Section 4.1 and, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, delve 
into the calculations of the various strategies and hypothetical bargaining solutions 
between the states. Lastly, Section 4.4 includes a presentation of the results.  
 
4.1. Evaluating the Game Model Parameters 
This case study models two parties in a nuclear security arrangement with no 
cooperation and also with cooperation. Specifically, the source state (State A or the 
U.S.S.R.) is interested in securing its own assets so that it is not used against it and the 
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target state (State B or the U.S.) is interested in an asset not being released from under 
State A’s control and subsequently used against State B. Though the objectives of both 
states are different (hence, their interests), the potential consequences of an event can 
impact both states substantially. Therefore, it is assumed that the potential non-state 
adversary does not serve the interest of either player. A terrorist organization potentially 
could use an asset to attack the target state, but there is the probability the asset could be 
used against the source state also. The latter provides incentive for the source state to 
secure its weapons. As modelled in the uncorrelated-strategy game, the target state makes 
no attempt to influence the source state to enhance its security further. Rather, the target 
state adopts interdiction as its countermeasure to this threat. As was the case during the 
Cold War, each state commits to interdiction and security independently and cooperation 
between the two was non-existent. In reference to the total cost model found in Equations 
(3.2.1) and (3.2.4), many parameters are identified for State A (α, λ, PA, and KA) and State 
B (µ, KB, and Γ) in the remainder of this Section 4.1. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 detail how to 
calculate the appropriate uncorrelated, correlated, and bargaining strategies corresponding 
to the defined parametric values in the pursuit of minimizing the total costs to each state.  
 
4.1.1. State A Parameters 
In order to solve the non-cooperative games for the states’ strategic costs, 
parameter values tailored to the 1985 era were determined under various assumptions. 
When dealing with the Soviet Union (as well as Russia in Chapters 5-7), it is “exceedingly 
difficult if not impossible to comprehend the total historical and current costs of the 
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Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons program” – let alone the nuclear security program.118 
With this in mind, inferences and other best estimates from a myriad of historical 
publications were used to estimate spending effectiveness and other parameters for this 
Soviet case. Though not an explicitly-defined parameter of the methodology, the overall 
level of security within the Soviet Union during this time (where society was under heavy 
government control) is roughly estimated by defining α subsequently. Because the 
population was closely watched and their actions were so scrutinized and policed, it is a 
safe assumption that the likelihood of a nuclear-related crime within the Soviet Union in 
1985 was low. 
Estimating the first parameter, α85, necessitates determining the probability of a 
single unlikely event during the 36-year time span between the Soviet Union having a 
nuclear device (1949) and the year of this case study (1985). Deemed as a rare event in 
their work, Quigley and Revie determine the probability of such an event corresponds to 
the reciprocal of 2.5 times the number of years.119 Therefore, with a sample size of 36, the 
rate of loss for this rare event (an asset being removed from the Soviet Union’s control in 
the midst of the Cold War) is  
 
( )
α  = =  ⋅  
85
1 SQ0.011
2.5 36yr yr
  (4.1.1) 
With 𝛼𝛼85 = 0.011 �SQyr�, the marginal reduction in loss, λ, for the Soviet government in 
1985 is computed after more assumptions and other information are extracted from 
published reports and statements. First, due to a lack of actual lost assets in 1985 (and 
before), a rough estimation of loss rate is made using a relative value from the 1955 
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AFSWP report for acceptable losses of a 10-100kT weapon (of the like prevalent under 
Soviet control around 1985).120,121 The number of “accepted accidental events” stated in 
the report was 3e-4 events/year when only 2422 weapons were in existence in the U.S. 
Adjusting this value per weapon for the U.S. and re-estimating for Soviet numbers in 1985 
(39,197) yields an estimated value for the loss rate as 0.00486 events.122 Also, based on a 
stated estimation of funds (2M USD) spent on “fissionable material accountability” from 
1957 and converting from 1957 to 1985 yields 7.66M USD via the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor.123,124 Hence, using α85, an estimated loss rate 
and an estimated cost for security, with Equation (3.1.18) yields the following: 
 
( )85
85
85 85
85
1
85
1 ln
1 0.00486ln
7.66 0.011
0.108 $M
L C
C
λ
α
λ
λ −
 
= ⋅  −  
 = ⋅  −  
 =  
  
For this case study, PA, for lack of a better value is estimated as the number of 
years when a fatal terrorist attack occurred during the entire time of existence of the Soviet 
Union (particularly because for the ten-year span of this case study, no fatal terrorist 
attacks occurred in Moscow). Therefore, using only 1973 and 1977 as the two years when 
a fatal attack occurred in Moscow from the entire existence of the Soviet Union (1922 – 
1991) leads the frequency of such an attack 2 years in 69 – or 0.029.125,126 Hence, PA = 
0.03.i  
                                               
i As stated in Subsection 3.2.2, this value (along with many others) is meant to be evocative for the sake of proving the 
logic presented herein – not to provide the definitiveness of the results. 
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Recalling Subsection 3.2.3 in defining the consequences, KA, of an attack suffered 
by State A requires several calculations and estimations. For calculating the at-target KA 
value, the following data are used: 8,580,000 as the population of Moscow that year127; 
878.7 square kilometers as the land area of the city of Moscow128; $1,780 as the GDP per 
capita of Russia129; 0.77 kilometers as the radius range of a 10-kT nuclear detonation92 
and a 50% survivability; 32,000USD as the value for statistical life for an average Russian 
from Moscow130; and the rough estimate of rebuilding Moscow after a large-scale attack, 
Kni, is given by using the cost used to rebuild Mexico City in 1985 after a devastating 7.6 
magnitude earthquake as 5 billion USD.  
( )[ ] ( ) [ ]π π    = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     
2 2
2
ppl 8.58M50% fatality VSL 0.77 0.5 $32,000 $291M
km 878.7
hu
A bK r
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]π π      = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =       
2 1985 2
per capita2
ppl 8.58M50% fatality GDP 0.77 0.5 $1,780 $16.2M
km 878.7
ec
A thK r
 
= $5,000MniAK  
 
= + + = + + =$291M $16M $5,000M $5,307Mhu ec niA A A AK K K K  
 
Therefore, in this model, at-target KA = 5.3B USD.  
 
4.1.2. State B Parameters 
The parameter µ circa 1985 was estimated by examining the beginning of the 
American radiological/nuclear interdiction system as well as border porosity threshold 
U.S. lawmakers strived to achieve. In early 1984, an estimated 600 tons of radioactive 
steel (alloyed with cobalt-60 taken from a medical radiotherapy device) was shipped to 23 
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U.S. states and Canada from Mexico. As some material was detected near Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, a national effort was put in place later that year by the U.S. Customs 
Service and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to install radiation monitors at 22 border 
crossings.131 Though never implemented, the estimated total cost of the first year of that 
program was stated as 6.1M USD. With this in mind and interdictions only having 
occurred by chance, the estimated non-detection probability, PB, for this case study is set 
at 0.99 (a reasonable value due to an ineffective national interdiction system). Hence, the 
estimated value for µ is 0.00164 according to Equation (3.1.24) – when compared to other 
case studies, this value of µ is lower and therefore, implies that investment to State A’s 
security was more beneficial to State B than investing in their own interdiction as 
discussed in Section 4.3: 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
µ
µ
− ⋅=
− −
= = =
ln ln 0.99
0.00164
6.1
BC
B B
B B
B
P C e
P C
C
  
For State B, Equations (3.1.21), (3.1.22), and (3.1.23) are used to estimate KB and its 
constituents (Khu, Kec, and Kni): 
 = + +hu ec niB B B BK K K K  
 
Where, in using values from Glasstone and Viscusi95,132:  
( )
( ) ( )
π
π
   = ⋅       
    = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅       
=
2
2
2
2
ppl $1.33M50% fatality
km person
1.464M $1.33M0.77km 0.5
59.1km person
$30,683M
hu
B th
hu
B
hu
B
K r
K
K
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And Kec for 1985 uses the estimated population and land area of Manhattan, New 
York City (1.464M people and 59.1 km2) and the gross domestic product per capita 
($18,264.4) to produce  the following values133,134: 
( )
( ) ( )
π
π
    = ⋅      
    = ⋅       
=
2 1985
per capita2
2
2
ppl 50% fatality GDP
km
1.464M 18,269.40.77km 0.5
59.1km 1,000,000
$421.5M
ec
B th
ec
B
ec
B
K r
K
K
 
 
 
Kni is estimated such as for State A by comparing the similar event of the Mexico City 
earthquake of 1985. Again, the financial estimated impact to the city’s infrastructure 
exceeded 5 billion USD. Therefore, without a better alternative, Kni = $5,000 M, and the 
summation of KB is shown below: 
 
 = + + = + + =$30,683M $422M $5,000M $36,105Mhu ec niB B B BK K K K  
 
 
As is conveyed in the previous case study, the value of Γ is an attempt to convey 
the equal likelihood of an attack against State B using an asset from another source that is 
not State A. Hence, in this case study, we do not expand the potential source of an asset 
and therefore, Γ=0. 
 
4.2. Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
The 1985-era values, estimated as described in the preceding section, of the 
parameters for States A and B for Case Study 1 are summarized in Table 4.1. All regime 
107 
solutions and strategy sets are determined using these values but other future analysts are 
encouraged to modify the values of the game parameters per their own 
investigation/knowledge.  
Table 4.1. Estimated parametric values for CS1 
α 0.011 [SQ] 
λ85 0.108 [$M-1] 
PA 0.03 [ ] 
KA 5,307 [$M] 
µ 0.00164 [$M-1] 
KB 36,105 [$M] 
Γ 0 [SQ] 
Of note, λ is almost two orders of magnitude greater than µ – the implication of 
such is State B receives a greater reduction in its threat cost from investing in State A’s 
security rather than State B’s interdiction measures. A comparison of the parametric 
values for each case study is included in Section 9.1. 
4.2.1. Non-Cooperative Solution: Uncorrelated Strategies 
The uncorrelated strategies for Case Study 1 are determined by calculating the 
Nash Equilibrium: the best response strategy for each state trying to minimize their 
respective total costs as shown in Equations (3.1.6) and (3.1.7). By using values from 
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Table 4.1, the strategic costs for State A and B can be evaluated for each state’s 
uncorrelated strategy, 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵, by using Equations (3.2.2) and (3.2.5), respectively. 
𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵 are then used in Equations (3.1.13) and (3.1.14) to calculate TA and TB and 
lastly into Equation (3.1.2) for each state. Below is the series of calculations for calculating 
𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵 (with all units in millions USD). 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
{ }
α λ
λ
α λ
λ
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = = −
= − =
1' max 0, ln
1' ln
1 1' ln 0.011 0.108 0.03 5307 ln 0.189 15.4
0.108 0.108
' max 0, 15.4 0
A A A
A A A
A
A
C P K
C P K
C
C
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
λα −− ⋅   = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =   
= + = + =
0.108 0'' 0.03 5307 0.011 1.7
' ' ' ' 0 1.7 1.7
AC
A A A A
A A A A A
T C P K e e
TC C C T C
  
 
Using the values from Table 4.1 produces the result 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 = 0, meaning that there is 
no requirement for the Soviet Union to have made an additional strategic investment in its 
own nuclear security even for an at-target attack on a center of population like Moscow. 
For this reason, the consequence of an on-site attack is not used to determine another value 
for 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 – if the uncorrelated strategy yields no need for investing against a more impactful 
attack, then there is less benefit to investing against a lesser attack at the facility which 
houses the nuclear asset originally.  
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Similarly, determining the value of 𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵: 
( )
( )( )
λµ α
µ
− ⋅
−
  = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ   
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + 
'
0.108 0
1' max 0, ln
1' ln 0.00164 36105 0.011 0
0.00164
AC
B B
B
C K e
C e
 
 
[ ]
{ }
1' ln 0.651 261.4
0.00164
' max 0, 261.4 0
B
B
C
C
= = −
= − =
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
µ λα− ⋅ − ⋅
− −
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + =
= + = + =
' '
0.00164 0 0.108 0
' , '
' , ' 36105 0.011 0 397.2
' ' , ' ' ' , ' 0 397.2 397.2
B AC C
B A B B
B A B
B A B B B A B
T C C e K e
T C C e e
TC C C C T C C
  
 
The total cost for both states in this non-cooperative bilateral regime amounts to 
398.9M USD (where both states take unilateral action).The grand majority of State A’s 
total cost is borne by State B, in the form of threat costs, but, in the next subsection, it will 
be conveyed how it would have been more cost effective to invest directly into State A’s 
strategy.    
 
4.2.2. Non-Cooperative Solution: Correlated Strategies 
Seeking to understand the observed lack of cooperation between Cold War foes in 
1985 regarding nuclear security, we replicate the parameters of the states’ relationship and 
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use them in TCAB to determine whether cooperation would have provided any benefit to 
the two states. 
 ( ) λ µ λα α− ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅   = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ   , A B A
C C C
AB A B A A A B BTC C C C P K e C e K e
  (4.2.1) 
Continuing by solving for the correlated strategies, the values calculated in this section 
were based on finding the global minimum in the multivariate total regime cost equation 
as shown in Equation (4.2.1). To ensure the values were located at a minimum, the partial 
derivatives were set to zero at the solution pair. 
* * *
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( )
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Calculating the second partial derivatives for determining the concavity utilizes the 
following: 
2
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And: 
( )
( )
2
2 2
2
2
2
,
,
9.7 3 0
AB x y x
A A B
A
AB
A
TC x y
P K e e K e
C
TC x y
e
C
λ µ λαλ αλ− − −
∂
= +
∂
∂
= − >
∂
 
( )
( )
2
2
2
2
2
,
,
2.28 3 0
AB y x
B
B
AB
B
TC x y
e K e
C
TC x y
e
C
µ λµ α− −
∂
=
∂
∂
= − >
∂
  
Therefore, as stated in Subsection 2.2.1, both requirements are satisfied for point (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) to be considered a minimum. Hence, when 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ = 35.2 and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗ = 0 for this case 
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study, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) is at its minimum. This implies the correlated strategic costs, as 
exhibited by *iC , are 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ = 35.2 and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗ = 0. The remaining threat and total costs are 
calculated based on the above values for 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗: 
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Table 4.2 includes all calculated values thus far.  
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Table 4.2. Annualized costs [in $M] from the non-cooperative game  
 Uncorrelated [$M] Correlated [$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 0 35.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 1.7 0.04 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 1.7 35.2 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 0 0 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 397.2 9.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 397.2 9.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 398.9 44.5 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the three dimensional profile of the strategic and total costs to 
the states. The red star represents the uncorrelated (unilateral) Nash Equilibrium between 
the states at point (0, 0, 398.9). The cyan star represents the correlated, cooperative 
strategy point at (35.2, 9.3, 44.5) if both states collaborate in strategies. The total cost, 
TCAB is reduced substantially but requires an investment increase by State A (this is 
discussed in more detail in Section 9.1). This and all other 3-D plots were created using 
the MATLAB script included in Appendix A. 
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Figure 4.1. Total costs vs strategic costs for states A and B  
 
 
4.3. Bargaining Solution Concepts and Utility Transferability 
A two-dimensional representation of the various strategy points is included in 
Figure 4.2.  
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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Figure 4.2. Imputations of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. game (1985)  
 
 
As introduced in Subsection 2.5.1, the blue-shaded triangle represents the core of 
the cooperative game while any line segment that intersects the hypotenuse of the triangle 
defines an imputation (otherwise referred to as a bargaining solution or surplus split 
between the states). The cyan dot represents the correlated strategy set. This correlated 
QCBAN 
QALL 
QNBS 
QCOR 
P 
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strategy point lies on the line of utility transferability (UT) but does not exist in the game’s 
core. Thus, as per the discussion in Subsection 2.5.2, the solution’s viability is not certain. 
The surplus, visualized in Figure 4.1 as the distance between the points along the z-
direction (i.e., the difference in total costs) and computed as 398.9 − 44.5 = 354.4M, is 
now the bargaining medium between the two states. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Annualized costs [in $M] from the non-cooperative game  
 Uncorrelated [$M] Correlated [$M] CBA-Neutral [$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 0 35.2 0 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 1.7 0.04 0.04 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 1.7 35.2 0.04 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 0 0 35.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 397.2 9.3 9.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 397.2 9.3 44.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 398.9 44.5 44.5 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 summarizes the various costs for each strategy. The third column 
conveys a renegotiated strategic option between the states. The CBA-Neutral solution 
concept (shown as QCBAN in Figure 4.2) represents State B’s contribution (CBA) of all of 
State A’s additional burden over its original strategic cost, CA. This bargaining solution is 
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shown in Figure 4.2 as the intersection point of the red line and the dark blue UT line at 
(0, 44.5).  
The orange line segment which bifurcates the hypotenuse is the NBS imputation 
(i.e., a 50-50 split of the savings between the states) and leads to the strategic point of (-
175.4, 220) where each state receives half of the 354.4M USD savings surplus. Because 
the Soviet Union’s correlated position is substantially better located than the U.S.’s 
position, they stand to receive a substantial negative cost (i.e., a profit). Lastly, the black 
dot located at (-352.6, 397.2) signifies a cooperative solution defined by the Soviet Union 
receiving the benefit of the entire surplus. This implies that the U.S. would not have 
received any benefit from the cooperation with the Soviet Union (in fact, this would have 
facilitated the opportunity for them to make a profit off their nuclear insecurity as 
insinuated in Corr’s theory from Section 3.4 where if TCA < 0, there would be a manner 
by which the Soviet Union would have profited).33 
 
4.4. Analysis and Discussion 
Recall that the states in this case study were the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R) as State 
A and the United States (U.S.) as State B, Table 4.4 shows the results for the four 
aforementioned bargaining strategies discussed in Section 4.3: the correlated strategy 
point (QCOR), the NBS point (QNBS), the CBA neutralization equivalent point (QCBAN), and 
the all-surplus-to-A point (QALL). Additionally, the strategic point signifying the 
uncorrelated, unilateral strategic point, P, between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. is also shown. 
Lastly, as a point of reference, the actual amounts for total cost per the definitions in 
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Chapter 3 are included as QACT for reference. The aforementioned solutions were 
calculated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Moreover, the total costs to each state and the regime 
are shown. The metric used to assess which solution proves more favorable to the U.S. or 
the U.S.S.R. is the column with the 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  values. This quantity conveys the ratio of B’s 
dividend of the surplus savings over A’s from correlating their strategies. A negative value 
implies the strategic point falls out of the core (the blue-shaded triangle region) in Figure 
4.2. A value of 1 implies the split is 50% to the Soviet Union and 50% to the U.S. – 
otherwise referred to as the Nash Bargaining Solution. When 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ > 1, more of the surplus 
goes to the U.S. Conversely, when 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ < 1 (such as in QCBAN and QALL), the Soviet 
Union receives more of the surplus.  
 
 
Table 4.4. Imputations of the cooperative game for case study 1 
  Savings 
Split 
for A 
[$M] 
Savings 
Split 
for B 
[$M] 
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟
 TCA [$M] 
TCB 
[$M] 
TCAB 
[$M] 
P -- -- -- 1.7 397.2 398.9 
QCOR -33.54 387.9 -11.57 35.24 9.3 44.54 
QNBS 177.18 177.18 1.00 -175.48 220.02 44.54 
QCBAN 1.66 352.7 212.47 0.04 44.5 44.54 
QALL 354.36 0 0.00 -352.66 397.2 44.54 
QACT -- -- -- 9.06 831.2 840.26 
 
 
The reader can compare these specific results to Figure 4.2 and assess which 
imputations/solutions could serve which state. If the Soviet Union and the U.S. had been 
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able to overcome any political adversity and correlate strategies, the resulting strategic 
point, QCOR, would have required the Soviet Union to invest slightly more than what it had 
already deemed necessary and even supplement the U.S.’s split of the surplus by an 
additional 33.5M USD. QNBS, QCBAN, and QALL are located within the game’s core and 
therefore seem as viable options (see Subsection 2.5.1) for bargaining a hypothetical 
bilateral nuclear security regime between the Soviet Union and the U.S. circa 1985 
(discussed in Subsection 2.5.2). Importantly, if inclined to have desired a bilateral 
arrangement with the Soviet Union at this time for securing nuclear assets, the American 
government could have used this methodology to analyze any bargaining process with the 
Soviet Union using financial incentives outlines in Table 4.4.  
Presenting the final results as utility percent advantages (as discussed in Section 
3.1.2), Table 4.5 displays values to aid in determining how much each state would benefit 
in terms of gained or lost utility compared to the uncorrelated solution concept. Those 
with positive values exhibit those strategic points beneficial to that state – negative 
numbers imply a lost utility.  
 
 
Table 4.5. Tabulated change in utility per imputation 
 UA UB UAB 
QCOR -19.73 0.98 0.89 
QNBS 104.22 0.45 0.89 
QCBAN 0.98 0.89 0.89 
QALL 208.45 0.00 0.89 
 
 
120 
As exhibited by the results in Table 4.5, all but one strategy solution results in an 
advantage over the Nash equilibrium (unilateral) strategy point, P, for both states. The 
correlated strategy point, QCOR, is a bargained solution where one state receives a negative 
benefit while the other does not. The QALL strategy point shows a substantial benefit for 
the Soviet Union yet nothing for the U.S. – not a seemingly favorable regime for the U.S. 
to enter. In this case, an argument could be made about the U.S. instead focusing on its 
own expenditures for a substantive defensive posture. Though, conceptually with so much 
to gain for the Soviet Union, a great opportunity hypothetically exists within the core 
where the U.S. could influence the U.S.S.R. to play the game by selecting a strategy point 
which greatly benefits the latter (such as QNBS or QALL). However, in light of the 
antagonistic relationship between the two states during this time in their history, any 
interaction would have had to supersede substantial impedances including domestic 
politics of collaborating with a cold war enemy. Lastly, despite the potential for the Soviet 
Union to have gained a negative cost (and thus a profit from the relationship), the utility 
benefit for the regime (UAB) exemplifies a collective gain over the original uncorrelated 
strategy set at point P of 89%.  
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5. CASE STUDY 2: RUSSIA – U.S. (1995) 
 
This second case study is a model of the bilateral regime5 between the U.S. and 
the Russia Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union in late December 1991. That same 
year, American President H.W. Bush signed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 
1991 into law, commonly referred to as the “Nunn-Lugar” legislation that paved the way 
for establishing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program which helped establish 
the Russian-U.S. relationship focused on securing nuclear assets.135 The relationship 
developed into a regime per Young’s definition of a “specialized [set of] arrangements 
that pertain to well-defined activities and resources.”136 Resulting from insight gathered 
by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, the CTR Program articulated two primary 
objectives: 1) to facilitate the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of 
nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor states; and 2) to 
assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation. After a 1991 visit by Nunn to Moscow, 
there was an understood need for the U.S. and the four newly-independent states (Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) to collaborate in securing former Soviet nuclear 
weapons. More so, upon his return from Moscow, Nunn called for “confidence-building 
measures and military exchanges as part of an effort to put in place quickly some measures 
that could shore up stability in the Soviet military and convey Washington’s goodwill and 
support of a safe transition to a post-Soviet world.”137 This would aim at building trust 
between the states in an effort to open the collaboration for and show a commitment to 
enhancing nuclear security in the region (as discussed in Section 3.3, both trust and 
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commitment would be integral to an effective nuclear security regime). In December 1994, 
the Budapest Memorandum was the agreement where Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan 
would surrender the former Soviet nuclear weapons within their borders to Russia by late 
1996 in exchange for Russia accepting the states’ sovereignties as well as accepting 
responsibility for the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the disarmament activities.138 With that, 
the U.S. and Russia would collaboratively secure nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
material under the CTR Program for over 23 years (until it was cancelled on January 1, 
2015).139  
In 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin established the Federal Inspectorate for 
Nuclear and Radiation Safety (known as Gosatomnadzor). It was originally formed to 
create a national system of radioactive and nuclear material control and accounting and 
regulate personnel handling nuclear materials.140 Though it was a civilian regulatory body, 
it had authorization to inspect both civilian and military nuclear facilities that handled 
special nuclear material (eliciting the ire of both the Ministry of Defense’s 12th Main 
Directorate and the Ministry of Atomic Energy).141 Until 1995 when the authority over 
accounting and safety for nuclear weapons was transferred to the 12th Main Directorate, 
Gosatomnadzor was the sole entity responsible for nuclear material accounting and 
domestic inspections in the Russian Federation.142,143 While it was still the main inspecting 
entity, in 1994, Gosatomnadzor stated the government would invest 1B USD to secure 
Russian nuclear materials for the subsequent 5-7 years.144  
During these first few years of Russian existence, many instances of nuclear 
trafficking that originated from Russian nuclear facilities were beginning to occur. Though 
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signed into law in late 1991, the Nunn-Lugar act was not able to secure funds to enhance 
nuclear security in Russia until fiscal year 1993 (beginning October 1992). At this point, 
most of the American funding was concentrated in securing nuclear weapons in Russia 
under the CTR program by the Department of Defense (DOD) while a small amount of 
funding was provided to Russia for securing weapons-usable nuclear material by the 
Department of Energy (DOE) under the newly formed Material Protection, Control, and 
Accounting (MPC&A) Program. Together, the American and Russian governments 
collaborated in securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials in Russia through 
collaborative engagements between the DOD, DOE, and Gosatomnadzor for two 
subsequent decades.  Bukharin provides more details on these and other of the various 
components (e.g., disposition of former weapons materials jointly declared excess to needs 
of the time) of the bilateral nuclear security regime that came into place circa 1995, along 
with other elements focused on securing personnel (e.g. former Soviet weapons 
designers), rather than materials per se.145  Some of these latter elements include the Lab-
to-Lab program focusing on promoting civil research collaborations between staff of the 
respective nuclear weapons laboratories and the similarly motivated International Science 
and Technology Center that attempted to pair former Soviet nuclear weapons designers 
with technical experts from across the EC and Japan, as well as from private industry in 
the U.S. 
Case Study 2 models the relationship between the U.S. and Russia in 1995 as a 
regime after the first tangible benefits of both the CTR and the MPC&A Programs were 
beginning to be observed. Similar to Case Study 1 (1985), the source state (State A) is 
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taken here as the Russian Federation and the target state (State B) as the United States. 
This chapter focuses on ascertaining the adequacy of the game-theoretic model described 
in Chapter 3 as a way to replicate the cooperative strategies under the CTR program and 
quantitatively determine various bargaining solutions between the states.  
 
5.1. Evaluating the Game Model Parameters 
 As stated, Case Study 2 models a bilateral regime between the U.S. and the Russian 
Federation in 1995 when the collaboration under the CTR was underway. Here, both states 
invest in their respective strategic actions but State A’s (RF) investment in securing its 
nuclear assets is not as strong as it once was during the Cold War when the Soviet Union 
relied on the “regimented, security-obsessed regime [to] hold down the risks of insider 
theft.”146 This was due in part to the economic down-turn that the RF suffered in the early 
1990s as well as the general disorganization which caused “a deterioration of the fissile 
material management infrastructure.”147 When security decreased, the U.S. supplemented 
the gaps in funding via monetarily supporting the modernization of the Russian nuclear 
security complex. The assumptions made here reflect an attempt to make a plausible 
estimate with realistic data. The model can be run with other assumed input values for 
future analyses. Just as in Case Study 1 (1985), the set of parameters that must be evaluated 
for States A and B consist of (α, λ, PA, KA) and (µ, KB, Γ), respectively. 
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5.1.1. State A Parameters  
From Subsection 3.2.1.1 for 1994, α94 = 0.249 as the maximum loss rate when 
nothing is spent on securing nuclear assets by State A. A database by Zaitseva accounts 
for loss events of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium-239 originating from the former 
Soviet Union in 1995.148 Table 5.1 below shows the total number in terms of significant 
quantities per year as L(C95) = 0.0149 SQ/yr. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Nuclear trafficking events in 1995 for computing L(C95) 
Date Location of Confiscation Material 
Mass [g] SQ 
June Moscow, Russia HEU (21%) 1700 0.0143 
June Prague, Czech Republic HEU (87.7%) 0.415 >0.001 
June Ceske Budejovice, Czech Republic HEU (87.7%) 
16.9 >0.001 
TOTAL    0.0149 
 
 
Gosatomnadzor’s statement in 1994 dictated that the Russian government  would 
dedicate 1B USD total, over the subsequent 5-7 years, to enhance Russian nuclear 
security.138 Using this estimation at best, the most would be $200M annually ($1B divided 
by 5 years). This also corresponds to Bunn’s cited quote from the leadership (Commander 
Valynkin) of the 12th Main Directorate (responsible for securing Russia’s nuclear 
weapons) that their budget was “only half as large as the entire U.S. assistance for Russian 
warhead security” (the reallocated budget for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
under the U.S. Department of Defense was $401M in 1995).141,149 Therefore, the estimate 
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of CA = 200M USD is plausible. With these values, Equation (3.1.18) yields the following 
estimate for λ95. 
 
 
( )
λ
α
λ
λ
 −
= ⋅  
 
−  = ⋅   
=
95
95
95
95
95
1 ln
1 0.0149ln
200 0.249
0.0141
L C
C
  
 
Provided in Subsection 3.2.2, the definition of PA (the perceived probability of an 
attack against State A using A’s asset) is estimated from dividing the number of years 
immediately preceding and following the year of interest in which a terrorist attack 
occurred in Moscow with the number of years an attack did not occur. For the year of this 
case study (1995), over a 10-year span from January 1, 1991 until December 31, 2000, 
there was at least one fatal terrorist attack in Moscow 6 out of the 10 years.150 Hence, for 
Case Study 2, PA = 0.6.  
The consequence of a detonation in KA is calculated similarly to Case Study 1 with 
the values computed by utilizing Equations (3.1.21), (3.1.22), and (3.1.23) for an at-target 
attack. Equation (3.1.21) is used to estimate KA for this case study and the assumed target 
is the most populous city in 1995 Russia: Moscow (approximately 9.2M inhabitants in just 
under 880 square kilometers per the 1995 entry for Moscow in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica).151 Using a median value of life taken from a 2015 study by the Russian Center 
for Strategic Researches (4.5 million 2015 rubles) and adjusting to 1995 U.S. dollars yields 
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46,885USD.124 Using calculated data from the Glasstone Nuclear Bomb Effects computerj 
for a 10-kT yield like in Chapter 4 and utilizing a 34B USD annual estimate of the 
reconstruction of Chengdu (a city of similar size of 1995 Moscow) following the 2008 
Szichuan earthquake produces the following components for KA.95 Lastly, the gross 
domestic product per capita per Russian citizen in Moscow is assumed as 2,665.7USD 
taken from the World Bank data website.97 
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Hence, KA = 34.48 billion USD for an at-target attack in Case Study 2.   
 
 
                                               
j Using 7.5 psi for overpressure as stated in Subsection 3.2.3 and using rb for the blast radius and rth for the thermal 
radius. 
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5.1.2. State B Parameters 
Based on a memo to the U.S. Senate from Harvard University’s Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, the U.S. was “poorly prepared to detect weapons being 
imported into the U.S.” in 1997.152 Therefore, the non-interdiction probability of the U.S. 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) is estimated at 75%. Furthermore, the authors of the memo accounted the U.S. 
Congress’ budget for nuclear material interdiction at U.S. borders as $61.1M to meet the 
threat of smuggling weapons of mass destruction. With this information (as close as the 
dollars were in comparison with 1995 currency) and that of the U.S. border system being 
inadequately equipped from 1994-1998, Equation (3.1.24) is reformulated to calculate µ 
(in terms of the annual number of events per $M spent): 
 
( ) [ ] 1ln ln 0.75 0.00471 $M
61.1
B B
B
P C
C
µ −
−   −   = = =     
Equation (3.1.21) is used to estimate KB as the cost of an attack for the time of this case 
study (circa 1995) on Manhattan Island (59.2 km2) as the most populated American city. 
Using estimated values of statistical life as defined in Viscusi and adjusting to 1995 
dollars, the value of statistical life for the average American that year was approximately 
$3.89M.126 Using this, the same 1995 cost estimate of 40B USD for rebuilding portions 
of Los Angeles after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (as in Subsection 4.1.1), and using 
the same fatality percentage from a similar 10-kT blast radius results in the following 
elements for KB:   
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Lastly, in this case study, the gamma value, Γ, is considered to be equal to zero 
because, until the late 1990s, the primary nuclear weapon threat would continue to be 
perceived as originating from the Russian arsenal. Hence, nuclear security for thwarting a 
non-state adversary’s acquisition from another source is not considered for this case study.  
 
5.2. Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
Table 5.2 presents a tabulation of the parameters for Case Study 2 ascertained in 
Section 5.1. The values here form the basis for calculating the uncorrelated and correlated 
strategies for the non-cooperative solutions for States A and B as described in Subsection 
3.3.1. In Section 5.3, the calculated correlated strategies provide the opportunity to explore 
cooperative solution concepts. Lastly, Section 5.4 is a section that provides an analysis of 
the various results presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.  
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Table 5.2. Estimated parametric values for CS2 
α 0.249 [SQ]  
λ95 0.0141 [$M-1] 
PA 0.6 [ ] 
KA 34,483 [$M] 
µ 0.00471 [$M-1] 
KB 133,314 [$M] 
Γ 0 [SQ] 
 
 
Again, a comparison of the parametric values for each case study is included in Section 
9.1. 
 
5.2.1. Non-Cooperative Solution: Uncorrelated Strategies 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the uncorrelated strategies are determined by 
calculating the best response strategies (also referred to as the Nash Equilibrium strategies 
as discussed in Section 2.2) using Equations (3.2.2) and (3.2.5). By using values from 
Table 5.2, the strategic costs for State A and B are computed for each state’s optimal 
uncorrelated strategy, 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵, respectively (with all units in millions USD).  
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The uncorrelated strategic costs are then used to calculate the threat costs for both states 
using Equations (3.1.13) and (3.1.14). 
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Lastly, the total costs 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵 are the sum of the respective state’s strategic (𝐿𝐿′𝑖𝑖) 
and threat (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) costs as shown in Equation (3.1.2). 
 ( ) ( )= + = + =' ' ' ' 304.3 71.0 375.3A A A A ATC C C T C   
( ) ( )= + = + =' ' , ' ' ' 163 212.4 375.4B A B B B BTC C C C T C    
Therefore, the combined total cost for both states in this non-cooperative bilateral 
regime amounts to 750.7M USD with State B investing a similar amount as State A. 
= + = + =' ' ' 375.3 375.4 750.7AB A BTC TC TC  
 
5.2.2. Non-Cooperative Solution: Correlated Strategies 
Utilizing the same process as in Subsection 4.2.2 for Case Study 1, values for the 
correlated strategies (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) are ascertained via the partial derivatives discussed in 
Subsection 3.2.1: 
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Setting each partial derivative to zero allows us to solve for 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗  first and then for 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗. 
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𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
∗  is determined as undefined. Hence, for practical application in this case, 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗ = 0. 
Equations (3.1.13), (3.1.14), (3.1.2), and (3.1.4) are used to calculate the threat costs, 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗)and 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗), and the total state and regime costs, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗), 
in terms of millions of USD.  
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The results included in Table 5.3 as the uncorrelated and correlated results utilize 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.3. Annualized costs [in $M] from the non-cooperative game  
 Uncorrelated 
[$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 304.3 446.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 71.0 9.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 375.3 456.3 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 163.0 0 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 212.4 61.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 375.4 61.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 750.7 517.8 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows a 3D representation of the solution space (pairs of strategic costs) 
between State A (the RF) and State B (the U.S.) in terms of total regime cost versus total 
costs to both states.  
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Figure 5.1. 3D representation of total annual regime cost for case study 1 
 
 
In this plot, the cyan dot represents the correlated strategies for States A and B and 
the red dot displays the uncorrelated strategies. The vertical displacement between the two 
strategies is the surplus, v (below calculated using Equation (3.1.12)).  
 
= −
= − =
*'
750.7 517.8 232.9
AB ABv TC TC
v
  
In this case study, the surplus (i.e., the amount in savings for the collective 
partnership) amounts to 232.9M USD which results from the two states correlating their 
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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strategies. How best to distribute the surplus in savings is discussed in the Section 5.3 
(page 134) as transferring the utility within the relationship. 
 
5.3. Bargaining Solution Concepts and Utility Transferability 
Figure 5.2 shows a simple two dimensional plot of the cooperative game structure 
(total cost to each of the two states) of Case Study 2. The horizontal axis represents the 
total cost to the RF (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) and the vertical axis represents the total cost to the U.S. (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵). 
Of note, the red point (304.3, 163, 750.7) signifies the uncorrelated strategies by both 
states (i.e., the NE strategies). The cyan point (446.8, 0, 517.8) graphically represents the 
calculated combined strategies of the states achieved by coordinating strategies for 
minimizing the cost to the regime (i.e., correlated strategies as in Figure 5.1). The 
triangular blue-shaded region represents the core of the cooperative game where various 
imputations (or ratios of surplus divisions) between the players are included. The 
collection of imputations forms the basis for the cooperative game: the correlated 
strategies depend on the negotiated bargaining solutions. The hypotenuse of the core is the 
efficiency frontier of the strategies – otherwise referred to as the line of utility 
transferability (UT) line where, through side payments, a bargaining solution, can be 
hypothetically achieved benefiting both states. 
Two bargaining solutions lie on the UT line: the initial correlated strategy (in cyan) 
and the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) in orange. As aforementioned, the red dot (375.3, 
375.4) is the uncorrelated strategic pairing for both states and, when they correlate their 
strategies, the cyan point (456.3, 61.5) on the UT line shows the resulting strategy set 
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under the assumption that Russia bore the entire strategic cost of securing its materials and 
the U.S. only covered the strategic costs and interdiction efforts. This is the first step in 
determining the minimum total cost to both States A and B collectively. Of note, this 
optimal correlated strategy point lies outside the game’s core – meaning that if State A 
were required to bear the entire strategic cost of securing its own materials, then its total 
costs would be larger than if will have to invest more than the amount they would if they 
were to adopt an optimal uncorrelated strategy. The NBS constitutes a 50-50 split of the 
surplus between the players (intersecting at the orange point in Figure 5.2). In this solution, 
the two states evenly split the surplus/savings gained from correlating their strategies 
(232.9M USD) so each gains a savings, in total cost, of 116.45M USD – hence, the NBS 
solution occurs at (258.8, 258.9). 
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Figure 5.2. Imputations of the U.S.-RF game (1995) 
 
 
Figure 5.2 presents two simple bargaining solutions for States A and B in this 
situation. A deduction from this data is that, when correlation occurred, the majority of 
the observed reduction in the regime’s total cost occurs by reducing State B’s total cost 
through investing in State A’s security. As discussed in Subsection 5.1.2, the national 
QNBS 
QCOR 
P 
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interdiction program in the U.S. was not a robust system. Therefore, the only alternative 
available under to the U.S. was to assist in securing  Russia’s nuclear assets. In addition 
to other potential solutions, Table 5.3 introduces two other solution concepts in the 
appended third and fourth columns termed as the CBA-Neutral (CBA-N) and the CBA-
Subsidize (CBA-S) strategies.  
 
 
Table 5.4. Uncorrelated, correlated, CA-Neutral, and CA-Subsidize strategies  
 Uncorrelated 
[$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
CBA-Neutral 
[$M] 
CBA-Subsidize 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 304.3 446.8 304.2 0 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 71.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 375.3 456.3 313.7 9.5 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 163.0 0 142.6 446.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 212.4 61.5 61.5 61.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 375.4 61.5 204.1 508.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 750.7 517.8 517.8 517.8 
 
 
 
 In the CBA-N strategy, which is an abbreviation for the Strategic Cost 
Neutralization (CBA-N) strategy point, the states agree to correlate their strategies so as to 
arrive to the UT line but State B bears the maximum burden of paying for all additional 
strategic cost, say CBA, required to secure A’s nuclear assets beyond the level attained by 
following the uncorrelated strategy.  For this case study, CBA = 142.6M USD in order to 
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achieve the collective benefit. This leads to 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 313.7M and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 204.1M (with TB 
still at 61.5M). This solution allows both states to have a lesser total cost than if both were 
not to correlate their strategies but the split in surplus savings would favor State B.  
In the CBA-S strategy, State A’s entire strategic cost (including that above and 
beyond the additional investment to reach the correlated strategy point) is borne by State 
B: a total of 446.8M USD (304.2M USD for A’s original strategic cost and 142.6M USD 
of additional strategic cost necessary from somewhere in order to achieve the correlated 
strategic cost). This leaves State A with only the burden of the calculated threat cost of 
9.5M USD – seeing that no other state can absorb the burden of one state’s threat cost. 
State B’s total costs can range between the CBA-S and CBA-N solution concepts. These two 
strategic points are identified on the gray utility transferability (UT) line in Figure 5.3 as 
the purple (9.5, 508.3) and the red (313.7, 204.1) points respectively. 
The CBA-N strategy point appears at the endpoint of the red line at (313.8, 204). 
The purple point signifying the CBA-S strategy point shows the intercept where State B 
bears the entire strategic investment for securing State A’s materials: 365.8M. This ex-
core strategy set presents a substantial benefit to State A: Russia. Similarly, though the 
correlated (456.3, 61.5) strategy point is on the UT line, it is also an ex-core strategy point 
which is not ideal to the regime. Another potential strategic point shown in Figure 5.3 (the 
intersect of the UT line by the black dotted line) occurs if State B were to bear all of State 
A’s additional security costs (142.6M) as well as allow State A to benefit from all the 
savings (232.9M) after the establishment of the bilateral regime. Therefore, State B’s 
investment would not shift from its original uncorrelated investment strategy. This point, 
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signified as the intersection of the black dotted line and the UT line, occurs at (142.4, 
375.4).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Imputations of the U.S.-RF (1995) + CBAN  
 
 
QNBS 
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P 
QALL 
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These potential bilateral regime strategies segue into the next discussion (Section 
5.4) of parsing strategic costs of securing State A’s materials into separate contributions 
by the game’s players – not unlike the relationship exhibited by former-Cold War enemies 
the U.S. and Russia in the mid-1990s (such as in this case study). The resulting total cost 
of the regime (and the corresponding individual state costs) shows a direct benefit to both 
states in this situation. With State A and B’s threat costs being reduced and State B’s 
strategic cost decreasing to zero (when considering the only perceived threat of a nuclear 
security event against State B is from State A), the resulting strategy of both can be 
inferred as to invest heavily into State A’s nuclear security.  
 
5.4. Analysis and Discussion 
 The strategic points presented in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are detailed in Table 5.5.  
 
 
Table 5.5. Imputations of the cooperative game  
  Savings 
Split 
for A 
[$M] 
Savings 
Split 
for B 
[$M] 
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟
 TCA [$M] 
TCB 
[$M] 
TCAB 
[$M] 
P -- -- -- 375.3 375.4 750.7 
QCOR -81 313.9 -3.88 456.3 61.5 517.8 
QNBS 116.45 116.45 1.00 258.85 258.95 517.8 
QCBAN 61.5 171.4 2.79 313.8 204 517.8 
QCBAS  365.8 -132.9 -0.36 9.5 508.3 517.8 
QALL 232.9 0 0.00 142.4 375.4 517.8 
QACT -- -- -- 519 170780 171299 
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Each imputation is a strategy Qi with i referring to the strategy name. P is the initial 
state in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 at 375.3, 375.4) which represent the Nash equilibrium (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵) of the uncorrelated game. The total regime cost is also included in the final 
column. The first two columns in Table 5.5 correspond to the surplus (or savings) split in 
actual quantities of $M for each state and the third column conveys the resulting ratio of 
the savings split as discussed in Subsection 2.3.2. The blank cells imply there is no surplus 
to divide between the players.  
The 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  value denotes the ratio of savings that B receives over that of which A 
receives (when 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ > 1, B receives more of the surplus but when 0 < 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ < 1, A receives 
more). When 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ < 0, the savings division, and therefore, the imputation, resides outside 
the core of the game. The QCOR imputation conveys the initial assessment of a correlated 
solution concept where the total regime cost is minimized. The QNBS imputation is the 
Nash Bargaining Solution. The QCBAN imputation simulates State B receiving 2.79 times 
more of the surplus than A but also can imply that A’s additional strategic cost (beyond C'A) can be neutralized by State B as well. Alternatively and though outside the core, the 
QCBAS imputation (with 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ = −0.36 ), shows State A receiving a favorable quantity of 
the surplus to subsidize its entire strategic cost (𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴). Additional annual investments of 
this ilk could prove problematic for State B to maintain over the long term.  
Between the QALL and QCBAS imputations shows an interesting result of the 
methodology. Previous scholars have introduced concepts of certain states’ abilities of 
utilizing nuclear insecurity as a commodity.33 In this case study, there is an area of 
cooperation between the states that, though the imputation does reside in the cooperative 
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game’s core (hence, it is a viable strategic solution), one state can assuredly claim a clear 
benefit over the other by receiving a negative total cost in the regime. Obviously, the 
gained benefit could provide incentive for State A to continue with the cooperative regime. 
Though State B would receive no additional benefit in the form of saving from its 
investment, TCB for the QALL imputation is equal to its utility for B’s uncorrelated strategy. 
Actual investments determined through published data are included at the bottom of Table 
5.4 as QACT. If QACT is assumed as an accurate representation of the regime’s actual 
strategies in 1995, two conclusions can be made: 1) the states could have better managed 
their respective strategies for the benefit of all (e.g., by investing more in Russian nuclear 
asset security) and 2) the actual strategies taken during 1995 were not a Nash Equilibrium 
between the states.  
Table 5.6 is constructed using values from Equation (3.1.26). All Ui values are 
based of the change in utility from the NE solution concept (i.e., the uncorrelated strategy 
set).  
 
 
Table 5.6. Tabulated change in utility per imputation 
 UA UB UAB 
QCOR -0.22 0.84 0.31 
QNBS 0.31 0.31 0.31 
QCBAN 0.16 0.46 0.31 
QCBAS  0.97 -0.35 0.31 
QALL 0.62 0.00 0.31 
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Both states would see some change in utilities based on which solution concept is 
achieve. Some solution concepts result in positive utility change for only one state (QCOR, 
QCBAS, and QALL) and others convey a positive change in utility for both states (QNBS and 
QCBAN). The overall lesson with this case study is that assuming State A and State B would 
come to a consensus on the terms of a bilateral agreement for nuclear security, both states 
could benefit according to the UAB values in the third column and any 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  ratio between 0 
and 1 could help influence the Russian strategy. Lastly, the collective benefit to the regime, 
UAB = 31%, shows a positive change in utility from the uncorrelated strategy set.   
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6. CASE STUDY 3: RUSSIA – U.S. (2008) 
 
Case Study 3 consists of the bilateral security regime between the Russian 
Federation and the U.S. as States A and B, respectively. The difference here is the year of 
the game model: 2008. This year is used herein due to detailed information being available 
through various publications by Bunn and Schwartz as well as the 2008 fiscal year being 
in the midst of a successfully, long-running cooperative relationship between the states. 
As opposed to 1985 (when a relationship was non-existent), 1995 (when the first year had 
yet to yield tangible results from the CTR and MPC&A), and 2015 (after the relationship 
had deteriorated between the states’ governments), 2008 represents a year identified by 
substantial cooperation for the collective benefit of securing special nuclear material 
against any perceived attack in Russia.  
Near the end of 2008, U.S.-Russian relations were at a low due to the strained 
relationship in the wake of that year’s Russian-Georgian war. The change in the American 
administration proved an opportunity to reset the relationship and plow ahead with other 
nuclear-related accords such as the NewSTART treaty.153 However, other activities 
regarding nuclear security were also in full swing: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(announced in 2004 for minimizing nuclear material around the world – large component 
consisted of removing HEU from Russian and Russian-provided reactors); the Second 
Line of Defense (established in 1998 to equip susceptible border crossings around Russia 
to minimize nuclear traffic); and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(launched in 2006 under Russian and American leadership /to thwart the advent nuclear 
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terrorism) among others.154,155,156 Though these programs were primarily multilateral, we 
simplify the concept into a bilateral model in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
 
6.1. Evaluating the Game Model Parameters 
Data for the 2008 case study were attained through publications from various 
research organizations. These published studies (identified in the subsequent sections) 
discuss investments in nuclear security by the U.S. and Russia in light of a newly emerging 
nuclear terrorist threat. Leadership in both states pushed for increased collaboration in 
securing nuclear assets and, especially after the 2008 election of Barack Obama, a strong 
push was made to facilitate programs for securing all (special) nuclear materials. Hence, 
because the security of nuclear materials was on the forefront of many minds, many studies 
were published on state-level investments in nuclear security.  
 
6.1.1. State A Parameters 
In this case study, like the previous two, State A is the Russian Federation (RF). 
Financial contribution data were attained from 2007 documents and estimated for 2008 
for this case study. Specifically for calculating λ08 and α08, estimates were needed for 
plausible Russian nuclear security expenditures and a 2008 Russian material loss rate. 
According to Bunn, the Russian Finance ministry committed approximately 30M USD in 
funding for sustaining “security measures at nuclear weapon sites” in 2007.157 Bunn 
expands this by stating that though individual sites were financially responsible for 
providing adequate security and accounting measures at their respective sites, the Ministry 
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of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the 12th Main 
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense all contributed essential security components as 
well. In addition to the published 30M USD for nuclear weapons security, the U.S. also 
provided an additional 87.1M USD under the CTR in 2007 for enhancing the “weapons 
storage security” in Russia (allocated from a total budget of 372M USD under the CTR).158 
Thus, in 2007, a total of just under 120M USD was spent on nuclear weapons security in 
the RF. Furthermore, in 2007, the total Russian military budget amounted to 1100B RUB 
(equivalent to 44B USD) according to Cooper.159 When only considering the Russian 
contribution of 30M USD as a percentage of the total federal budget in 2007 (44B USD), 
the percentage of the federal budget allocated to nuclear weapons security is 0.06%. With 
the American 87.1M USD contribution in 2007, the total amount spent on nuclear 
weapons security that year in Russia consisted of roughly 0.266% of the total Russian 
military budget. Therefore, assuming 0.266% of the entire Russian military budget is 
allocated to weapons security and using 1394B RUB as the 2008 Russian military budget 
(55M USD) with the USD-RUB exchange rate that year, the total 2008 expenditure on 
nuclear weapons security is estimated at 146.38M USD.  
Regarding (non-weapon) nuclear materials, Rosatom proposed a seven-year 
budget for a new Federal Targeted Program (FTP) to target nuclear safety and security in 
2007.160 The amount listed in this report was 132B RUB (5.28B USD per year for 7 years) 
starting in 2008 and included provisions for (1) nuclear material protection, control, and 
accounting; (2) material consolidation and reduction; (3) facility clean-up; (4) spent 
nuclear fuel storage; and (5) site restoration. Only constituting a fifth of the total budget 
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and only 1 out of the seven years, the amount for 2008 is approximately 150.9B USD. 
Therefore, for computing λ08, C08 = 146.4M + 150.9M = 297.3M. 
For the 2008 case study, 𝛼𝛼08 is estimated as slightly lower than in 1995 at 0.2 SQyr . 
Though an arbitrary reduction, it can be justified by the fact that, by 2008, Russia and the 
U.S. had had over ten years of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting programs to secure nuclear assets throughout Russia. 
And, with such longstanding arrangements, it can be argued that the overall rate of asset 
loss if nothing had been spent on security in 2008 would have been lower. Furthermore, 
with the Russian economy being substantially in a better financial situation than in 1995, 
the expenditures on securing nuclear materials assisted in reducing the potential threat of 
nuclear theft. Only one major security event occurred involving special nuclear material 
from Russia: a theft of three natural uranium fuel rods from the Chepetsky Mechanical 
Plant in Glazov consisted of a total of just over 30 kilograms of natural uranium (as shown 
in Table 6.1).152 The definition of significant quantities for natural uranium is 10,000 kg 
Unat = 1 SQ.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Nuclear trafficking events in 2008 for computing L08 
Date Location of Confiscation Material 
Mass [g] SQ 
December Glazov, Russia Natural U 30700 3.07e-3 
TOTAL    3.07-3 
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Hence, using α08 and the appropriate loss rate, L(C08), shown in Table 6.1, λ08 is computed 
below.  
( )08
08
08
08
1
08
1 ln
1 0.00307ln
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0.014 $M
L C
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λ −
 
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Applying the same method as in the previous 1995 case study for determining the 
probability (related to the frequency) of large-scale fatal terrorist events in the near ten 
years (January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2013) yields a value of 0.3 for terrorist acts 
that occurred in 2003, 2004, and 2010. We use PA = 0.3 as a rough estimate for an at-
target detonation with the understanding that if we consider an on-site detonation, PA 
could be higher (as discussed in Subsection 3.2). 
 Lastly, the at-target consequence parameter, KA, is as in  both Chapters 4 and 5. 
The various constituents listed below are used in Equation (3.1.21). 
• 11,294,000 for the interpolated 2008 population of Moscow146;  
• 2,511 km2 as the land area153;  
• 11,635 USD is estimated as the 2008 GDP per capita97;  
• 64,950 USD as the adjusted value of statistical life in 2008124;  
• the range of 0.77 km to simulate a single 10kT yield explosion producing a 
minimum 7.5 psi overpressure effect needed create a 50% fatality rate (which is 
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based on the most common weapon in current operationk  within the Russian 
nuclear arsenal)154; and  
• an estimate of 63,390M USD for rebuilding a vast portion of Moscow based on a 
modern city-wide rebuild such as post-2012 Hurricane Sandy on New York Cityl. 
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Therefore, in this model, at-target KA = 63.736B USD. 
 
6.1.2. State B Parameters 
The values for the U.S. parameters (µ, PB, KB, and Γ) are for 2008. Recalling 
Equation (3.1.24) and using Schwartz’ estimations, 2008 expenditures by federal agencies 
                                               
k As of January 2016, 460 warheads are on 46 R-36M2 (SS-18 Voyevoda) with an estimated yield of 750 - 1000kT, 
150 warheads are on 150 Topol class missiles with estimated yields of 800kT each, and 292 warheads on 73 RS-24 
missiles with at least 1MT yields each according to http://russianforces.org/missiles. 
l A Category 3 hurricane, Sandy struck New York City in October 2012 and was estimated to have caused $67.6B in 
damage according to NOAA: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.  
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on nuclear security are categorized into five groups. Crossing multiple departments and 
program offices, Schwartz defines the following five groups: nuclear forces and 
operational support; deferred environmental and health costs; missile defense; nuclear 
threat reduction; and nuclear incident management. The nuclear threat reduction category 
is further parsed into three more subcategories: prevention/securing; elimination; and 
nonproliferation. Care was taken to further deconstruct the subcategorization of 
expenditures for prevention and securing into two separate groups for that year: 
$2,673.3M and $437.1M, respectively.112. Using the former value for investment by the 
U.S. and a common non-detection probability, PB, of 5% (as described in Subsection 
2.2.2), the value for µ is calculated below: 
( ) [ ]ln ln 0.05
0.00112
2673.3
B B
B
P C
C
µ
−   − = = =  
 
Invoking Equation (3.1.21) again from Subsection 2.2.2, KB is the consequence of a 
nuclear detonation on U.S. soil with a Russian 10kT device. The individual costs from the 
loss of lives (Khu) requires using previously defined cost of life estimations.126 The 
economic impact of losing those lives is based on GDP per capita for 2008 (Kec) and the 
similar loss from Subsection 6.1.1 (Kni) such as New York City (adjusted for inflation).  
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= + + = + + =$218,232M $1,243M $63,400M $282,875Mhu ec niB B B BK K K K  
 
The last value for the case study, Γ, signifies the potential for a nuclear threat to 
arise from elsewhere beyond Russia. In 2008, the number of states with nuclear weapons 
had increased by one – the addition of North Korea increased the number of nuclear-armed 
states (P5 + India, Pakistan, and North Korea). Moreover, security in the latter two 
countries (Pakistan and North Korea) had been a continual concern against a non-state 
(and sub-state) threat.161 To accommodate this additional threat, Case Study 3 uses Γ > 0. 
The magnitude of Γ calls into question how much of State B’s nuclear terrorist threat 
comes from State A. Assuming Γ is the same as the loss rate for State A, then State B’s 
threat would come equally from within State A and anywhere that is not State A. However, 
if Γ is greater than the attained loss rate, then the assumption is State B bears at least the 
same level of threat (if not more) from beyond State A than State A itself. Due to the long 
term collaborations on nuclear material and weapon security between the U.S. and the RF 
until 2008, Γ = 0.00307 SQ/yr.  
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6.2. Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
The estimated values from Section 6.1 are collected in Table 6.2. From these, the 
non-cooperative solutions will be shown in the subsequent subsections. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Estimated parametric values for case study 3  
α 0.2 [SQ] 
λ08 0.014 [$M-1] 
PA 0.3 [ ] 
KA 63,736 [$M] 
µ 0.00112 [$M-1] 
KB 282,875 [$M] 
Γ 0.00307 [SQ] 
 
 
Notably, though it seems that m has not increased much from the 1985 case study 
(conveying a porous border), the 2008 value relies on the increased rate of interdiction but 
also additional expense of such a national system. 
 
6.2.1. Non-Cooperative Solution: Uncorrelated Strategies 
Recalling Equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.6) for determining 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵 leads to the 
following results: 
( )
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In this case, State A’s strategic annual investment is 283.6M USD which yields 
the total cost of 354.8M USD. Per the methodology in Section 2.4, solving for the 
American NE requires solving for 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ : 
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= + = + =' ' ' 354.8 1576.6 1931.4AB A BTC TC TC  
 
As shown above, the total cost to State B (the U.S.) is much greater than that for 
State A (the Russian Federation) and the total cost to the regime of the two states with no 
cooperation is 1,931M USD.  
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6.2.2. Non-Cooperative Solution: Correlated Strategies 
The correlated, CBA-neutralization and CBA-subsidization solutions are computed 
using the aforementioned MATLAB script and presented in Table 6.3 as an attempt to 
quantify the bilateral relationship between Russia and the U.S. in 2008. Notable here is 
the fact that the costs to State B are all greater than those costs to State B in the 1995 case 
study. The reason for this stems from Γ ≠ 0 seeing that the driving factor for State B’s 
threat cost is external beyond State A. 
Table 6.3. Annualized costs [in $M] from case study 3 (2008) 
Uncorrelated 
[$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
CBA-Neutralized 
[$M] 
CBA-Subsidized 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 283.6 476.7 283.6 0 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 71.2 4.7 4.7 4.7 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 354.8 481.4 288.3 4.7 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 684.3 44.8 237.9 521.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 892.3 892.3 892.3 892.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 1576.6 937.1 1130.2 1413.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 1931.4 1418.5 1418.5 1418.5 
The red and cyan points represent the uncorrelated and correlated results in Figure 6.1. 
   
157 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Case study 3: Russia-US (2008) 
 
 
As is shown, the vertical displacement between the uncorrelated and correlated 
strategy points amounts to 512.9M USD (1931.4 − 1418.5 = 512.9). Thus, the 512.9M 
USD surplus in savings defines the range for the bargaining solutions discussed in Section 
6.3. 
 
 
 
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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6.3. Bargaining Solution Concepts and Utility Transferability 
In Figure 6.2, five different potential bargaining solutions are shown (along with 
the uncorrelated strategy set in red). The line containing the hypotenuse of the blue shaded 
region (the cooperative game’s core) is the utility transferability (UT) line with a slope of 
-1. This signifies that the surplus savings is distributed wholly between the Russian 
Federation (A) and the U.S. (B). The uncorrelated strategy point determined in Subsection 
6.2.1. is the red point at (354.8, 1576.6) and the correlated strategy from Subsection 6.2.2 
is the cyan point at (481.4, 937.1) – replicating the same color scheme from Figure 6.1. 
The slope between these two solution points is -5.05 (substantially less than the UT line’s 
slope of -1). The greater difference of these lines’ slopes conveys the strength of the 
collaborative solution benefitting both states. The orange line segment splitting the 
hypotenuse evenly conveys the Nash bargaining solution which is a commonly discussed 
result for games with cooperation signifying the equal distribution of the surplus between 
the game’s players. This point at (98.4, 1320.1) lies within the game’s core conveying this 
solution’s plausibility. Importantly, the second red point at (288.3, 1130.2) signifies the 
when B neutralizes A’s additional investment in its own security to reach the collaborative 
strategic solution. A previously-discussed solution (introduced in previous chapters) is the 
purple dot at (4.7, 1413.8) where B subsidizes all of A’s strategic costs including 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 
(a.k.a. the CBA-subsidized bargained solution). This implies that A will receive 350.1M 
USD of the 512.9M USD surplus. Meanwhile, the black-dotted line segment ends at the 
black point at (-158.1, 1576.6). This bargaining solution strategy point implies A receives 
a negative total cost.  
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Figure 6.2. Russia-US (2008) – cooperative game core 
 
 
State A’s solution space between (0, 1418.5) and QALL at (-158.1, 1576.6) on the 
UT line resides in the game’s core which shows a feasibility of a strategic bargaining 
solution between the states where State A receives a negative cost benefit. Alternatively 
stated, the RF would receive a profit in agreeing to enter into a cooperative agreement 
QCBAS 
QCBAN 
QALL 
QNBS 
QCOR 
P 
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with the U.S. if the pre-negotiated bargaining point resided in this area of the game’s core. 
As shown in the next subsection, if the states were to agree to this strategic point, Russia 
could use its nuclear insecurity as a means to make a profit. Therefore, this figure conveys 
Corr’s underlying theory of nuclear insecurity as a commodity as mentioned in Section 
3.4 but discussed in more detail in Subsection 9.4.33 
 
6.4. Analysis and Discussion 
The uncorrelated, best-response solution, P, and bargaining solutions described in 
the previous section, Qi, are displayed in Table 6.4 with more detailed data to help describe 
each strategy set. Considering the uncorrelated strategy set for Russia and the U.S. 
provides no collective benefit, no data are included as a savings split (the first three 
columns). QCOR conveys the utility (in terms of total cost) for each state if they are to 
collectively pursue a strategy that minimizes the bilateral regime’s total (the combined 
strategic and threat) cost. For this 2008 Russia-U.S. case study, the regime’s minimized 
total cost amounts to 1418.5M USD. Therefore, any solution on the UT line (Qi in Table 
6.4) will maintain the total regime’s minimized cost. QNBS represents the Nash bargaining 
solution which exhibits a 50-50 split in the surplus saving of 512.9M USD and therefore 
holds a 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  value of 1. Next, QCBAN is the CBA-neutralized solution set for when B 
neutralizes A’s additional strategic cost so that both can benefit from the collaboration. In 
this imputation, the U.S. invests the additional 193.1M USD (𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶) − 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶) =1130.2 − 937.1 = 193.1) for Russia to achieve the equivalent expenditure of the 
correlated strategy. This implies that only 66.5M USD goes to Russia for its additional 
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investment (over its uncorrelated strategy responsibility of 354.8M USD). The 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  ratio 
leans heavily for the U.S. at 6.71. 
 
  
Table 6.4. Imputations of the cooperative game  
  Savings 
Split 
for A 
[$M] 
Savings 
Split 
for B 
[$M] 
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟
 TCA [$M] 
TCB 
[$M] 
TCAB 
[$M] 
P -- -- -- 354.8 1576.6 1931.4 
QCOR -126.6 639.5 -5.05 481.4 937.1 1418.5 
QNBS 256.45 256.45 1.00 98.35 1320.15 1418.5 
QCBAN 66.5 446.4 6.71 288.3 1130.2 1418.5 
QCBAS 350.1 162.8 0.47 4.7 1413.8 1418.5 
QALL 512.9 0 0.00 -158.1 1576.6 1418.5 
QACT -- -- -- 362.5 3236.9 3599.4 
 
 
QCBAS is the bargaining solution where the U.S. pays for all of Russia’s investment 
(signifying a potential attempt at influencing it to maintain the nuclear security bilateral 
regime between the two states). In this imputation, the U.S. covers all costs for Russia 
(save for Russia’s threat cost) and the solution strategy point is at (4.7, 1413.8). This also 
signifies that the surplus split is slightly more favorable to Russia: 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ = 0.47. QALL is the 
solution point for when both states agree to provide all surplus savings (512.9M USD) to 
Russia (𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ = 0). This point is displayed at (-158.1, 1576.6). Notably, QALL yields 
negative values for Russia (though still residing within the game’s core). With this 
solution, it can be conveyed that Russia is receiving a benefit from the collaboration in the 
form of a negative cost (i.e., receives a profit as part of these solutions sets). This illustrates 
   
162 
 
Corr’s theory of nuclear insecurity potentially being used as a commodity from which a 
state can receive a profit. As unfair as these solutions are, they are not wholly 
unrepresentative of historical nuclear security arrangements. Specifically in 2008, the 
Russian-U.S. relationship for applying nuclear security was beginning to receive some 
concern domestically in the U.S. for providing too much to Russia.162 The results in Table 
6.4 seem to illustrate this point especially when one considers how historically, the 
relationship between the U.S. and Russia must have resided to the right of QCBAS (where 
the U.S. subsidizes all of Russia’s strategic costs – similar to the situation in 1995). A 
more precise assessment of the regime’s bargained solution concept could be surmised 
with more readily available data on how Russia was investing in their nuclear security. 
 
 
Table 6.5. Tabulated benefits in utility results per imputation 
 UA UB UAB 
QCOR -0.36 0.41 0.27 
QNBS 0.72 0.16 0.27 
QCBAN 0.19 0.28 0.27 
QCBAS 0.99 0.10 0.27 
QALL 1.45 0.00 0.27 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 presents the utility benefits (as discussed in Subsection 3.1.2.) for each 
state and the regime. As in previous case studies, positive values exhibit strategies that are 
beneficial to the state or regime whereas negative values imply lost utility. For the regime 
in 2008, the last column, UAB, shows a collective benefit of 0.27 – thus conveying the 
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existence of at least some benefit in utility to both states (over the utility of the 
uncorrelated strategies). QCOR is the only imputation where one state receives a negative 
utility (relating to the only solution point falling outside the game’s core in Figure 6.2). 
QNBS and QCBAS yield similar utility benefits for both states. Interestingly, as can be seen 
with QALL, when UA > 1, State A receives a negative cost at the detriment to State B despite 
the regime’s benefit from any collaboration.   
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7. CASE STUDY 4: RUSSIA – U.S. (2015) 
 
In the modern era of deterring non-state adversaries from attaining a nuclear attack 
capability (previously discussed in Subsection 1.3 as the fourth wave by Knopf), the 
danger has been elevated to the forefront of many minds.163 The numerous terrorist attacks 
since the mid-1990s have shined a light where scholars and decision makers look to 
propose ideas in diminishing the potential nuclear hazard presented by those who would 
do harm. One of the largest attempts by any coalition of states (achieved by Russia and 
U.S.),  the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, as first mentioned in Case Study 1, was 
aimed at curbing the non-state nuclear threat and was reaching its planned expiration in 
2013.164 As of the program’s expiration, from the U.S. perspective there was “no legal 
basis for continued cooperation on security for nuclear weapons.”165 In light of numerous 
previous successful joint activities (e.g., securing weapons of mass destruction, 
eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons, and facilitating the removal of nuclear 
weapons out of former Soviet republics), the Russian government elected to sign a new 
bilateral framework with the U.S. under the umbrella of the Multilateral Nuclear 
Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR).166 The new program 
constituted a narrower scope consisting of collaborations “in several areas of 
nonproliferation collaboration, including protecting, controlling, and accounting for 
nuclear materials.”166 Though not ideal, only non-weapons usable material would continue 
to be secured under a similar program meant to continue components of the old material 
protection, control, and accounting program. However, relations between the U.S. and the 
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Russian Federation soured after a series of events in 2014.m Due to this and other mounting 
domestic political pressures in Russia, as well as in the U.S., all collaborations between 
the two states ceased.n Furthermore, Russia did not participate in the final 2016 Nuclear 
Security Summit. As unfortunate as this was for the international nuclear security regime, 
Russia maintained a stated commitment to continue unilaterally its efforts in advancing 
the security enhancements at various facilities. In contrast to the first two case studies, the 
threat of a non-state adversary acquiring a nuclear weapon from a source other than Russia 
is non- zero. Hence, Γ > 0. In sum, the year 2015 was chosen (as explained in Section 
3.5) as the closest year with full retrievable data at the time of this composition. 
 
7.1. Evaluating the Game Model Parameters 
An attempt at representing plausible modern-day estimates for nuclear security 
was made. Since the end of the CTR program on January 1, 2015, published documents 
with information on Russia’s nuclear security efforts have been scarce. With the lack of 
collaboration between the U.S. and Russia, joint activities between the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) and the Russian 12th Main Directorate, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) and Russia’s Rosatom, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
Russian Gosatomnadzor have lacked any publications with reportable data. Rosatom was 
established in 2007 after Rostekhnadzor (the result of splitting the responsibilities of 
Gosatomnadzor in 2004) to maintain material protection, control and accountancy on non-
                                               
m The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine was cause for heightened tensions between the states and 
thusly, many future joint plans were scrapped in response. 
n The only continued collaboration was under space exploration between the respective space agencies. 
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military nuclear material. As mentioned, the 12th Main Directorate collaborated with the 
U.S. DOD under the CTR on securing nuclear weapons, but Rosatom has worked 
extensively with the U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration to meet the 
needs of securing material against non-state use. Collaborations continued until political 
pressure strained the relationship. On both sides, tensions rose: among other things, the 
U.S. was critical of Russia’s regional incursions into Georgia and the Ukraine and the 
Russian government had reserved issues with American insistence on weapons/material 
inspections and verification activities under the CTR. 167,168,169 In all, the relationship 
deteriorated at both ends. With this, the game is defined by populating it with values for 
the following parameters: State A (α, λ, PA, KA) and State B (µ, KB, Γ). 
 
7.1.1. State A Parameters 
For current statuses of funding the security of a nuclear weapons program, it is 
difficult to find accurate representative numbers. For this reason, the various input data 
values estimated here are to serve as a basis for making sensible estimates inferred from 
publications and by subject matter experts in nuclear security, arms control, and Russian 
economic studies. The first estimated parameter is α as 0.15 assets lost per year when no 
funding is applied to nuclear security. This further reduction from the 2008 case study is 
attributed to the strengthening Russian economy (which could have contributed to 
reducing the financial incentive an adversary may have had to divert material) and the 
increase in power and influence by the Russian government on the world stage as a leader 
against nuclear terrorism through numerous international endeavors: GINCT, 
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UNSCR1540, etc.170 With α, we compute λ15 (an estimated reduction in loss rate) as 
discussed in Subsection 3.1.2.1.For the loss rate and corresponding expense for security 
by Russia in 2015, inferring data from published articles and other scholarly research lead 
to plausible parameter inputs used in this case study. For example, the loss rate of 2015 
was calculated using the same method in the previous two case studies. Table 7.1 includes 
the tabulated recorded cases of nuclear trafficking of weapons-usable nuclear material 
from various published sources in terms of significant quantities from Russia.143,171,172   
 
 
Table 7.1. Nuclear trafficking incidents for calculating loss rate in 2015 
Date Location of Confiscation Material Mass [g] SQ 
August Chisinau, Moldova DU 1800 2.7e-7 
June Chisinau, Moldova HEU 7 5.6e-4 
January Blagoveshchensk, Russia Th 2200 1.1e-4 
June Moscow, Russia Th 56000 2.8e-3 
TOTAL    3.47e-3 
 
 
Similar to the methods presented in the 2008 case study in Chapter 6, the 
investment for nuclear security in Russia was estimated using various documents with 
data from 2007 and a Russian National financial report on nuclear and radiation safety 
from 2015. The combination of loss rate data from 2015 in Table 7.1 and Russian 
expenditure estimates were used to make plausible assumptions of 2015 data for this case 
study (Russian expenditures for 2015 were difficult to attain at the time of this writing – 
therefore, 2007 data was used and several adjustments were made). The Russian Duma 
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federal budget allocated a total of 3,973B RUB for military expenditures (using the 2015 
exchange rate of 0.02 USD to 1 RUB, this amounts to 79.46B USD).173,174 The Russian 
military budget allocation for nuclear weapon security can be estimated at around 190.7M 
USD (0.24% of the Russian military budget for securing nuclear weapons if assumed at 
the 2007 level of both Russian and American contributions). Regarding (non-weapon) 
nuclear materials, the publically-available Fourth National Report of the Russian 
Federation states that, in 2007, Rosatom proposed an eight year budget for a Federal 
Targeted Program (FTP) in Nuclear and Radiation Safety Assurance which, among other 
tasks, consisted of “ensuring and monitoring” nuclear and radiological material and 
activities during normal operations at Rosatom facilities – nuclear material protection, 
control, and accounting.175 The amount listed in this report was 20B RUB for all eight 
years. Using the exchange rate of roughly 1 USD to 25 RUB from 2007 and estimating 
the 2015 amount by calculating 1/8 of the original amount yields approximately 100M 
USD.176 Therefore, the total amount for C15 used to calculate λ15 per Equation (3.1.18) is 
290.7M USD – as shown below: 
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Unlike previous case studies, an assumption for PA was made using any fatal 
terrorist attack in Russian for the preceding decade to 2015. Using the 2010 bombings of 
the Moscow metro station and the 2011 bombing at Moscow’s international Domodedovo 
   
169 
 
Airport, PA is set at 0.2 assuming an at-target detonation (contrary to an on-site detonation, 
as discussed in Subsection 3.2.2, where the conditional probability of a detonation on-site 
given material is confiscated by a terrorist group is certain).177,178 PA = 0.2 can be 
considered a conservative estimate due to actions taken by all nuclear weapon states 
(including Russia in 2015) that have invested heavily in nuclear forensics – which by 
assumption contributes substantially to the nuclear security effort by increasing the 
probability of correct and expedited attribution. Hence, if nuclear forensics is enhanced, it 
can be assumed that the probability of an attack on Russia using its own material or 
weapon is lower than 20%. This probability can be changed by any methodology user in 
future campaigns.  
To estimate a value for the at-target KA, we solve for Equation (3.1.21) using its 
various constituents:  
• 12,166,000 for the 2015 population of Moscow146;  
• 2,511 km2 as the current land area153;  
• 9,092 USD is estimated as the 2015 GDP per capita97;  
• 71,500 USD as the value of statistical life in 2015124;  
• the range of 0.77 km to simulate a single 10kT yield explosion producing a 
minimum 7.5 psi overpressure effect needed create a 50% fatality rate (which is 
   
170 
 
based on the most common weapon in current operationo  within the Russian 
nuclear arsenal)154; and  
• an estimate of 67,600M USD for rebuilding a vast portion of Moscow based on a 
modern city-wide rebuild such as post-2012 Hurricane Sandy on New York Cityp.  
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Therefore, in this model, the at-target KA = 64.964B USD.  
 
 
                                               
o As of January 2016, 460 warheads are on 46 R-36M2 (SS-18 Voyevoda) with an estimated yield of 750 - 1000kT, 
150 warheads are on 150 Topol class missiles with estimated yields of 800kT each, and 292 warheads on 73 RS-24 
missiles with at least 1MT yields each according to http://russianforces.org/missiles. 
p A Category 3 hurricane, Sandy struck New York City in October 2012 and was estimated to have caused $67.6B in 
damage: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.  
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7.1.2. State B Parameters 
In this case study, State B’s interdiction efforts (i.e., the U.S.) are characterized by 
the advent of the domestic portion of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) 
as of 2006 under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO). In general, the GNDA is the global “framework for detecting 
(through technical and non-technical means), analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and 
other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control.”4 Supported by various 
American departments and other entities (e.g., the Departments of Defense, Energy, 
Justice, State, etc.), the DNDO focuses on the integrated role of interdiction through 
domestic detection, identification, and neutralization measures. Per a statement by DNDO 
Director Huban Gowadia, the annual operating budget of the DNDO domestic protection 
efforts amounts to approximately 180M USD.179 Additionally, the DOE, DOD, and DOS 
also contribute to State B spending to help secure State A’s interdiction mission as well. 
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative Securing the Bomb Budget Tool, a total of 
approximately 1.455B USD was spent on interdicting nuclear smuggling by the three 
aforementioned departments (excluding the DNDO) in 2015.180 Therefore, the total 
amount from all four organizations is estimated at 1.635B USD. In calculating µ, this value 
is used as the investment amount in order to achieve a non-detection probability of 5% per 
the modification of Equation (3.1.24) shown below.  
( ) [ ]µ −−   −   = = =  
1ln ln 0.05 0.00183 $M
1635M
B B
B
P C
C
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Of note, the increase in value of µ between 2008 and 2015 signifies a decrease in 
investment of State B’s interdiction. This can be the result of any number of reasons which 
are touched upon further in Section 9.1. 
Below is the process used for determining KB – the financial consequence to the 
U.S. of a direct nuclear attack on the most populous major city using the same method as 
used in the preceding subsection for 2015 Moscow with a 2015 Manhattan (population of 
1,644,518127 and a 59.2-km2 land area181). Beyond the estimate used for simulating an 
attack on Moscow, for Americans of New York, the estimates include a 9.4M USD value 
of statistical life and a 55,837 USD GDP per capita for 2015.126,97 All else being equal 
yields the following: 
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Finally, contrary to the first two case studies, and like Case Study 3, Case Study 4 
incorporates the non-zero value of Γ as a means to signify that, in the modern world, the 
Russian Federation is not the only source of a nuclear weapon for a non-state actor. The 
estimate for Γ (the calculated loss rate for this scenario) is increased one order of 
magnitude to signify the perceived non-state threat would come from elsewhere much 
more likely than from Russia. Relatively, the number of nuclear devices and weapons-
grade nuclear material in other countries with a lower level of applied nuclear security 
outweighs that of within the borders of 2015 Russia. Hence, for Equation (3.2.4), Γ =10 × 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿15) = 0.0347 SQ/yr.   
 
7.2. Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
Table 7.2 below compiles all the previously discussed input variables for 
determining the strategies in this section.  
 
 
Table 7.2. Estimated parametric values for CS4 
α 0.15 [SQ] 
λ15 0.0129 [$M-1] 
PA 0.2 [ ] 
KA 67,963 [$M] 
µ 0.00183 [$M-1] 
KB 312,235 [$M] 
Γ 0.0347 [SQ] 
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In this case study, the value of µ is greater than the 2008 case study value of  
0.00112 $M-1 due to a decreased investment in State B’s system of interdiction while the 
non-interdiction probability was estimated as the same: 5%. This could be the result of the 
impact of investment was greater in 2015 than 2008 in the United States or that as much 
investment did not have to occur due to the raised nuclear security awareness around the 
world thanks for multilateral endeavors such as GICNT, the Nuclear Security Summits, 
and the IAEA’s general global outreach for enhancing nuclear security.2,42 The following 
two subsections, 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 show the calculation of the various costs for the players: 
the Russian Federation as State A and the United States as State B.  
 
7.2.1. Non-Cooperative Solution: Uncorrelated Strategies 
Determining the appropriate state-level uncorrelated strategies requires solving for 
the strategic costs in Equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.6). This is shown below using the values 
in Table 7.2. 
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The strategic annual investment therefore is 252.7M USD which yields the total 
cost of 329.9M USD. This is estimated as the best case scenario for the Russian Federation 
(with the aforementioned parameters). Solving for the best-response strategies for the U.S. 
requires solving for 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ : 
( )
( )( )
{ }
λµ α
µ
− ⋅
−
  = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ   
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = 
= =
'
0.013 252.7
1' max 0, ln
1' ln 0.0018 312235 0.15 0.0347 1713.6
0.0018
' max 0,1713.6 1713.6
AC
B B
B
B
C K e
C e
C
 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
µ λα− ⋅ − ⋅
− −
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + =
= + = + =
' '
0.0018 1713.6 0.013 252.7
' , '
' , ' 312235 0.15 0.0347 545.8
' ' , ' ' ' , ' 1713.6 545.8 2259.4
B AC C
B A B B
B A B
B A B B B A B
T C C e K e
T C C e e
TC C C C T C C
  
= + = + =' ' ' 329.9 2259.4 2589.3AB A BTC TC TC  
 
As shown above, the total cost to the U.S. is much greater than that for the RF. The 
total cost to the regime of the two states with no cooperation therefore, is 2589.3M USD 
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according to the model. Subsection 7.2.2 shows how to calculate the cost of the correlated 
strategies where then we compare the uncorrelated and the correlated costs to the regime. 
 
7.2.2. Non-Cooperative Solution: Correlated Strategies 
The correlated strategy is where the total regime, as defined in Equation (3.2.8), 
exhibits a global minimum. Following confidence in the results calculated in Chapters 4-
6 for Case Studies 1-3, the correlated results for Case Study 4 are shown in Table 7.3. 
Compared to the total amounts invested and the potential consequential costs, Ti, there is 
not much benefit to the regime (with subscript ‘AB’) in correlating strategies. Especially 
exhibited when comparing TCAB values, the surplus only amounts to 24.9M USD 
according to this model. Though potentially viable as a means for initiating and 
maintaining a bilateral arrangement for some states, this amount would not invigorate 
either the U.S. or the Russian Federation to overcome a multitude of (domestic and 
international) political challenges for collaborating on nuclear security. 
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Table 7.3. Annualized costs [in $M] from the non-cooperative game  
 Uncorrelated 
[$M] 
Correlated  
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 252.7 308.9 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 77.2 37.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 329.9 346.1 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 1713.6 1672.4 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 545.8 545.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 2259.4 2218.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 2589.3 2564.4q 
 
 
As of summer 2016, there is no collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in 
nuclear security. With the fallout of the CTR/MPC&A and eventually the MNEPR, joint 
activities and collaborative efforts between Russia and the U.S. seem to be diminishing by 
both sides for various reasons. Therefore, in the hope of analyzing the benefit of 
collaboration, this case study will also consider the possibility of a collaborative game in 
order to understand the mutual gains for each player and how to maintain it annually.  
Figure 7.1 presents the strategies on a 3D plot. With Γ > 0, one can see the 
increasing trend for TCAB as strategic costs increase from the correlated strategy point as 
represented by the cyan star. Again, the vertical difference between the red and cyan points 
on Figure 7.1 amounts to 24.9M USD in total cost to the regime. With this amount, Section 
                                               
q Discrepancies are due to rounding in calculations. 
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7.3 includes a discussion of various bargaining solutions where this surplus in savings can 
be potentially split between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Total costs vs strategic costs for states A and B 
 
 
 
 
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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7.3. Bargaining Solution Concepts and Utility Transferability 
Table 7.4 repeats the data found in Table 7.3 but includes a third solution concept 
under the CBA-Neutralization (CBA-N) strategy. The uncorrelated and correlated solution 
concepts show an interesting scenario in that the additional strategic security investment 
(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ − 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ ) to Russia bears no effect on the threat cost to the U.S. (𝑇𝑇′𝐵𝐵 = 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵∗) because Russia 
does not present the only threat to the U.S. (i.e., Γ ≠ 0). Hence, Russia’s reduced threat 
correlated cost, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗), is the only observed benefit of the additional investment to the 
security of material shown in Table 7.4.  
 
 
Table 7.4. Annualized costs [in $M] from the non-cooperative game  
 Uncorrelated 
[$M] 
Correlated  
[$M] 
CBA-Neutralized 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 252.7 308.9 252.7 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 77.2 37.2 37.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 329.9 346.1 289.9 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 1713.6 1672.4 1728.7 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 545.8 545.8 545.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 2259.4 2218.2 2274.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 2589.3 2564.4 2564.4 
 
 
The CBA-N strategy in the third column infers the U.S. is contributing to the 
additional cost of securing nuclear assets in Russia to the amount of 56.2M USD per [𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗ − 𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴]. This amount is contributed by the U.S. as CBA. Because Γ > 0, the American 
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strategy must still defend against other threats originating from beyond Russia. This effect 
also occurred in Case Study 3 although it was not as drastic – though Γ > 0, State B could 
invest all the surplus to State A’s security and the final strategic and total cost to State B 
was still less than the uncorrelated costs as shown in Table 6.3. Hence, no significant 
diminished investment occurs between 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  and no decrease occurs from 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵) to 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗). Therefore, for the CBA-neutralized strategic solution, the 
American investment cost is calculated as the following:   
 ( ) ( )* * * ' . . . .1672 4 308 9 252 7 1728 6= + = + − = + − =B B BA B A AC C C C C C   
The new CB amount yields no difference in TB and therefore, yields TCB = 
2,274.4M (which provides minimal benefit over its uncorrelated expense of 2,259.4M 
USD). Furthermore, as seen in Figure 7.2, the correlated solution (albeit on the UT line) 
falls outside the game’s core heavily favoring State A’s utility in that it would require the 
RF in this case to receive all the savings surplus in addition to a side payment from the 
U.S. This is shown as the red point at (289.9, 2274.4).  
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Figure 7.2. Imputations of CS3: the RF-U.S. game (2015) 
 
 
The orange point in Figure 7.3 occurs at the Nash Bargaining Solution (317.4, 
2246.9) where each state receives an equal share of the cost savings of 12.5M USD. The 
black strategic point at (304.9, 2259.4) signifies all the savings surplus is received by 
Russia and therefore conveys that the total cost of the U.S. does not change while the 
Russian Federation’s total cost diminishes substantially. As opposed to Case Study 2 (data 
QALL 
QNBS 
QALT 
QCOR 
QCBAN 
P 
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in Table 4.2), the U.S. receives no reduction in threat cost if it contributes to Russia’s 
security due, in part, to Γ > 0 (i.e., the threat for the U.S. still exists so reducing the 
conceivable threat cost regarding Russia provides no benefit). Hence, the minimum total 
cost achievable by the U.S. in this case is only 2,218.2M USD. Lastly, an alternative 
bargaining solution is included as the purple ALT segment to convey another, more 
favorable bargaining solution for the U.S. that falls within the game’s core: (325, 2239.3). 
 
7.4. Analysis and Discussion  
Table 7.5 shows the details of all the imputations between the 2015 Russian 
Federation and the United States: the uncorrelated, Nash Equilibrium strategy; the 
correlated strategy; the Nash bargaining solution; the CBA-Neutralization strategy; the all-
surplus transfer solution; the previously-discussed alternative solution; and the best 
attempt at the actual strategy point used in Section 7.1 to determine the α, λ and µ values. 
The last imputation, QACT, can assist one in understanding the benefit for the U.S. to 
cooperate with Russia in 2015. Conversely, not much would be gained by Russia in this 
case because the total cost of 337.9M did not provide a significant benefit to Russia.  
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Table 7.5. Imputations of the cooperative game for CS 4 
  Savings 
Split 
for A 
[$M] 
Savings 
Split 
for B 
[$M] 
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟
 TCA [$M] 
TCB 
[$M] 
TCAB 
[$M] 
P -- -- -- 329.9 2259.4 2589.3 
QCOR -16.2 41.2 -2.54 346.1 2218.2 2564.3 
QNBS 12.5 12.5 1.00 317.4 2246.9 2564.3 
QCBAN 40 -15 -0.38 289.9 2274.4 2564.3 
QALT  4.9 20.1 4.10 325 2239.3 2564.3 
QALL 25 0 0.00 304.9 2259.4 2564.3 
QACT -- -- -- 337.9 2230.9 2568.8 
 
 
To convey the final utility percent advantage (as defined in Section 3.1.2), Table 
7.6 shows the utility benefits per imputation for Russia (UA), the U.S. (UB), and the 
collective regime (UAB). Those with positive values exhibit those strategy points lying 
within the game’s core.  
 
 
Table 7.6. Tabulated benefits in utility results per imputation 
 UA UB UAB 
QCOR -0.05 0.02 0.01 
QNBS 0.04 0.01 0.01 
QCBAN 0.12 -0.01 0.01 
QALT  0.01 0.01 0.01 
QALL 0.08 0.00 0.01 
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These results convey how various strategy sets benefit the two sides in this case 
study. Impressively, half of the imputations exhibit some individual utility benefit over 
unilateral strategies – albeit none being substantial. Notably, UAB for all solutions never 
exhibits a substantial collective benefit for the regime (0.01). These minimal values lead 
one to consider the benefit of cooperation between the states in Case Study 4: Russia-U.S. 
(2015). Imputation QALL yields a zero benefit for the U.S. and therefore has low credibility 
within the regime. However, depending on the reliance of other U.S. interests with Russia 
or within the region, these imputations cannot be discounted without fully assessing the 
international situation. In all, these solution concepts illustrate how adopting various 
strategies could have assisted in defining the nuclear security regime between Russia and 
the U.S. in 2015.   
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8. CASE STUDY 5: PAKISTAN – U.S. (2008) 
 
Case Study 5 is an attempt to demonstrate the utilization of this methodology with 
a different pair of states. Here, we focus on the precarious relationship between the U.S. 
and Pakistan. This case study serves as a trial of the methodology on a completely different 
potential bilateral partnership than the previous four case studies. As regards potential 
targets for terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials or weapons, Pakistan has a small-scale 
civil nuclear program consisting of four reactors at the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant in 
the Punjab province that provide less than 5% of its power.111,182 However, the perhaps 
larger concern is the state’s nuclear weapons program which reportedly stockpiles 110-
130 weapons and, by one unofficial account, has produced 3000 kilograms of highly 
enriched uranium and 200 kilograms of plutonium since its beginning.111 The weapons 
and material are under the stewardship of the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 
the military. In July 2004, retired Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani published a 
document for Sandia National Laboratories on Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role 
of Nuclear Weapons.183 In it, Durrani identifies four Pakistani nuclear policy objectives: 
1) “deter all forms of external aggression that endanger [Pakistani] national security,” 2) 
do so by developing and maintaining “an effective combination of conventional and 
strategic forces,” 3) deter all adversaries by “securing strategic assets and threatening 
nuclear retaliation,” and 4) “stabilize strategic deterrence in the South Asia region.” 
Echoing the aforementioned objectives in his December 2011 report, Banuri states 
“India’s massive conventional military buildup, the India-U.S. nuclear deal, and [India’s 
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pursuit of missile defense systems] forced Pakistan to make qualitative and quantitative 
adjustments” to their arsenal.184  
With the close proximity to areas of terrorist activities and the concern over 
government/leadership stability, Pakistan has received numerous offers of international 
collaborative activities, including with the U.S. Particularly, the U.S. and Pakistan have 
long collaborated against Taliban activities in the region but with Pakistan’s leadership 
wary of American actions. For example, as the U.S. was preparing to attack the Afghan 
Taliban after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., then-President Musharraf 
reportedly “ordered the Pakistani nuclear arsenal redeployed to new, secret locations.”185 
According to a televised speech by Musharraf, the move was a result of Musharraf’s 
insecurity with American intentions and whether “the U.S. would decide to conduct 
military strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear assets if the government did not assist against 
the Taliban.”186  
In 2007 and 2008, expressions of doubt regarding the adequacy of security 
surrounding the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were raised in public – both internally to 
Pakistan and outside. In late 2007, Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto publically 
questioned the stability of Musharraf’s control over the nuclear weapons arsenal in an 
interview.187 Furthermore, numerous U.S. officials began to question publicly the level of 
security surrounding nuclear weapons in Pakistan (especially in times of political turmoil 
– which were beginning to occur more frequently). Given the original intent of the arsenal 
as a state-level deterrent, Krepon openly questioned the movements of nuclear assets 
across Pakistan to counter Indian aggression as a vulnerability to nuclear security because 
187 
of less-then-adequate transportation security (compared to heavily-guarded storage 
sites).188  
In light of these perceptions, various governments (particularly the U.S.) began 
encouraging and promoting collaborations with Pakistan. In her January 2005 
congressional confirmation hearing, then U.S. State Secretary Rice responded to an 
inquiry about the status of nuclear weapons in Pakistan during and after a radical Islamic 
coup with an affirmation that the situation had been considered and a contingency plan 
had been discussed.189 Later in 2007, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage 
confirmed American assistance in securing Pakistani nuclear weapons and deemed them 
“fairly secure.”190 However, former DOE Director Mowatt-Larssen of the Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence did admit later in 2009 that with the lack of 
transparency, it was difficult to ensure how assistance in the amount of $100M was being 
spent but that, upon a subsequent visit, the “money was well spent.”191 Mowatt-Larssen’s 
qualitative statement harkens back to Section 3.3’s Trust and Commitment discussion 
regarding a lack of self-enforcement between the game’s players – the U.S. did not have 
a method by which to measure how Pakistan was investing in its nuclear security program. 
 One defining aspect of the Pakistani nuclear program is the shadow cast by 
the black market network for nuclear technologies operated by Abdul Qadeer Khan. 
Since the revelation of his large-scale network, many officials in the U.S. government 
agreed that Pakistan had “increased its efforts to prevent [further] nuclear 
proliferation.”111  
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8.1. Evaluating the Game Model Parameters 
For this case study, the players of the game are assigned as State A (Pakistan) and 
State B (the U.S.). Due to the difficulty of finding published numbers for the numerous 
parameters, this case study consists of defining plausible values for 2008 and determining 
the corresponding strategies and their calculated costs. Despite a level of distrust between 
the partnersr, there is a proven record of cooperation between the two. Furthermore, in 
light of modern day relationships, Pakistan can definitely not be considered the sole threat 
of a nuclear attack on the U.S. Therefore, Γ > 0. Other parameters are discussed in the 
following two subsections. 
 
8.1.1. State A Parameters 
Pakistan presents many issues not observed in case studies between the R.F. and 
the U.S. The father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, embodied the pinnacle of 
nuclear proliferation (specifically nuclear technologies). Though distributing weapons and 
material were not the modus operandi of Khan’s network, his detrimental effect on the 
nonproliferation regime was (and continues to be) felt globally. Furthermore, the 
prominent existence of non-state and even some sub-state adversaries within Pakistan 
constitute a large nuclear security concern.192 Therefore, the lack of evidence of nuclear 
trafficking cannot conservatively be considered as a lack of activity by terrorists to acquire 
nuclear materials and/or weapons.  
                                               
r Surmised as the US assisting Pakistan in securing its material because of distrust and Pakistan mistrusting American 
intentions in weapons security due to lax security. 
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For this case study, α and an estimated loss rate, 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃), are used in Equation 
(3.1.18) to estimate λ:  
 
( )
λ
α
 
= ⋅  −  
1 ln PAKt
PAK
L C
C
  
As mentioned earlier, in the introductory preface to this chapter, Mowatt-Larssen 
states there was at one time around 2008 an investment from the U.S. to Pakistan for 
securing its weapons (CPAK = 100M USD). In the particular case of Pakistan circa 2008, 
there are no recorded loss events of nuclear materials or weapons.155 Therefore, as a 
plausible estimate, 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)is assigned a small value by basing it off the 1955 AFSWP 
report for acceptable losses of a 10-100KT weapon (similar to the process presented in 
Chapter 4).163 With the close connection between Pakistan and the U.S., it is conceivable 
that the published numbers could have been the starting point of a discussion for defining 
loss rates between the states (but no record supports this assertion – this is merely an 
assumption by the author). The acceptable loss value in 1955 for 10-100kT yield weapons 
is defined as 2e-3 events per year. Just as in Case Study 1 from Chapter 4, α is estimated 
using Quigley’s assumption of the likelihood of an event occurring is the inverse of 2.5 
times the number of years since Pakistan has had a nuclear arsenal (18 years as of this 
document).114 Hence, recalling Equation (4.1.1) in Chapter 4, α=0.022 [SQ/yr]. Therefore, 
assuming an averaged loss rate, 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃) = 0.002 events in 2008, CPAK = 100M USD and 
α=0.022, 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  is computed below: 
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λ
λ −
 = ⋅  −  
 =  
1
1 0.002ln
100 0.022
0.024
PAK
PAK M
 
Terrorists have been highly active in Pakistan since at least 2000: 2008 alone saw 
2,148 terrorist attacks with 2,267 fatalities and 4,558 injuries.193,194 Using the same 
estimation process as the previous three case studies, each five-year span surrounding 
2008 (except 2003) saw a large-scale, high-casualty terrorist attack in Karachi.193 
Therefore, PA = 0.9 for an at-target detonation in Case Study 5. 
Estimating the KA value requires using the following assumptions for 2008-era 
Karachi (as the most populous city in Pakistan and assumed as the primary target for 
terrorist activity) in Equation (3.1.21) for determining 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑢𝑢, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖:  
• 2008 Karachi is estimated to have 18,000,000 inhabitants and a total land area of 
3530 square kilometers195;  
• the estimated Pakistani GDP per capita according to the World Bank is 1,042.80 
USD97;  
• an averaged 548,000 USD value of statistical life196;  
• the range of 0.77 km to simulate a rough yield of at most 10kT with a 50% fatality 
rate197; and  
• a 2.4B USD estimate taken from reconstruction costs for the similarly-sized 
Houston, Texas after Hurricane Ike passed over that city in 2008.198   
 
   
191 
 
( )[ ] ( ) [ ]π π    = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     
2 2
2
ppl 22.5M50% fatality VSL 0.77 0.5 $548,000 $3,256M
km 3,527
hu
A bK r
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]π π      = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =       
2 2008 2
per capita2
ppl 22.5M50% fatality GDP 0.77 0.5 $1,042.80 $6.2M
km 3,527
ec
A thK r
 
 = $2,400MniAK  
 
 = + + = + + =$3,256M $6M $2,400M $5,662Mhu ec niA A A AK K K K  
 
Therefore, in this model, the consequence of an at-target detonation, KA, is 5.662B USD.  
 
8.1.2. State B Parameters 
The values for the U.S. parameters (µ, PB, KB, and Γ) are estimated circa 2008. 
Recalling Equation (3.1.24) and invoking values published by Schwartz of the 
deconstructed U.S. government spending on nuclear security for 2008.199 Using his 
estimates (as in Case Study 3), the expenditures for interdiction that year was $2,673.3M 
which, with a common non-detection probability, PB, of 5% (as described in Subsection 
2.2.2), the value for µ is computed as: 
 
( ) [ ]
µ
−   − = = =
ln ln 0.05
0.00112
2673.3
B B
B
P C
C
 
 
Using Equation (3.1.21) again, from Subsection 2.2.2, KB is the consequence of a 
nuclear detonation on U.S. soil with a 10kT device originating from Pakistan. The 
economic impact of losing individual lives is based on GDP per capita for 2008 (Kec) and 
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the loss of infrastructure of an analogous event in a highly populated area (Kni) such as 
New York City (adjusted for inflation).126  
( )[ ] ( ) [ ]π π   = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =   
2 2
2
ppl 50% fatality VSL 10,358 0.77 0.5 $8.5M $81,996M
km
hu
B bK r
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]π π     = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =     
2 2008 2
per capita2
ppl 50% fatality GDP 10,358 0.77 0.5 $48,401 $467M
km
ec
B thK r
 
 
 = $63,400MniBK  
 
  = + + = + + =$81,996M $467M $63,400M $145,863Mhu ec niA A A AK K K K  
The last parameter estimate required to populate the input parameters for the model 
corresponding to this case study is Γ which, if positive, implies that the threat is not 
isolated to only coming from Pakistan. In 2008, there existed seven other nuclear weapon 
states – all of which could be a source for materials to be used in an attack on the U.S. For 
simplicity purposes, we set the value for Γ as equal to 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃) for assuming the likelihood 
of material originating in Pakistan is the same as if it were to originate from any of the 
other nuclear weapon states. In Section 8.3, this assumption will be relaxed by increasing 
Γ over 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃) to signify the greater possibility of material being used from elsewhere 
beyond Pakistan.  
 
8.2. Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
The estimated parameter values determined in the preceding section are presented 
together in Table 8.1. State B’s parametric values (all but Γ) are repeated from Case Study 
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3 in Chapter 6 due to the efforts put forth by the U.S. in 2008 were the same regardless of 
the bilateral regime being assessed. Contrarily to Case Study 3 however, Γ conveys how 
the origination of threats did not solely come from Pakistan in this case – in 2008, Pakistan 
was far from the only state with nuclear assets that could have been used against the U.S. 
For this reason, the U.S. would have benefitted from Pakistan securing its own assets while 
the U.S. would have better invested in its interdiction efforts to thwart threats from beyond 
Pakistan. Furthermore, the value of λ is computed at 0.024 $M-1 based on Quigley 
explained in Subsection 8.1.1 which shows how effective investments in nuclear security 
measures were in Pakistan. Lastly, with Pakistan’s history with nuclear weapons being 
much less than Russia’s that same year, α is much less as well. 
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Table 8.1. Estimated parametric values for CS5 
α 0.022 [SQ] 
𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 0.024 [$M-1] 
L(CPAK) 0.002 [events] 
PA 0.9 [ ] 
KA 5,662 [$M] 
µ 0.00112 [$M-1] 
KB 145,863 [$M] 
Γ 0.002 [SQ] 
 
 
8.2.1. Non-Cooperative Solution: Uncorrelated Strategies 
Solving for the total costs of the uncorrelated strategies requires using Equations 
(3.2.3), (3.2.6), and (3.2.7) as shown below for States A (Pakistan) and B (the U.S.). First, 
the costs for Pakistan: 
( )
( ) ( )
{ }
α λ
λ
α λ
λ
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
= =
1' max 0, ln
1 1' ln ln 0.022 0.024 0.9 5,662 41.2
0.024
' max 0,41.2 41.2
A A A
A A A
A
C P K
C P K
C
( ) ( )
( )
λα − ⋅
− ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
'
0.024 41.2
' '
' 0.9 5,662 0.022
' 41.7
AC
A A A A
A
A
T C P K e
T e
T
 
( ) ( )= + = + =' ' ' ' ' 41.2 41.7 82.9A A A A ATC C C T C  
 
For the U.S.: 
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( )
( )( )
{ }
λµ α
µ
− ⋅
−
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ 
 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = 
= =
'
0.024 41.2
1' ln
1' ln 0.00112 145,863 0.022 0.002 454.7
0.00112
' max 0,454.7 454.7
AC
B B
B
B
C K e
C e
C
 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
µ λα− ⋅ − ⋅
− −
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +
=
' '
0.00112 454.6 0.024 41.2
' ( ' , ' )
' ( ' , ' ) 145,863 0.022 0.002
' ( ' , ' ) 892.3
B AC C
B A B B
B A B
B A B
T C C e K e
T C C e e
T C C
 
( ) ( )= + = + =' ' , ' ' ' ' 454.6 892.3 1346.9B A B B B BTC C C C T C  
For the regime: 
= + = + =' ' ' 82.9 1346.9 1429.8AB A BTC TC TC  
 
8.2.2. Non-Cooperative Solution: Correlated Strategies 
Using values presented in Table 8.1 with Equation (3.2.8), strategic and threat 
costs are included in Table 8.2. Of note, these results convey the consequences of an at-
target detonation (which will be replaced with an on-site detonation assumption later in 
this subsection). 
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Table 8.2. Annualized costs for CS5 
 Uncorrelated [$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
CBA-Neutralized 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 41.2 182.6 41.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 41.7 1.4 1.4 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 82.9 184 41.6 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 454.7 0 141.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 892.4 332 332 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 1347.1 332 473.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 1430 516 516 
 
 
For the perceived threat against the U.S. from Pakistan, the uncorrelated strategy 
for the U.S. is 454.7M USD and for Pakistan, it is 41.2M USD. Figure 8.1 represents the 
two solutions in a 3D plot with the red star signifying the uncorrelated strategy point (41.2, 
454.7, 1430) and the cyan star signifying the correlated strategy point (182.6, 0, 516). The 
best correlated strategy for the U.S. in this situation is to invest in Pakistan’s nuclear 
security. This strategy set is displayed in Table 8.2 in the middle column where the total 
regime cost is equal to that of the correlated strategies and the surplus is 914M USD. The 
last column, CBA-N, displays results for when the U.S. pays the additional amount it would 
take in strategic costs to secure assets in Pakistan – where the latter state’s threat cost 
decreases but the U.S. receives no such benefit from its further investment.  
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Figure 8.1. Uncorrelated and correlated strategy points between states A and B 
 
 
Changing Γ can reflect another scenario: where the threat from Pakistan is not 
nearly the most pressing. To demonstrate this, results for Γ = 10 × 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃), are shown 
in Table 8.3 below. 
 
 
 
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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Table 8.3. Annualized costs for CS5 – Γ > 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃) 
 Uncorrelated [$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
CBA-Neutralized 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 41.2 134.6 41.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 41.7 4.4 4.4 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 82.9 139 45.6 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 1363.1 1095.1 1188.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 892.4 892.4 892.4 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 2255.5 1987.5 2080.9 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 2338.4 2126.5 2126.5 
 
 
In Table 8.3, one can infer many important distinctions: there is a reduction in 
surplus between the uncorrelated and correlated strategies when Γ is greater; and due to 
the increased Γ, the threat cost for the U.S. (TB) between the uncorrelated and correlated 
strategies does not change because the partner country does not constitute the primary 
threat of the U.S.  
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Figure 8.2. Uncorrelated and correlated strategy points between states A and B  
 
 
We repeat Tables 8.2 and 8.3 (as well as Figures 8.1 and 8.2) with a modified 
success of attack by a non-state adversary seeking to confiscate a nuclear weapon in State 
A. This includes an on-site detonation at the facility where the asset is held initially. This 
leads to PA = 1 and a reduced KA due to the likelihood of the asset being on a military site 
far from a center of population and any vital national infrastructure elements. The effects 
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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of these adjustments are shown below in Table 8.4 and Figure 8.3 with an on-site -
detonation with Γ = 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃) and Table 8.5 and Figure 8.4 with an on-site detonation with 
Γ > 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃). 
 
 
Table 8.4. Annualized costs for CS5 – on-site detonation 
 Uncorrelated [$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
CBA-Neutralized 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 45.6 98.8 45.6 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 41.7 11.7 11.7 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 87.3 110.5 57.3 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 0 0 53.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 136.6 59.2 59.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 136.6 59.2 112.4 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 223.9 169.7 169.7 
 
 
 
If PA = 1 (meaning a non-state adversary makes an unsuccessful attempt at 
removing a nuclear weapon at a military facility and then detonates on site), then both 
major solution concepts (uncorrelated and correlated strategies) imply the lack of benefit 
for State B to invest in its own interdiction. The reduction in B’s threat cost from 
uncorrelated to correlated can be ascribed to State A’s increase of nuclear security. 
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Figure 8.3. Uncorrelated and correlated strategy points between states A and B  
 
 
Table 8.5 includes the costs for an on-site detonation with Γ = 10 × 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃). 
 
  
* uncorrelated strategy * correlated strategy 
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Table 8.5. Annualized costs for CS5 – on-site detonation – Γ > 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃) 
 Uncorrelated [$M] 
Correlated 
[$M] 
CBA-Neutralized 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 45.6 98.8 45.6 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 41.7 11.7 11.7 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 87.3 110.5 57.3 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 0 0 53.2 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 399.2 321.8 321.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 399.2 321.8 375 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 486.5 432.3 432.3 
 
 
Despite Γ = 10 × 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃), there is no impact on State B’s correlated strategic 
cost if it collaborates with Pakistan. However, as Γ increases, State B’s potential threat 
cost, TB, is increased (compared to TB in Table 8.4). This can imply the fact that when only 
considering an on-site detonation in State A, State B should still invest in its interdiction 
capabilities for all threats beyond State A but will still experience a reduction in its threat 
cost when State A’s security is enhanced through an increase in 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴: 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ → 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗. 
 
 
Table 8.6. Variants of CS5 
Figure Table Location Γ [NW] 
𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
∗ 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿′𝐵𝐵 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
∗  
[$M] 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿′𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 
[$M] 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵
∗  
[$M] 
8.1 8.2 A.T. 0.002 41.2 182.6 454.7 0 1430 516 
8.2 8.3 A.T. 0.02 41.2 134.6 1363.1 1095.1 2338.4 2126.5 
8.3 8.4 O.S. 0.002 45.6 98.8 0 0 223.9 169.7 
8.4 8.5 O.S. 0.02 45.6 98.8 0 0 486.5 432.3 
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Table 8.6 recaps the four previous figures and tables with adjusted values for Γ 
and the two forms locations of detonations: on-site (O.S.) and at-target (A.T.). Herein, the 
uncorrelated, 𝐿𝐿′𝑖𝑖, and correlated costs, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖∗, reflect how modifying these parameters affects 
the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. For example, modifying Γ can have a 
substantial effect to both 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  or 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . For the regime, modifying Γ and estimating the 
success of the non-state adversary in stealing a nuclear asset both have substantial impacts 
on both the uncorrelated and correlated total costs. These effects are expected due to how 
the strategies are defined in Equations (3.2.3), (3.2.6), (3.2.7), and (3.2.9). 
8.3. Bargaining Solution Concepts and Utility Transferability 
The initial assumption for this discussion will consist of using parameters from 
Figure 8.2 and Table 8.3 where a non-state adversary successfully gained control of a 
nuclear asset from Pakistan but yet, does not pose the largest threat to the U.S. (i.e., Γ =10 × 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)). The data are shown in Figure 8.4.  Here, the red point located at (82.9, 
2255.5) represents the uncorrelated strategy point between Pakistan and the U.S. whereas 
the cyan point located at (139, 1987.5) represents the correlated strategy point. In order to 
achieve the benefit, Pakistan must invest an additional, compared to its optimal 
uncorrelated strategy annual cost, 56.1M USD per the results in Table 8.3, 139 − 82.9 =56.1M. With the savings surplus as 211.9M USD, if split evenly and provided to each 
state (each receives the benefit of 105.95M in savings), the result is the NBS strategy 
shown as the orange segment’s intersection with the UT line at (-23, 2150.5). The black 
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dotted line infers all the 211.9M USD surplus in savings is provided to Pakistan meaning 
only they receive that benefit and not the U.S. The solid red line signifies the U.S. paying 
for the entire amount of Pakistan’s security measures (including over the uncorrelated 
strategic costs), which is shown as QCBAN in Figure 8.5. This bargaining strategy point, 
shown at (45.6, 2080.9), conveys how the U.S. can offer to pay for Pakistan’s additional 
security measures and both states still gain more benefit over acting unilaterally without 
correlating their strategies. 
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Figure 8.4. Imputations of modified CS5 
 
 
Lastly, the purple line signifies the U.S. offering to pay Pakistan’s entire strategic 
cost for securing their nuclear weapons with only Pakistan bearing the threat cost, TA; also 
Pakistan bearing only that cost.  This is the QCBAS (cost of A’s security being completely 
subsidized by B) bargaining strategy point. Hence, that strategy is (CA,CB)= (2.7, 2123.8), 
in millions of USD annually. Interestingly, this point signifies an improvement over the 
QALL P 
QNBS 
QCBAS 
QCBAN 
QCOR 
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NBS strategy point for State B (but not State A). More notably, more than half the game’s 
core is in the negative strategy space for State A, meaning State A can receive a negative 
total cost when it collaborates with State A. This is discussed more in Chapter 9. 
 
8.4. Analysis and Discussion 
Figure 8.4 graphically conveys various bargaining strategies available between 
Pakistan and the U.S. Detailed results and data are included in Table 8.7.  
 
 
Table 8.7. Imputations of game for CS5 
  Surplus 
Split for 
A [$M] 
Surplus 
Split 
for B 
[$M] 
𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟
 TCA [$M] TCB [$M] 
TCAB 
[$M] 
P -- -- -- 82.9 2255.5 2338.4 
QCOR -56.1 268 -4.78 139 1987.5 2126.5 
QNBS 105.95 105.95 1.00 -23.05 2149.55 2126.5 
QCBAN 37.3 174.6 4.68 45.6 2080.9 2126.5 
QCBAS 80.2 131.7 1.64 2.7 2123.8 2126.5 
QALL 211.9 0 0.00 -129 2255.5 2126.5 
QACT -- -- -- 110.2 2702.5 2812.7 
 
 
Table 8.7 shows the various imputations in table format for if Pakistan invests in 
its own nuclear security. The six strategy points exhibit a wide array of 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  ratios. Though 
QNBS is a 1:1 ratio, it can be construed as unfair by State B due to the mere fact that it leads 
to a negative total cost (i.e., a profit) for State A. QALL and QCBAN also occur within the 
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game’s core but at different ratios signifying which state receives the savings benefit (i.e., 
the reduction in total cost). QALL represents an agreed cooperative solution where all 
211.9M USD of the savings surplus goes to Pakistan: 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄ = 0. Signifying the contribution 
of B to A, QCBAN, the ratio 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  is 4.68. Only QCOR exhibits a negative 𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟⁄  value of -4.78 
signifying the points fall outside the game’s core and hence are non-viable.   
Table 8.8 displays the change in utility as compared to the uncorrelated strategy 
for each state and the regime as discussed in Subsection 3.1.2. All but one imputation 
(QCOR) exhibit a positive utility. However, there is not sufficient proof of the benefit in 
savings to the U.S. (State B) with all being 12% or less. Lastly, the change in utility for 
the regime is only 9% over uncorrelated strategies. 
 
 
Table 8.8. Tabulated benefits in utility results per imputation 
 UA UB UAB 
QCOR -0.68 0.12 0.09 
QNBS 1.28 0.05 0.09 
QCBAN 0.45 0.08 0.09 
QCBAS 0.97 0.06 0.09 
QALL 2.56 0.00 0.09 
 
 
If more accurate data can be acquired (i.e., beyond what currently is publically 
available), Case Study 5 should be repeated. It is the author’s intent to show how the 
methodology in Chapter 3 potentially provides insight in a stand-alone case study such as 
2008 Pakistan-U.S. in addition to being useful for comparative analysis as exhibited in 
Case Studies 1-4 (Chapters 4-7).  
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9. DISCUSSION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology described in Chapter 3 was used to estimate the strategic costs 
of nuclear security regimes resulting from two states either correlating their strategies or 
choosing to act independently. When choosing the former solution, the methodology 
approximates the result of negotiations leading to agreement on some of the details – but 
not enforcement – of a cooperative arrangement. The methodology was applied to five 
case studies in Chapters 4-8: the Soviet Union and the U.S. in 1985; Russia and the U.S. 
in 1995; Russia and the U.S. in 2008; Russia and the U.S. in 2015; and Pakistan and the 
U.S. in 2008. Plausible values of the model input parameters were assembled from various 
literature sources and used to construct the uncorrelated and correlated strategies as well 
as to construct the cooperative game cores – the set of possible plausible strategies 
corresponding to use of the correlated-strategy solution as an agreed starting point for 
negotiations on how to split the surplus deriving from correlating strategies. The objective 
of this was to develop and utilize a method in which using certain input parameters can 
help assess the utility of state-level strategies between two states in a bilateral nuclear 
security regime. Three game models were devised via non-cooperative (an uncorrelated 
strategy set and a correlated strategy set) and cooperative (a bargained solution strategy) 
approaches. Specific results are included in the fourth section of each case study’s chapter 
but an overall discussion of the methodology and results are presented in Section 9.1 
(except for Case Study 5: Pakistan-U.S. due to a lack of comparative data for drawing 
conclusions).   
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 In each case study, two states were designated as players A and B: the source state 
was the former while the target state was the latter. The target state, State B, in all case 
studies was the United States. The source state, State A, varied between the Soviet Union 
and the Russian Federation during different time periods and Pakistan in the fifth case 
study (Chapter 8). That State B always represented the U.S. is not definitive – the intent of 
the methodology is to be applied to any two states where one would like to evaluate the 
potential for developing a bilateral nuclear security regime. Unique to each state was the 
determination (in sequence) of α and λ. An alternative method of determining α and λ is 
discussed in Section 9.2.   
The methodology developed herein relies on the numerous input parameters to 
yield plausible results to aid in discussion. Section 9.3 addresses how results can be 
impacted by the changes in various parameters. 
Echoing Subsection 3.1.2.2., Section 9.4. delves deeper into the distinction 
between different PA parametric values – specifically between a non-state adversary 
gaining access and detonating a device on the facilities’ site or gaining access and 
detonating a device at a pre-determined target (which includes transporting the asset, 
successful extraction from the facility with the full asset, and other considerations). The 
discussion is based heavily on Bunn’s 2006 work on risk management for security.89  
Section 9.5 identifies some characteristic indicators that can assist in analyzing 
results from the methodology. Computed using results from the case studies discussed in 
Chapters 4 through 7, the indicators are presented as an attempt to provide a qualitative 
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validation of the model’s computed results with observed characteristics from the bilateral 
regimes. Particular focus is given on the State A’s actions and results due to the 
asymmetric nature of the regimes previously presented: State A faces the decision of 
whether to implement a nuclear security program prior to cooperation with State B or not. 
Also, an indicator is included to represent State B’s implementation of an interdiction 
program at their border. Though present results are fragmentary, future work can continue 
in this area to solidify and more accurately draw conclusions.   
Lastly, section 9.6 presents a concept that was exhibited in case studies 2 and 3 
(Chapters 5 and 6, respectively): the potential for profit from correlating strategies. 
Discussed by Corr, one state faces the possibility of “exporting” its nuclear insecurity by 
using it as a negotiating tactic for receiving a more favorable utility.33 By the placement 
of the correlation game plot along the total cost axes (as exhibited in Figures 4.2 and 6.2), 
part of the core (and therefore some imputations of the bargaining strategies between the 
states) occurs as a negative total cost for State A which infers how a lack of security of 
nuclear material and/or weapons could potentially be ‘sold’ as a commodity. As discussed 
therein, Corr’s point will be illustrated. 
 
9.1. Comparison of Model Results with Observed Actions 
The case studies presented in Chapters 4-7 provide an opportunity to evaluate the 
methodology as it was applied to specific cases where historical strategies and actions can 
be inferred. Though we do not know actual state expenditures on discrete objectives such 
as nuclear security or interdiction with utmost certainty, much can still be deduced from 
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observing actions during each snapshot in time which the case studies represent. As a 
reference for the following discussion, results from case studies 1-4 are rounded to the 
nearest $1M and displayed in Table 9.1. Results are categorized by year and separated into 
three separate solution concepts: the uncorrelated strategies, the correlated strategies, and 
the CBA-neutralized (or bargained) strategies (where State B contributes the additional 
strategic cost for State A’s security so that State A does not have to pay over its 
uncorrelated strategic cost). As shown in each case study, to achieve correlation of 
strategies, the total cost of at least one state must be increased from the uncorrelated 
solution concept.  
 
 
Table 9.1. Costs of state strategies [$M] 
  𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 
19
85
 UNC 0 2 2 0 397 397 399 
COR 35 0 35 0 9 9 45 
CBA-N 0 0 0 35 9 45 45 
19
95
 UNC 304 71 375 163 212 375 750 
COR 447 10 457 0 61 61 518 
CBA-N 304 10 314 143 61 204 518 
20
08
 UNC 284 71 355 684 892 1577 1931 
COR 477 5 482 45 892 937 1419 
CBA-N 284 5 289 238 892 1130 1419 
20
15
 UNC 253 78 330 1714 546 2260 2590 
COR 309 37 346 1672 546 2218 2564 
CBA-N 253 37 290 1729 546 2275 2564 
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In Case Study 1 (Soviet Union-United States), both states’ uncorrelated strategies 
were to not invest in their respective strategic costs. The resulting disparity of each state’s 
threat cost is substantial which implies the benefit to State B if State A were to secure its 
own nuclear materials. As shown in the correlated costs, State A could have increased its 
strategic cost to 35M USD so as to decrease the threat costs to both states. Under a 
bargaining solution concept, State B could have hypothetically covered the increased 
strategic cost of 35M USD for State A and both would have been better off in terms of 
total costs to each (0,45) but this can set up a moral conundrum and opened the game up 
to substantial abuse by one state. In 1995, the situation had been changed with the fall of 
the Soviet Union. As conveyed in Table 9.1, strategic costs for State A securing its nuclear 
assets were more than those in the previous case study (1985) due to the deterioration of 
the Soviet police state. State B’s increased uncorrelated strategic and threat costs also 
reflect this. As the primary source of a nuclear threat, the security of State A’s assets has 
the most impact in reducing the total regime cost. Hence, additional investment in its own 
nuclear security (signified by the correlated strategic cost of 447M USD) is paramount to 
reducing the regime’s (primarily from State B’s perspective) total cost: 518M USD. This 
connection leads to bargained solution concept where State B bears the additional strategic 
cost of State A’s nuclear security (the difference between the correlated and uncorrelated 
strategic costs), both states would reduce in total costs. For Case Study 3 (2008) between 
Russia and the U.S., the methodology produced results that reflect 1) the improved 
Russian economy and 2) the heightened nuclear threat from beyond Russia (Γ > 0). The 
latter leads to State B’s increased strategic cost for interdicting a nuclear asset from any 
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source state as well as the resultant threat cost that is unchanged between the uncorrelated, 
correlated, and bargained solution concepts due to threats not being realized from just 
Russia. Furthermore, the drop between the uncorrelated and correlated total regime costs 
(TCAB) convey that there existed some benefit for both states if they cooperated: 1931𝑀𝑀−1419𝑀𝑀 = 512𝑀𝑀. That difference between the uncorrelated and correlated total costs for 
the regime is greatly reduced in the 2015 case study: 2590𝑀𝑀− 2564𝑀𝑀 = 26𝑀𝑀. This 
suggests there was not much incentive for the states to correlate their strategies in the 
hopes of receiving any substantial benefit in reduced total costs. Furthermore, as is shown 
in Table 9.1, State B’s strategic costs for 2015 do not convey a favorable bargaining 
strategy: the uncorrelated total cost (2260M) is less than the total cost it receives with a 
correlated or bargained strategy (2275M). Hence, more so than in 2008, there is little to 
no incentive for State B to enter into the bilateral regime with State A. 
 
 
Table 9.2. Comparison of observed and indicateds results 
 State A – 
Security 
State B – 
Interdiction 
Regime – 
Cooperation 
 Indicated? 
[Y/N] 
Observed? 
[Y/N] 
Indicated? 
[Y/N] 
Observed? 
[Y/N] 
Indicated? 
[Y/N] 
Observed? 
[Y/N] 
Surplus? 
(𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵′ − 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗ ) 
1985 N N N N Y N 356 
1995 Y Y Y Y Y Y 232 
2008 Y Y Y Y Y Y 512 
2015 Y Y Y Y Y N 26 
 
                                               
s Though used throughout this section, “indicated” behavior implies “with bargaining.” 
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Table 9.2 presents a summary of observations from the numerical data in Table 
9.1. Using values from the latter, various behaviors were indicated to have been possible 
to occur by the methodology. For example, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′  and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′  provide insight on whether nuclear 
security and interdiction were indicated to have been implemented independently by 
States A and B,  respectively. The observed columns for each are deduced from historical 
observations between the partners (discussed previously in each case study’s chapter). The 
three columns under the Regime – Cooperation describe whether cooperation was 
indicated from the existence of any surplus present, whether cooperation was observed, 
and the quantity of said surplus (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵′ − 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∗ ), if it existed. For both States A and B, the 
indicated and the observed results are consistent for each. The Regime – Cooperation 
indicated and observed results differ. Whereas the methodology’s results indicate 
cooperation would have yielded a positive surplus in 1985 and 2015, cooperation did not 
occur due to extenuating circumstances landing beyond the scope of this study. For 
instance, as discussed in Chapter 4, in 1985, there existed many impediments to nuclear 
security collaboration between the U.S. and the Soviet Union stemming from being on 
opposite sides of the long-standing Cold War. Regardless of the perceived benefit for both 
sides in collaborating in the particular area of nuclear security, domestic and international 
political pressures inhibited such discussions and engagement. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
2015 signified the beginning of a new era between the U.S. and the Russian Federation: 
all technical collaboration had since ceased despite perceived mutual benefits due to 
political and economic pressures. For these reasons in both case studies, though the 
methodology indicates a benefit from cooperation, cooperation did not occur. In contrast, 
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data for 1995 and 2008 convey that there was a surplus to be had ($232M and $512M, 
respectively, to be divided between the states) and there was cooperation between States 
A and B also.  
Comparing results with historically observed actions exhibited by the states in each 
case study discussed above, we can illustrate how the methodology can assist in analyzing 
bilateral nuclear security regimes. For example in 1985, the Soviet Union and United 
States had very limited engagement within the nuclear industry save for disarmament 
activities through test bans and arsenal drawdowns. Securing nuclear assets did not occur 
as a collaborative effort at any level between governments. Though results in Tables 9.1 
and 9.2 show the regime would have benefited from any collaboration (by virtue of 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), none occurred that year. In 1995, the Russian Federation was struggling 
financially and therefore, did welcome engagement with the U.S. through government 
engagements at the ministerial–departmental levels on upgrading security measures and 
accounting methods at various nuclear facilities, training and educational methods of 
nuclear asset security, and an overall enhancement of the nuclear security culture 
throughout the Russian military and civilian nuclear complexes. In 2008, nuclear security 
collaborations continued between both states but with the strengthening Russian economy 
and the growing threat of nuclear terrorism from other corners of the world (e.g., Pakistan, 
Iran, North Korea), the recognized need for the U.S. to assist Russia secure its nuclear 
assets waned in the form of deteriorating congressional support for American funds to 
Russia (as introduced in Section 6.1). This diminished support continued until 2013 when 
the Russian government ceased engagements with the U.S. in securing its nuclear assets. 
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Particularly in 2015, there was no collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in securing 
the latter’s nuclear assets. Conversely to 1985 when no cooperation existed despite an 
advantage for the regime to do so, cooperation did not exist in 2015 as there was no 
substantial benefit for the regime. This can be attributed to the expanded threat and the 
waning interest on both sides to continue. Respectively represented within the game 
models as Γ ≠ 0 and the decrease in α, PA, and PB for the states (shown in Tables 9.2 and 
9.3). 
 
 
Table 9.3. Estimated parametric values for case studies 1-4 
 α [SQ] λ [$M-1] PA [ ] KA [$M] µ [$M-1] PB [ ] KB [$M] Γ [SQ] 
1985 0.011 0.108 0.03 5,307 0.00164 0.99 36,105 0 
1995 0.249 0.0141 0.6 34,483 0.00471 0.75 133,314 0 
2008 0.2 0.014 0.3 63,736 0.00112 0.05 282,875 0.00307 
2015 0.15 0.0129 0.2 67,963 0.00183 0.05 312,235 0.0347 
  
 
Reflecting on the latter observed actions between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union/Russia provides an opportunity to evaluate the validity of the results from the 
methodology in Table 9.1. For example, the methodology indicated that despite a 
reduction in total correlated costs between the U.S. and Russia indubitably due to the CTR 
and MPC&A, cooperation did not exist in 1985.37,110 Reasons for this can be explained by 
four of the estimated parameters shown to be substantially different in 1985 than other 
years in Table 9.3: α, λ, PA, and KA. Compared to the parameters from 1985, the 1995 
estimated parametric values of α, PA, and KA in Table 9.3 provide insight about the 
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methodology’s results that is supported by historical observations. With the porous 
Russian borders in 1995, the leakage rate of nuclear assets was high – providing to a 
relatively higher value of α (refer to Section 5.1). Furthermore, the central government’s 
strangle on the population as a police state during the tumultuous post-Cold War years had 
allowed crime to rise as well as a growing anti-Russian sentiment.200 Therefore, the 
probability of a violent terrorist attack on a major Russian metropolitan area was 
considered – PA was derived from the number of years with a fatal attack in Moscow (6) 
in the 10 years surrounding the year in question: 0.6. Lastly, the value for KA was an 
increase from the previous case study due primarily to the increase in the median value of 
statistical life in 1995 Russia from 1985 Soviet Union (refer to Section 5.1).  
From 1995 to 2008, KA increased (as value of life increased and the economy 
grew), α decreased (estimated for an increased awareness of nuclear security after 16 years 
of collaboration with the U.S. to secure nuclear assets), and PA decreased (due to the 
enhanced security measures implemented in nuclear facilities). By 2008, several 
substantial shifts had emerged between Russia and the U.S. For example, the domestic 
political regime within the U.S. was beginning to raise questions such as if the Russian 
government was using American funds to secure its nuclear assets or was it assisting other, 
more nefarious actions like supporting militaristic activities. Furthermore, the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks altered the terrorism landscape in that the largest terrorist act the 
world had ever seen had originated from somewhere beyond Russia. Between 1995 and 
2008, the number of nuclear-armed states had increased to include two states with 
precarious security situations: Pakistan and North Korea. For this reason, the terrorist 
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threat definition had changed substantially: it was not limited to nuclear terrorists 
acquiring assets from Russia only. For this reason, Γ (the source of nuclear threat to State 
B that is beyond State A) was non-zero – opposed to Γ = 0 in 1985 and 1995. With Γ >0, the results in Table 9.1 for 2008 represent a regime where State B’s threat cost would 
not be impacted by increasing State A’s strategic cost but the regime’s total cost would 
still decrease through collaboration. This echoes the continued relationship between the 
U.S. and Russia in 2008 during which both the CTR and the MPC&A programs were 
being implemented.  
Lastly, by 2015, collaborative security efforts between Russia and the U.S. had 
ended. The nuclear security threat for the U.S. had expanded well beyond the threat posed 
by terrorists acquiring a weapon from Russia – states like Pakistan and North Korea had 
grown their nuclear arsenals since 2008. Overall, the estimated parameters in Table 9.3 
for Case Study 4 do not show a substantial change from the previous case study (2008) 
other than Γ for the U.S. With an increase of ten times greater, Γ shows how the nuclear 
threat shifted greatly away from Russia and thus, limited the amount of cost savings the 
U.S. was able to achieve through collaborating with Russia that year. From Table 9.1, the 
uncorrelated strategic cost (1714M USD) to the correlated strategic cost (1672M USD), 
the only amount of reduced strategic cost for the U.S. amounted to 42M USD – not a 
substantial amount of received savings in cost to warrant a new nuclear security 
collaboration. Furthermore, if the U.S. would have agreed to an arrangement where they 
would have contributed to Russia’s strategic costs for securing nuclear assets, the 
maximum strategic cost under a bargaining solution concept could have potentially 
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amounted to 1729M USD – more than the uncorrelated amount of 1714M USD. Hence, 
there was no incentive to collaborate from the U.S.’s perspective. This reflects what 
actually did transpire in 2015 between the U.S. and Russia: no collaboration.  
Returning to the value of µ in each case study, one can see the trajectory of the 
value across the four case studies. In 1985, the value represented a lack of investment in 
the interdiction capabilities of the U.S. (as per Equation (3.1.24) in Subsection 3.1.2). The 
nondetection probability of an asset crossing a border was high and there was not much 
spent on the control system. In 1995, the need was recognized to invest greater resources 
into a national interdiction system (suggested by α and µ from Table 9.3) and, hence,  both 
are increased from 1985. However, the reduction in TB for the U.S. was actually achieved 
through investing in securing Russian nuclear assets. In 2008, µ is the lowest value 
compared to all case studies considering that substantial investment was being made into 
American interdiction – which could have stemmed from a growing concern of continuing 
any investment in nuclear security in Russia. The µ value increased in 2015 reflecting a 
decreased investment in interdiction but still achieving a similar non-detection probability 
as in 2008 (5%). This could potentially be due to any number of global and/or American 
endeavors of the time: the GICNT, nuclear security culture awareness efforts by the U.S. 
and the IAEA, Nuclear Security Summits, and others.2,42  
With the estimated parameters present in Table 9.3, real-world, historical 
observations could be replicated (as shown in Table 9.1). Despite limitations of the results 
and lacking consideration of some externalities (such as domestic opinions, budgetary 
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restrictions, shifting state objectives, etc.), the results can roughly illustrate estimations of 
state actions within a bilateral nuclear security regime.  
 
9.2. Re-estimating Parametric Values 
 Subsection 3.2.1 included a description of estimating the parametric values α and 
λ for each case study. Specifically, α was estimated for 1985 using Quigley and for 1995 
with data from Zaitseva.114,143 And λ was estimated using retrieved data with admittedly 
questionable assumptions (especially regarding assumed data for the 1985 USSR-U.S. 
case study where the value of 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) was estimated from old data).119 This section focuses 
on an alternate approach to estimating these parameters to re-compute results shown in 
Table 9.1 for Case Studies 2-4 from Chapters 5-7 (Case Study 1 was omitted because of a 
lack of confidence in the parameters from 1985). Determination of a non-linear regression 
line by the least-squares method was used to estimate constant values for α and λ using 
the compiled values of 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑  from Sections 5.1, 6.1, and 7.1. (shown below in 
Table 9.4).  
 
 
Table 9.4. 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 from case studies 2 (1995), 3 (2008), and 4 (2015) 
 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 [$M] 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) �𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� 
1995 200 0.0149 
2008 297 0.00307 
2015 291 0.00347 
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Figure 9.1. Non-linear regression line with least-squares fit 
 
 
Plotted in Figure 9.1, we derive an exponential regression line of 𝑦𝑦 =0.3778𝑒𝑒−0.016𝑚𝑚  where 𝛼𝛼 = 0.3778 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
� and 𝜆𝜆 = 0.016[$𝑀𝑀−1]. These values of α and λ 
are then used to recreate results from Table 9.1 which are incorporated as italicized results 
in Table 9.5 (Table 9.1 results are not italicized). As can be seen, results do not change 
much but with more data points for 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑  from more years, a more accurate 
analysis could be made. Moreover, trends continue to reflect historically observed 
activities. An example of this is that despite there existing a slight reduction in total costs 
for the regime in 2015 by correlating strategies, such a reduction was not sufficient to 
convince the U.S. to increase its strategic costs as shown as CBA-N (in the last row). For 
   
222 
 
future applications of the methodology, it would serve the analyst better to determine the 
α and λ parameters, from more data, prior to determining the strategies resulting from the 
game-theoretic model presented here.  
 
 
Table 9.5. Costs of state strategies [$M] 
  𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 
19
95
 
UNC 304 71 375 163 212 375 750 247 63 310 320 212 532 842 
COR 447 10 457 0 61 61 518 422 4 426 0 59 59 485 
CBA-N 
304 10 314 143 61 204 518 
247 4 251 175 59 234 485 
20
08
 
UNC 284 71 355 684 892 1577 1931 297 63 360 623 892 1515 1875 
COR 477 5 482 45 892 937 1419 467 4 471 36 892 928 1399 
CBA-N 
284 5 289 238 892 1130 1419 
297 4 301 206 892 1098 1399 
20
15
 
UNC 253 78 330 1714 546 2260 2590 275 63 338 1699 546 2245 2583 
COR 309 37 346 1672 546 2218 2564 321 30 351 1665 546 2211 2562 
CBA-N 
253 37 290 1729 546 2275 2564 
275 30 305 1711 546 2257 2562 
 
 
Furthermore, as introduced in Subsection 3.2.4, the value for µ would also benefit 
from being revisited. The parameters 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑) for Case Studies 1-4 are shown 
in Table 9.6.  
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Table 9.6. 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑  and 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑) for case studies 1-4 
 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 [$M] 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑) [ ] 
1985 6.1 0.99 
1995 61.1 0.75 
2008 2673 0.05 
2015 1635 0.05 
 
 
This allows us to formulate a non-linear regression line to determine values for µ 
and an additional multiplicative scalar, η, in Figure 9.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.2. Non-linear regression line for probability of non-detection for state B  
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The resulting equation – based on a modified exponential model of Equation 
(3.1.24) – 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) = 𝜂𝜂 ∙ 𝑒𝑒−𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴  – is 
  ( ) − ⋅= 0.0010.7713 BCB BP C e  (9.2.1) 
 
Here, the values µ = 0.001 [$M-1] and η = 0.7713 were both obtained by applying least-
squares regression to the plot of the data points (η can be interpreted as the non-interdiction 
probability when there is no further effort put into interdiction; i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 0).  
Replacing Equation (3.1.24) with Equation (9.2.1) yields a modified Equation 
(3.2.4) for recalculating 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵): 
 ( ) ( )µ λη α− ⋅ − ⋅= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Γ, B AC CB A B B BTC C C C e K e   (9.2.2) 
 
Equation (9.2.2) yields new equations for 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵), 𝑇𝑇′𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵), and 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵∗(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) that 
are used to reproduce Table 9.5 in Table 9.7 with cost strategies for Case Studies 1-4 using 
new values for α, λ, µ, and η – new results are italicized. 
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Table 9.7. Costs of state strategies [$M] 
  𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 
19
95
 
UNC 304 71 375 163 212 375 750 247 63 310 0 739 739 1049 
COR 447 10 457 0 61 61 518 406 5 411 0 58 58 469 
CBA-N 
304 10 314 143 61 204 518 
247 5 252 159 58 217 469 
20
08
 
UNC 284 71 355 684 892 1577 1931 297 63 360 324 1000 1324 1684 
COR 477 5 482 45 892 937 1419 454 5 459 0 727 727 1186 
CBA-N 
284 5 289 238 892 1130 1419 
297 5 302 157 727 884 1186 
20
15
 
UNC 253 78 330 1714 546 2260 2590 275 63 338 2247 1000 3247 3584 
COR 309 37 346 1672 546 2218 2564 345 20 365 2166 1000 3166 3531 
CBA-N 
253 37 290 1729 546 2275 2564 
275 20 296 2235 1000 3235 3531 
 
 
As can be gleaned from Table 9.7, modifying all four parameters does impact the 
specific values but not the trends: a correlated strategy for State B will always yield less 
cost than an uncorrelated strategy and a bargained strategy can provide a manner by which 
one state can contribute all additional security to another state.  
These results convey the potential for re-estimating parameters that describe the 
“effectiveness” of applied security and interdiction. Initially in Chapters 4-7, α, λ, and µ 
(η was not used previous to this section) were estimated and derived from published 
works. This section describes how, by using a least squares fit, parameters can be 
estimated for various snapshots in time but, more importantly, with other ways to estimate 
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parameters even if individual results change, the trends may not. In the following section, 
we explore how sensitive are the results to the estimated parametric values.  
 
9.3. Sensitivities of Model Results to Uncertainties in Parameters 
 The game-theoretic methodology underling this dissertation relies on real-world 
estimates of seven  input parameters taken from publically-available literature and based 
on plausible assumptions. They are exhibited in Table 9.3 in Section 9.1. Precise values 
were not achievable due to the limitations of the available data. Therefore, this section 
outlines the process and conclusions on how sensitive the model’s results were relative to 
the estimated input parameters. Each parameter was decreased and increased by an order 
of magnitude and the impact on the uncorrelated and correlated total costs for each state 
and the regime was recorded.  
The results presented in Table 9.8 are based on Case Study 3 (Russia-U.S.) from 
Chapter 6. Each of the seven parameters was multiplied by 10% and then 1000%. Then 
the fractional changes in the results compared to the original values are displayed in terms 
of orders of magnitude under each total cost for State A, State B, and the combination of 
State A and State B. For example, if α is decreased by an order of magnitude, the 
maximum impact to the total uncorrelated cost to State A is 20 percent. Another example 
is if KB is reduced by a factor of 10, the total uncorrelated strategy for State B will exhibit 
a 90% change.  
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Table 9.8. Sensitivity attributed to parameters in CS3 
Parameters 
Fractional 
Change of TCA  
Fractional 
Change of TCB  
Fractional 
Change of TCAB 
UNC COR UNC COR UNC COR 
α 
X0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 
X10 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
λ 
X0.1 4.4 4.4 1.0 1.0 1.6 2.1 
X10 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 
PA 
X0.1 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 
X10 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 
KA 
X0.1 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 
X10 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 
µ 
X0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 
X10 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
KB 
X0.1 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 
X10 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.2 1.1 1.4 
Γ 
X0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.6 
X10 0.0 0.2 0.9 2.2 0.8 1.4 
 
 
 
The objective of Table 9.8 is to convey which parameter has the most impact on 
results. Of note, λ, KB, and Γ have the largest impact on the total calculated costs for the 
states and the regime. It can therefore be reasoned that the use of this methodology would 
require some confidence in these three values for computing, with any kind of certainty, 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵, and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵. As is shown above, the methodology discussed within this document 
allows for uncertainties in some estimated parametric values without impacting results. 
We suspect that for more sensitive parameters, the use of data beyond what is publically 
available would allow the methodology to yield more accurate results.  
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9.4. On-Site versus At-Target Events 
 As was discussed within Subsection 3.1.2.2 while defining PA and KA, this study 
included the consideration of two types of nuclear terrorist events (also discussed in the 
case studies). This section includes a discussion on both PA and KA and how, if evaluated 
differently, they can impact the overall results of the methodology. Assuming a completely 
successful attack (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 ≅ 1) would include the non-state actor succeeding in almost every 
action they attempts – that is most likely not the case in the real world. As was introduced 
in Subsection 3.1.2.2, PA can be deconstructed into numerous other probabilities of events 
regarding the non-state adversary. This line of thought is expanded from Bunn et. al.’s 
treatise on “blocking the terrorist pathway to the bomb.”87 Table 9.8 presents a 
compilation of Bunn’s nine steps (and another six steps) to block a terrorist attempting a 
successful nuclear attack.  
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Table 9.9. Constituent probabilities for PA 
# Elements Steps for a successful nuclear attack 
1 intent The adversary’s intent in either making a statement or causing death and destruction 
2 non-detection The site’s security system not detecting the adversary’s incursion 
3 non-assessment The site’s security system correctly assessing the adversary’s incursion 
4 insider threat The adversary’s level of collusion with a potential insider 
5 acquisition The adversary gaining control of the asset 
6 non-response The site’s security system responding to the adversary’s incursion in time 
7 non-neutralization The site’s security system neutralizing the adversary 
8 detonation (on-site) The adversary’s ability to detonate the asset (if a weapon) on site 
9 removal The adversary’s ability to remove the asset from the site 
10 successful transport to base 
The adversary’s ability to transport the asset away from 
the site 
11 non-recovery The site’s and state’s abilities to recover the asset 
12 weaponization The adversary’s ability to weaponize the asset (if bulk fissile material) 
13 use at first The adversary’s willingness in using its first attained asset 
14 successful transport to target 
The adversary’s ability to transport the asset to the 
target point 
15 detonation (at-target) 
The adversary’s ability to detonate the asset at the target 
point 
 
 
Assuming all fifteen steps are required to successfully detonate one weapon at a 
pre-determined target, one can change the probability of an element occurring to decrease 
the overall risk of a nuclear terrorist event. For example, in an attack on a facility to steal 
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an asset, an intruding adversary enters and reaches an asset undetected. Once the asset is 
in their control, an alarm is triggered, assessed and a response force is dispatched to 
neutralize the intruding threat. Based on the facility’s physical security system capability, 
the intruder may have time to alter their objective and choose to detonate the asset while 
still in the facility. If this is the case, only steps 1-8 from Table 9.9 are in play. If the 
adversary is able to egress the facility successfully with the asset (whether detected or 
undetected), other steps are needed for the non-state adversary to achieve the goal of 
detonating the asset at a pre-selected target. This would mean steps 9-15 are also needed 
for the adversary to achieve success. For this reason, PA varies when an attempt is made 
either on-site or at-target and, in echoing Bunn’s treatise on mathematically modelling 
nuclear terrorism risk, Equation (9.4.1) shows the multiplicative nature of calculating the 
annual PA value:195 
 A a s r w dP P P P P P= × × × ×   (9.4.1) 
Recalling Subsection 3.1.2.2, PA is categorized into five different event probabilities: 
• Pa is the probability of a facility with an asset being attacked (this depends on what 
intent the adversary may have – to attain a weapon or merely the fissile material 
needed for a weapon); 
• Ps is the probability of successfully gaining control of a nuclear asset via the 
incursion attack, given that an attack occurs; 
• Pr is the probability of the non-state adversary removing the nuclear asset, given 
that an attack occurs and the attacker gains control of a nuclear asset (for example 
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the attacker might fail to remove the asset because  of action taken by the site’s 
response force); 
• Pw is the probability of weaponizing or converting that asset into a nuclear 
capability, given that an attack occurs, the attacker gains control of a nuclear asset 
and successfully removes the nuclear asset ; and  
• Pd is the probability of successfully delivering and detonating the asset at the 
target, given that an attack occurs, the attacker gains control of a nuclear asset, 
successfully removes the nuclear asset and weaponizes it or otherwise converts it 
into a nuclear asset. 
 
Deductively, we see which event probabilities are vital for an on-site (Pa and Ps) 
and an at-target (all five matter) type of eventual nuclear attack. For an on-site attack, one 
could assume the initial theft plan was inhibited by the facility’s physical security system 
or the adversary meant to merely sabotage the facility. Either way, the assumed events 
associated with the probabilities Pr, Pw and Pd are not vital to occurrence of a successful 
on-site attack, so can each be discounted by equating those respective probabilities to 
unity. This leaves the distinction between on-site PA (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜.𝑠𝑠.) and at-target PA (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚.𝑡𝑡.) as:  
 . .o sA a sP P P= ×   (9.4.2) 
 . .a tA a s r w dP P P P P P= × × × ×   (9.4.3) 
The distinctions between 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜.𝑠𝑠. and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚.𝑡𝑡. per Equations (9.4.2) and (9.4.3) implies 
there are different expected consequences, Ki, depending on the type of attack. The 
detonation location ranges between a storage location typically staffed by military 
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personnel and military-grade equipment to a highly-populated civilian location like a large 
metropolis with associated infrastructure and potential for economic loss. Similarly to how 
Ki is computed in Subsection 3.1.2.3, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜.𝑠𝑠. and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚.𝑡𝑡. signify the expected consequence of 
a detonation for an on-site and an at-target nuclear attack on State A which correspond to 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
𝑜𝑜.𝑠𝑠. and 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚.𝑡𝑡., respectively. Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between Pi and Ki 
depending on the detonation location.  
 The last parameter modification for determining an on-site detonation is λ. Per 
Equation (3.1.18) in Subsection 3.2.1.2 and particularly applied to the 2008 Russia-U.S. 
case study in Section 6.1.1, λ is recalculated with the adjusted value of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 = 146.6M 
USD solely based on the expenditures for nuclear weapon security (relevant here because 
an on-site detonation would require incursion into a site with nuclear weapons). Reflecting 
this change also implies a modification for 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑) as applied to a nuclear weapon site 
which arguably, can be assumed as very low in 2008. This would cause the value in the 
parenthetical argument for the natural logarithm of Equation (3.1.18) to decrease 
asymptotically towards negative infinity. Specifically for this discussion (maintaining α 
at 0.2 SQ/yr), 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 = 146.4M USD in Equation (3.1.18), therefore, 𝜆𝜆08 = 0.0285M USD-
1.  
This distinction between the detonation locations leads the discussion to consider 
the potential effects the adversary’s success has on the results for each case study. Each 
case study can begin with the consideration of an outside adversary gaining access to a 
military site in State A with intent to steal a nuclear weapon for eventual use (against either 
State A or B). Even with the intruding adversary detected and interdicted by the site’s 
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response force, there is the possibility that the adversary is not able to escape the site with 
the asset yet nor is the adversary neutralized. In this situation, the probability of the 
adversary attempting to detonate the device (either in the absence of successfully 
removing the device or if this was the original intent) increases. Table 9.9 takes the results 
of case study 3 (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 0.3, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 63,756M USD, and 𝜆𝜆08 = 0.0285M USD-1) and 
recalculates the states’ strategies with an on-site probability and detonation (keeping all 
other parameters equal to those in the original case study in Chapter 6). For illustrative 
purposes, assuming the worst case scenario as 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 1.0, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 6,373M USD as a rough 
estimate for a detonation successfully committed at a site where nuclear weapons are held 
is shown in Table 9.10 as on-site detonation 1 (limited civilian casualties and infrastructure 
destruction that would otherwise impact State A on a large scale). 
 
 
Table 9.10. Reformulated CS3 strategies using on-site detonation 1 and 2 
 At-target Detonation 
(original results) 
On-site Detonation 1 On-site Detonation 2 
 UNC COR UNC COR UNC COR 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 283.6 476.7 126 259.3 0 258.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 71.2 4.7 35.1 0.8 35 0 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) 354.8 481.4 161.1 260.1 35 258.5 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 684.3 44.8 891.8 10.7 3716.4 11.5 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 892.3 892.3 892.3 892.3 892.3 892.3 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) 1576.6 937.1 1784.1 903 4608.7 903.8 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 1931.4 1418.5 1945.2 1163.1 4643.7 1162.3 
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The modified values for PA and KA lower State A’s uncorrelated and correlated 
strategic costs in on-site detonation 1 and 2. If State A’s threat is only an on-site 
detonation, then the decision for when State A will invest in its own security is shown as 
UNC 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 under Detonation 1. Continuing with this logic, KA can effectively be lowered to 
when State A does not perceive enough of a threat from an on-site detonation (i.e., when 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
′ = 0) to expend any of its own resources to provide adequate security to its own nuclear 
assets. This case, as presented as on-site detonation 2, occurs when 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 175M USD (as 
opposed to the previously-defined value of 63,756M USD). Hence, if the consequence of 
a detonation from an adversary decreases by virtue of the location of the attack (say at a 
site with nuclear assets) to a low enough value, there may not be enough incentive for 
State A to invest enough to secure its own assets against an attack upon itself. t This will 
present a chain reaction imposed upon State B’s uncorrelated strategies as can be seen in 
Table 9.7 for the uncorrelated strategies for State B: 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′  increases as 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) does not 
change values. This exercise can be applied to all case studies and respective values of PA 
and KA. 
 
9.5. Characteristic Indicators 
 The work described herein presents a challenge in verifying the model (i.e. 
demonstrating that the methodology solves the problem correctly) or validating the results 
(demonstrating the problem solved in some way faithfully replicates the real-world 
                                               
t As a reminder, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴) is the perceived consequential threat cost of an at-target nuclear detonation on State A. Hence, 
TA does not change regardless whether a device is detonated on-site or at-target. State A’s preparation is the same. 
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situation). Some degree of confidence in the analysis can be provided by the results in 
each case study (Chapters 4-8); while it would not be accurate to claim the model solutions 
reproduce real-world results to a high degree of fidelity, the latter tend to have a degree of 
qualitative similarity to the former, especially if account is taken of known externalities in 
the model.   The sensitivity results in Section 9.3 suggest solutions of the various game-
theoretic models can be sensitive to the undoubtedly large uncertainties in the values of 
the various input parameters. The intent of this section is to develop and illustrate an 
assessment (otherwise, a qualitative validation) of the methodology’s results. Qualitative 
validation is based on determining boundaries of the input parameters where the nature of 
the results abruptly change; solutions of game-theoretic models commonly display such 
abrupt changes in their qualitative nature. The upshot of the explanation offered here is 
that a rather low degree of accuracy in values of input parameters suffices, if one is willing 
not to ask too much of the model results; i.e., suffice for qualitative reproduction of real-
world results.  
State A’s characteristic indicator is the marginal reduction of its threat cost 
(Equation (9.5.1)): the magnitude of reduction in threat cost should be greater than the 
magnitude of increasing the strategic cost (as shown in Equation (9.5.2)). For example, 
from State A’s uncorrelated solution strategy, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  (as discussed in Subsection 3.2.1), 
any unit increase of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 beyond 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  should exhibit at least a unit decrease in 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴. When 
this occurs, it signifies the existence of a perceived benefit in more investment into State 
A’s nuclear security. As investments continue, the subsequent reductions in threat cost can 
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decrease per unit of strategic cost so long as there remains a reduction in threat costs (as 
noted in Equation (9.5.3)).  
 ( ) λα − ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ACA A A AT C e P K   (9.5.1) 
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Solving for Equation (9.5.2) yields the alpaca indicator (based on α, λ, PA, KA) as shown 
in Equation (9.5.4) for when 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 0:u  
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If alpaca is equal to 1, then the amount of investment equals the amount of return. 
If it is below 1, then the amount gained from reducing the threat cost does not match the 
                                               
u This signifies that State A either (1) sees no benefit from investing into its own nuclear security measures and 
therefore, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 0 or (2) State A only considers its nuclear assets secure by way of the inherent security of the state (as 
was the case in 1985 Soviet Union). 
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amount invested. Inserting the parameters into Equation (9.5.3) yields the following 
signifying diminished returns as CA increases: 
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Applying this assessment to Case Studies 1-4 (the Soviet Union/Russia-U.S. 
bilateral nuclear security regimes) as discussed in Chapters 4-7, Table 9.11 shows (for 
each case) the parametric values (α, λ, PA, and KA), the uncorrelated strategic cost (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶) 
at which point alpaca is computed and the values of alpaca. As stated in its title, the values 
in Table 9.11 reflect an at-target attack within State A (per the discussion in Section 9.4).  
 
 
Table 9.11. Alpaca values for case studies 1-4 (at-target parameters) 
Year 
α 
�SQ yr� � λ  [$M-1] PA [ ] KA [$M] 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  [$M] alpaca �𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
1985 0.01 0.1066 0.03 5,307 0 0.187 
1995 0.25 0.0141 0.6 34,483 304.2 72.93 
2008 0.20 0.0140 0.3 63,736 283.6 53.72 
2015 0.15 0.0129 0.2 67,963 252.7 26.42 
 
 
 
The value of the alpaca indicator in each case study provides additional insight 
about the bilateral regime. In using the values in Table 9.11 (with at-target parameters), 
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the models yield alpaca values that can be used for a qualitative comparison between the 
indicated and observed behavior of State A: whether State A independently invested in a 
nuclear security program (i.e., if there was a perceived marginal reduction in threat cost 
per investment in strategic cost). Table 9.12 includes the alpaca values for each case study 
as well as a summary of if State A should have proceeded with securing its nuclear assets 
and whether they did or not.  
 
 
Table 9.12. Summary of the alpaca characteristic indicator (at-target) 
Columns 1 2 3 4 
Year 
Computed 
alpaca 
�SQ yr� � 
Is nuclear 
security 
indicated? 
[Y/N] 
Was nuclear 
security 
observed? 
[Y/N] 
If observed, was 
nuclear security 
(I)ndependent or 
(C)ooperative? 
1985 0.187 N N --  
1995 72.93 Y Y C 
2008 53.72 Y Y C 
2015 26.42 Y Y I 
 
 
Using Table 9.12, a rough assessment can be made by evaluating whether the 
methodology (applied to each model using specific parameters representing the nuclear 
security regime) indicates State A’s nuclear security investment for that year. In column 
1, if alpaca ≤ 1, then there was no indicated nuclear security program to be pursued 
because the marginal reduction in threat cost would not have been realized with such a 
program (shown in column 2). However, if alpaca > 1, then a nuclear security program 
was indicated. By comparing the methodology’s indications (column 2) with whether a 
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nuclear security was historically observed or not (column 3), then we can state the 
methodology’s results are consistent with history. Conversely, if columns 2 and 3 do not 
match, then the methodology did not yield accurate results. Upon review, the data 
presented in Table 9.12 convey that the methodology was able to accurately indicate the 
observed behavior of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation in all four case studies. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Soviet Union did not rely much beyond its closed and heavily 
policed society for securing its nuclear assets against unlawful access or diversion. This 
observation was indicated by the methodology. The remaining alpaca values in Table 9.12 
present a consistency between a indicated and observed nuclear security program by 
Russia (as discussed in Subsections 5.1.1, 6.1.1, and 7.1.1). Further, column 4 in Table 
9.12 distinguishes the manner by which nuclear security was observed to be applied in 
State A. As aforementioned, if alpaca > 1, nuclear security was indicated (and in these 
cases, observed). However, some case studies consisted of State A independently 
implementing a nuclear security program (I) while others convey State A cooperated 
(possibly after initiating their own independent security program) with their game 
counterpart to apply nuclear security (C). This added insight touches upon the possible 
future need of categorizing the alpaca value so as to determine if we can deduce how 
collaboration occurs between states. For example, a correlation could be made between 
alpaca and the ratio of State A’s strategic cost (CA) over the cost to secure (CS) as a way 
to determine how security is applied in State A: 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∝ 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆
.  
Specifically, in the 1985 case study, the alpaca value suggests that State A is not 
effectively convinced of the danger of an at-target detonation. Therefore, it does not invest 
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anything additional to secure its own nuclear assets. Conceptually, this lack of concern 
can be attributed to the heightened level of overall security in the Soviet Union circa 1985. 
The implication is such that there was not much concern of an outside terrorist threat 
entering a nuclear weapons site, attaining a weapon, escaping with said weapon, and 
successfully detonating it at a targeted site later. Conversely, the alpaca values for the 
other case studies are substantially greater than one. The implication with these values is 
that Russia (in 1995, 2008, and 2015) either did receive or would have received a reduction 
in their threat costs with the associated displayed strategic costs (even assuming an at-
target attack despite having a lower probability of occurring). Hence, when comparing 
alpaca between the four years, it can be stated that there was a benefit for State A to invest 
in its own nuclear security for the latter three cases. Some other inferences that can be 
gleaned from this data include the facts that: 1) there was a lack of nuclear security 
(explaining the jump in alpaca between 1985 and 1995), 2) there existed a gradual 
acceptance of a perceived threat (explaining the reduction in alpaca between 1995 and 
2015), and/or 3) a sense of nuclear security culture was growing through and permeating 
through the industry (explaining the gradual reduction in alpaca over the three years). 
Conversely, if the analysis is to consider instead on-site detonation threat, the 
alpaca indicators change leading to an analysis of State A unilaterally investing in its own 
security. To consider the on-site threat, values for λ, PA, and KA are modified per the 
discussion in Section 9.4. PA represents the worst-case scenario (𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 1) that a non-state 
adversary enters a site, acquires control over a weapon, and detonates it on-site. KA is 
decreased to 10% of the original KA value to signify the consequence of losing personnel, 
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facilities, and all else on a remote military site away from civilians and state infrastructure. 
And for Case Studies 1, 2, and 4, λ is reassessed using only nuclear weapons security 
(assuming an event would only occur on a military site with nuclear weapons) – similarly 
to the discussion in Section 9.4 for Case Study 3. The input parameters for determining λ 
are discussed in Chapters 4-7. 
 
 
Table 9.13. Alpaca values for case studies 1-4 (on-site parameters) 
Year 
α 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
λ 
[$M-1] 
PA 
[ ] 
KA 
[$M] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  
[$M] 
alpaca 
�SQ yr� � 
1985 0.01 0.1066 1 530.7 0 0.63 
1995 0.25 0.0282 1 3,448.3 113.2 24.31 
2008 0.20 0.0285 1 6,373.6 125.9 36.36 
2015 0.15 0.0198 1 6,796.3 152.0 20.13 
 
 
The 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  values of Table 9.13 reflect the impact of changing the detonation 
location in all four cases: if the considered threat in each case study is only the on-site 
detonation, State A’s uncorrelated cost strategy is understandably less than the at-target 
detonation values. The alpaca indicator value for each case study are the same as those 
values in Table 9.11 signifying the lack of reduction in threat cost per incremental strategic 
cost in 1985 (opposed to the values for 1995, 2008, and 2015 where alpaca is greater than 
1). Lastly, as mentioned previously, the accuracy of the input parameters need not be so 
precise because the qualitative behavior of State A (even with on-site parameters) is still 
understood – as it is in Table 9.11. 
   
242 
 
Similar analyses can be made for State B and the regime of States A and B. For 
example, another analysis can be completed in evaluating the point at which the amount 
of State B’s investment in its strategic cost is less than the amount of reduced threat cost 
to State B. Analogously to alpaca, State B’s characteristic indicator is based on Equation 
(3.1.14), expanded below in Equation (9.5.5), and can be used to determine State B’s 
security strategy of an interdiction program given State A will proceed with its optimal 
uncorrelated strategy.  
 ( ), A BC CB A B BT C C e e Kλ µα − ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ + Γ ⋅ ⋅    (9.5.5) 
Based on its threat cost, 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) as notated in Equation (9.5.5), one can infer 
that State B’s strategy of investing in interdiction relies on more than just its own strategic 
investment (but State A’s as well). A logical assumption is that if the marginal reduction 
in threat cost, when 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 = 0, is greater than the initial unit cost of interdiction and assuming 
State A adopts its uncorrelated strategy, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  (recall 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖′ = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶), then State B should 
adopt a strategy of investing in its own interdiction measures. The inequality (9.5.6) 
mathematically exhibits State B’s marginal reduction in threat cost per (any positive) 
investment of strategic cost. 
 
( )
= ≥
∂
− >
∂ ' , 0
,
1
A A B
B A B
B C C C
T C C
C
  (9.5.6) 
Also, it can be argued that State B continues to invest as long as there is a continued 
marginal reduction in threat cost that exceeds the increase in strategic cost as strategic 
costs increase (exhibited by Equation (9.5.7)). 
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  (9.5.7) 
Inserting Equation (9.5.5) into Equation (9.5.6) defines the characteristic indicator 
algum which is the characteristic indicator for State B’s perceived marginal reduction in 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵. Similar to the above discussion regarding alpaca, we use 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 = 0 to derive the 
simple formula for algum shown in Equation (9.5.8): 
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Continuing with Equation (9.5.7): 
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Taking a similar path as alpaca, Table 9.14 displays the various algum values as 
indicators for State B to unilaterally invest in its own interdiction using input parameters 
discussed in each case study (for at-target detonations). Of note, computing algum requires 
an assessment on State A’s strategy. Hence, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  is included in the table. 
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Table 9.14. Algum values for case studies 1-4 (at-target parameters) 
Year 
α 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
λ  
[$M-1] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  
[$M] 
µ 
[$M-1] 
KB 
[$M] 
Γ 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  
[$M] 
algum 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
1985 0.01 0.1066 0 0.0016 36,105 0 0 0.65 
1995 0.25 0.0141 304.2 0.0047 133,314 0 162.7 2.15 
2008 0.20 0.0140 283.6 0.0011 282,875 0.0031 688.2 2.16 
2015 0.15 0.0129 252.7 0.0018 312,234 0.0347 1,734.5 22.69 
 
 
 
The data presented in Table 9.14exhibit values for State B’s uncorrelated strategic 
costs with the assumption that State A adopts unilateral strategies to thwart any at-target 
detonation in State A using State A’s asset. In contrast to the alpaca indicator, values for 
the algum indicator (for State B) do not exhibit large ratios from unity. Analogously, the 
implication of this is that State B’s results are more susceptible to the obtained input 
parameters and thus, more care should be taken regarding their accuracy. Furthermore, 
when algum < 1, it can be perceived that there is not enough of a perceived threat to State 
B to justify expenses in an interdiction system – as was the case in 1985. In that year, as 
explained in Subsection 4.1.2, there was almost no concerted effort in the U.S. to invest 
in nuclear material interdiction at national borders or ports of entry.v In the other case 
studies (especially with the values close to the transitional quantity of 1 in 1995 and 2008), 
it is suggestive that the algum indicator values imply a potential sensitivity of the results 
                                               
v Recalling the 1984 case of 600 tons of radioactive steel shipped from Mexico into the U.S. and only detected once a 
portion of the shipment reached Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
   
245 
 
to uncertainties of the input parameters. Notably in the 2015 case study, algum is much 
greater than other years possibly due to the increase in Γ as mentioned in Subsection 7.1.2. 
 
 
Table 9.15. Algum values for case studies 1-4 (on-site parameters) 
Year 
α 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
λ  
[$M-1] 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  
[$M] 
µ 
[$M-1] 
KB 
[$M] 
Γ 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  
[$M] 
algum 
�𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟� � 
1985 0.01 0.1066 0 0.0016 36,105 0 0 0.65 
1995 0.25 0.0282 113.2 0.0047 133,314 0 395.9 6.46 
2008 0.20 0.0285 125.9 0.0011 282,875 0.0031 894.9 2.72 
2015 0.15 0.0198 152.0 0.0018 312,234 0.0347 1,758.3 23.69 
 
 
Echoing Table 9.14, if State A only considers the threat of an on-site detonation, 
the resulting uncorrelated strategic cost for State A impacts State B’s uncorrelated 
strategic cost and thus, impacts the resulting algum indicator values as shown in the far 
right column of Table 9.15. It can be rationalized that if State A invests less in securing 
its assets because the potential threat cost of an on-site detonation is less than the potential 
threat cost of an at-target detonation, then State B will have to invest more in its own 
strategic costs for interdiction.  
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Table 9.16. Summary of the algum characteristic indicator (at-target) 
Columns 1 2 3 
Year 
Computed algum 
�SQ yr� � Is interdiction indicated? [Y/N] Was interdiction observed? [Y/N] 
1985 0.65 N N 
1995 2.15 Y Y 
2008 2.16 Y Y 
2015 22.69 Y Y 
 
 
Table 9.16 presents a summary of the algum indicator for each case study assuming 
the former at-target scenarios. As with the alpaca indicator, the algum indicator provides 
an assessment of how well the methodology was able to provide results that accurately 
reflected observed interdiction by State B for each year. If it was observed that State B did 
invest in an interdiction program (column 3), the methodology should have indicated that 
(in column 2) by yielding algum > 1 (in column 1). Conversely, if no observed interdiction 
program existed in State B, the methodology would have accurately indicated that if algum 
≤ 1. If any alternative results are produced, the agreement between the observed and 
indicated behaviors would represent an error in parameter estimation or an externality that 
would explain the lack of agreement in results. As can be seen in Table 9.16, the algum 
indicator does confirm that the methodology’s results agree with historical behavior (as 
discussed in Subsections 4.1.2, 5.1.2, 6.1.2, and 7.1.2).  
Similar analyses can be completed for the joint benefit of both States A and B (as 
part of the bilateral regime) if they are to cooperate – a qualitative assessment of the benefit 
of cooperation pending on the marginal reduction of respective threat costs. However, this 
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would require the consideration of various bargaining solutions described under each case 
study such as how much would State B contribute to State A’s security: State B’s 
subsidization of State A’s additional strategic cost, State B’s neutralization of State A’s 
complete strategic cost, or any another imputation between the two. This analysis is left 
for future work. 
 
9.6. Potential for Regime Abuse  
Within the bilateral regime, there exists some situations where there exists a 
potential for abusing the collaborative relationship. For example, State A can enter into a 
cooperative arrangement and, if a bargaining solution concept is achieved between both, 
not use State B’s contributions for securing its nuclear assets. For another example, as 
introduced in the preamble to Chapter 9, the concept of a state profiting from its nuclear 
insecurity was illustrated in two of the five case studies: Russia-U.S. in 1985 and 2008 
respectively (discussed in Chapters 4 and 6). First described by Corr, the concept he 
discusses is that one state recognizes its insecurity as an asset that can be traded or 
“exported” to another country in exchange for monetary gain.33 In both case studies, the 
placement of the uncorrelated solution concept had an impact on whether this 
phenomenon arose. In general, whenever a solution concept consists of State B 
contributing any amount to State A’s nuclear security, CAB, (as is commonly done by the 
American nonproliferation community), there is the potential for abuse. Though the 
amount of abuse is subjective with any value of CAB, certainly, in the specific case of TCi 
< 0 (for any player i), the situation could easily be regarded as potentially abusive for the 
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non-i player. In sum, TCA < 0 is only one interpretation of the abuse potential by State A 
and the clearest demonstration of Corr’s concern. 
We return to the discussion from Subsection 3.3.1 where the strategic cost for 
securing nuclear assets in State A, 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆, is the combination of A’s investment, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴, and B’s 
contribution to A’s security, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵. Conversely, in Equation (3.2.12), the cost to State B for 
interdiction is its strategic investment, 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵, minus B’s contribution to State A’s security, 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵. The value of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 is what defines B’s diverted investment to A’s efforts and has a 
direct effect on the resulting solution concept of (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵). Specifically, when the 
surplus, v, is greater than State A’s uncorrelated total cost, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ , the amount of State B’s 
contribution, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, to the cost of State A’s security, 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆, can yield a negative total cost for 
State A.w As 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 increases, so does State A’s temptation to deviate from its correlated 
strategy. This may occur because as State B’s contribution grows, the value of State A’s 
investment decreases (discussed in Subsection 3.1.2.1 as diminished returns). As State A 
does not receive the same marginal reduction rate in threat costs, it can divert investments 
elsewhere. Corr’s concept is graphically displayed by the red tinted triangle in Figure 9.3 
below (repeated from Chapter 6). 
                                               
w Conversely, if 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
′ > 𝑣𝑣, State A’s uncorrelated strategic cost is high enough that no division of the surplus, v, would 
cause A to receive a negative cost. This implies that State A accepts that there is enough of a nuclear security threat 
that it adopts a nuclear security strategy consisting of  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
′ . 
   
249 
 
 
Figure 9.3. State A’s profit from nuclear insecurity (shown in red) 
 
 
In Figure 9.3, solution concepts are plotted using the total costs to both States A 
and B: 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵, respectively. Point P represents the uncorrelated solution concept (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ ,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵′ ) which can be used as the baseline by which other solution concepts (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖) 
QCBAS 
QCBAN 
QALL 
QNBS 
QCOR 
P 
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present in the figure are evaluated against. As shown, all solution concepts identified by 
Qi exhibit a reduction in total cost to at least either, if not both, states. Therefore, one can 
conceptualize how negotiations between the states would occur in order to receive a 
reduction in their total costs – the magnitude of which would depend on the final bargained 
solution concept.  
Utilizing Equation (3.2.9) results in 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  or (𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴∗,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗) – the initial potential 
bargained solution concept between the states. In the example presented in Figure 9.3, 
𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  exhibits the unconstrained case where 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 is increased but 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 decreases. The 
increase in 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 assumes State A does not receive as much reduction in its threat cost, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴, 
as it increases its investment in its strategic cost, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴. Contrarily, 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 is reduced because it 
sees the direct benefit in its 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 reduction (which is dependent on the increase of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴). 
Should State B contribution, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, to State A’s uncorrelated strategic cost, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ , 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 would 
rise and 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 would fall. As alluded to previously, the magnitude of 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 allows for any 
solution concept represented in Figure 9.3, 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 (including 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  – the extreme case of State 
B allowing State A to keep all of the surplus, v, thus allowing 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 < 0). 
Corr’s illustrated concept here begs the discussion of whether it is in State B’s 
interest to contribute to State A’s strategic cost of nuclear security (and if so, to what 
level). It is a precarious situation if, as a baseline, it is determined that  𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴′ < 𝑣𝑣. In this 
case, the bargained solution concept must be carefully negotiated from State B’s 
perspective so as not to result in 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 < 0 (though State B would have to assess whether a 
reduced 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 value is worth having 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 be negative). Conversely, it would behoove State 
A to have 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 be as high as possible so as to receive the negative 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 and possibly abuse 
   
251 
 
the cooperation between both states. On the other hand, if State B considers the hazard of 
cooperative action with State A is too high, it may forgo a collaborative approach and, 
instead, choose to solely invest its efforts into interdiction (irrespective of the source state) 
– a strictly defensive (and ostensibly isolationist) posture by State B.   
State B’s latter strategy infers the question of whether a cooperative approach to 
nuclear security benefits the overall goal of nuclear nonproliferation – especially in the 
face of multiple potential source states. This idea represents an obvious struggle of the 
global nonproliferation regime from the perspective of a single target state with resources. 
As the definition for State B includes the threat coming from just one other state, consider 
State B’s strategy of creating and maintaining a number of bilateral regimes with different 
partner states to address all nuclear security threats. This endeavor can be argued to be far 
more cumbersome than focusing on interdiction. There is also the concern that State A 
must be assumed to understand the nuclear security threat as well. When 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 0, State A 
has no incentive to invest in any security because there is no threat to it. This leads to a 
weak bargaining position for State B. From State A’s perspective, an appreciation of and 
a stated awareness to State B of the threat is necessary to enter into a potentially fruitful 
bilateral regime. In sum, State A could entice State B into entering into a bilateral regime 
but State B is left with defining whether it receives more benefit than adopting a unilateral 
defensive posture of interdiction. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A new methodology was developed for assessing strategies within bilateral nuclear 
security regimes based on game-theoretic analysis. To demonstrate the potential for 
providing insights into state-level security strategies on a bilateral basis, the methodology 
was applied to five case studies which consisted of three country partnerships: the Soviet 
Union and the U.S., the Russian Federation and the U.S., and Pakistan and the U.S. 
Though the U.S. was used as a partner in each case study, other states could easily be used 
in future applications if plausible data could be estimated to define input parameters.  
Two notable conclusions were derived from this work: 1) the values of the 
uncorrelated total costs for each state (which depends greatly on the uncorrelated strategic 
costs) can impact the nature of the collaborative bilateral regime, and 2) correlation of 
states’ strategies in a bilateral regime will assist in reducing the total costs but will almost 
always require additional investment by at least one state (as seen in figures 4.2. 5.2, 6.2, 
7.2, and 8.5). The first conclusion, as was alluded to in Section 9.6, centers on the 
reduction of a state’s temptation to profit from participating in a nuclear security bilateral 
regime. This is achieved by assuring the uncorrelated total costs (or Nash Equilibrium 
solution concept) for each state are greater than the surplus, v. In each specific case study, 
the only way this was to be accomplished was for having State A increase its total cost, 
TCA, by raising its strategic cost, CA, (which would also decrease State A’s threat cost, TA, 
a function of CA) – recalling Equation (3.1.2). The implication of this is that State A 
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understands its own nuclear threats and once convinced of State A’s sincerity, State B 
could then decide whether to enter into the bilateral regime with State A.  
The second conclusion infers that constructing and maintaining a cooperative 
regime (even for a mutually beneficial topic like securing nuclear assets) is not a simple 
task. The models presented herein do not contain external incentives that may exist which 
would convince states to enter or not into such a regime – though possible to explore in 
future work, this implies threat costs would be defined differently.. When comparing the 
uncorrelated and correlated total costs in each case study within Chapters 4-8 (as shown 
in Tables 4.2, 5.3, 6.3, 7.3, and 8.3), cooperation occurs among the asymmetric 
partnerships by the target state investing in the source state’s security. Elevating a source 
state’s nuclear security culture can raise awareness of nuclear security threats so that the 
state will unilaterally care about securing its assets. If the source state does not internalize 
the nuclear threat, it will be unlikely to care enough to invest. This was the situation in all 
case studies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia/Pakistan. Therefore, this 
methodology conveys that, though cooperation is possible, the target state will have to 
invest in the source state’s security to reduce their threat (as mentioned in Section 9.1) and 
it would behoove the target state to set an initial threshold the source state would have to 
surpass so as to exhibit their commitment to nuclear security before the target state begins 
to invest (as discussed in Section 9.6). 
Each case study discusses what can be done after determination that a cooperative 
regime can be established: bargaining the collective strategies so as to ensure a utility 
benefit for both partner states. In the third section of each chapter, one can see various 
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ways to devise potentially beneficial cooperative regimes and, more so, how to visualize 
them. Representing the bargaining solutions allows for an analyst to evaluate and provide 
comparisons of various strategies within the regime. 
 
10.1. Future Directions 
Applied game theory is being pursued internationally by scholars in several 
disciplines: network security, energy markets, global feeding, etc.201,202,203 Scholars and 
researchers throughout the U.S. and Europe have progressed the state of the art of game 
theory to particular areas of interest but much more can be done. Specifically with regards 
to the work presented herein, the following subsections outline ideas for readers to 
consider pursuing based on the developed methodology.  
 
10.1.1. A Characteristic Indicator for the Cooperative Regime  
The characteristic indicators discussed in Section 9.5 focus on States A and B 
individually. However, a cooperative performance indicator can be useful in delineating 
when States A and B, acting bilaterally to further secure State A’s assets, are able to reduce 
the collective regime’s total costs compared to the combined total costs resulting from 
their respective uncorrelated strategic costs. The mutual benefit received by both states, 
in the form of the surplus, can then be divided between the two states when their strategies 
are correlated. This third characteristic indicator can convey the benefit of cooperation 
when the aggregate marginal reduction in threat costs for both A and B, TAB (shown below 
as Equation (10.1.1) in generic form with CS and CI as discussed in Subsection 3.2.2 – 
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where 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 = 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 + 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 and 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 = 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 − 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵) is greater than unity. The total expanded threat 
cost of the regime, TAB, is represented as Equation (10.1.2) and the regime’s benefit of 
cooperation shown as Equation (10.1.3) denotes when there is a favorable reduction in 
regime threat cost per strategic investment (by both states) for the regime: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )= +, ,AB S I A S B S IT C C T C T C C   (10.1.1) 
 ( ) λ λµα α− −−  = + + Γ , S SI
C CC
AB S I A A BT C C e P K e K e   (10.1.2) 
 
∂
= − >
∂
1ABAB
S
TBC
C
  (10.1.3) 
The aforementioned equations serve as a springboard for future work in this area. 
Characteristic indicators for the regime could prove beneficial for qualitative assessments 
of the methodology in future work – especially when other sources of securing State A’s 
assets are considered. Moreover, we envision a benefit from developing more formal 
models of bargaining between states when establishing and maintaining cooperative 
bilateral nuclear security regimes.  
 
10.1.2. Coercion 
A strategy briefly introduced in Section 1.2 included the concept of coercion as a 
way to influence nuclear security. Otherwise described as providing negative incentives, 
coercion has been considered as a third viable security option beyond the two solutions 
presented in the methodology: uncorrelated strategies and correlated. One reason for 
defining the loss rate as it was presented in Equation (3.1.15) was to accommodate the 
impact of strategic costs on State A’s loss rate. The concept was to allow the possibility 
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of State A to incur so much cost that it would impede advancements in securing the nuclear 
material of interest. Other scholars have expressed similar concepts qualitatively. For 
example, in his book, Drezner describes two differing cases of economic coercion: the 
United Nations Security Council vote on imposing multilateral sanctions to Iraq in 1990 
for the invasion of Kuwait and the United States’ imposition of unilateral economic 
sanctions on Israel in 1991 to thwart the latter’s construction of new housing in the 
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza.11 The former case was unsuccessful 
because the multilateral economic sanctions did not help and so military action was taken 
to coerce Iraq’s concession. The latter case unilateral economic sanctions on Israel was 
considered a success because construction was halted. These examples show that results 
from coercion in international relations are not always consistent. In sum, a quantitative 
assessment could prove useful.  
Conceptually, coercion could be incorporated into the game theory model by 
permitting negative strategic costs which would impact the loss rate (as described in 
Equation (3.1.15)) as shown in Figure 10.1. 
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Figure 10.1. Impact of negative investment on loss rate  
 
 
The red-shaded region visualizes the state having such a level of economic 
sanctions imposed on it that the funds it would otherwise use for securing assets would be 
used in areas of a higher priority than nuclear security. Therefore, this could have an 
opposite effect on influencing said state to increase the security of its nuclear assets.  
 
10.1.3. Retaliation Factor  
Subsection 3.1.2 describes the various input parameters that are used to model the 
bilateral nuclear security regime. In an effort to better explore the threat costs to State A, 
a retaliation factor parameter was initially considered to convey State B’s potential 
response to State A if a nuclear asset were lost and used against State B. Though difficult 
to estimate the cost to State A in retaliation,  bounded assumptions could be made in 
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relation to the KB value. Equation (10.1.4) displays the modified cost function to State A 
with the incorporated retaliation factor, 𝑅𝑅(𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴). 
 
 ( ) ( )ACA A A A A ATC C C P K e R Cλα − ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +    (10.1.4) 
If considering a strictly military attack that is proportional to the initial attack on 
State B (where B suffers the cost of KB), the following relation can be defined as in 
Equation (10.1.5): 
 ( ) η   = ⋅      
$M $M
B BR C Kevent event
   (10.1.5) 
Where η = 1 if the retaliation is reciprocated in kind (the impacts on States A and B are 
similar). When the retaliation from B impacts A greater than the initial attack on State B 
(the punishment is harsher), η > 1. This line of thought leads one to consider the price of 
an attack. Quantifying this cost incurred by either State A or B assumes the same three 
primary variables similar to the definition of KB in Subsection 3.1.2.3: the loss of life 
(Khu), the economic impact (Kec) of such losses, and the loss of national infrastructure 
(Kni). While other variables such as military loss, emotional distress, and loss of domestic 
political clout are also greatly affected by a nuclear attack, the most impactful seem to be 
these three.90 
Furthermore, the value of η is important in the retaliation factor because this would 
signify how the initial attack on State B by a non-state actor using material from State A 
relates to the retaliatory attack onto State A by State B for not properly securing the special 
nuclear material (or nuclear weapon). When η < 1, the impact of the initial attack on State 
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B is greater than the retaliatory attack on State A. This could occur when State B is 
attacked in a highly populated area affecting B’s economy greatly and B does not retaliate 
in kind so as not to adversely affect State A’s command and control center. When η > 1, 
the impact of the retaliation on State A’s infrastructure is stronger than that on B with the 
initial attack. This would occur if a weapon taken from State A is detonated as a display 
of force against B by a non-state actor and B punishes State A with a military invasion for 
allowing such a transgression to occur. Simply put, the parameter η would define the 
magnitude of a retaliatory action on State A by State B. Therefore, this would constitute a 
new calculation of the total cost to State A, TCA, as shown in Equation (10.1.4) which 
would impact State A’s objective function, resulting strategy, as well as State B’s 
interdiction strategy (investment to interdiction may change if money is invested in State 
B’s retaliatory efforts).  
 
10.1.4. Multilateral Coalitions 
Another ripe area of game theory that was introduced initially and can be applied 
to the state-level nuclear security regime is the use of this methodology with multilateral 
regimes. Not without precedence and continuously pursued (such as the International 
Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verificationx), multilateral regimes exist for nuclear 
nonproliferation and security activities. This methodology can be easily adapted to allow 
                                               
x As mentioned during a Nonproliferation and Arms Control technical division meeting during the 2016 Annual 
meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, the group of 25 states (as of July 2016) is a public-private 
partnership between the U.S. State Department and Nuclear Threat Initiative for furthering to understand the complex 
technical challenges involved in nuclear verification. 
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for multiple states to join the regime and the players would evolve from being individual 
states to coalitions of states where multiple work together to attain an additional benefit in 
utility beyond what they would individually receive. 
 
10.2. Summation 
In sum, a quantitative assessment can be completed by evaluating uncorrelated and 
correlated strategies between two states in a bilateral nuclear security regime. The game 
theoretic methodology presented here for assessing bilateral regime strategies provides an 
opportunity to gauge surplus divisions and whether or not states gain more utility by 
correlating their strategies. This methodology has led to two notable conclusions:  
1. States attempting to address nuclear security concerns can benefit from a bilateral 
collaborative regime where states can correlate their strategies. Though the 
regime’s total (i.e., collective) cost can be reduced, it will almost always 
necessitate additional investment by at least one state. This asymmetrical 
partnership can lead to potential imbalances between the states in such a regime.  
2. In some case studies where a strategy set showed potential as a fair surplus division 
between the states, the resulting strategy point would fall as a negative total cost 
for State A. This would mean that many imputations of the game’s core between 
States A and B would provide State A an unfair advantage in receiving a negative 
cost (otherwise, a positive utility). In ‘playing’ with State B, State A would receive 
an additional benefit beyond the subsidization of its costs and possibly reap a profit 
from entering the bilateral regime at a position of insufficient nuclear security. This 
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could in turn lead State A to use its level of insecurity as a commodity to be sold 
off to State B.  
The primary conclusions above can contribute positively to the future discussion 
of applying game theoretic analysis as a way to assess utilities in state-level nuclear 
security strategies within bilateral regimes. The work presented herein will form the basis 
for future publications in game theory, risk assessment, and other relevant scholarly 
publications. Hopefully, others, through this work, will appreciate the feasibility of using 
game theory to contribute to the overall discussion of assessing state-level nuclear security 
strategies.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
MATLAB Code for Uncorrelated and Correlated Strategies 
 
clc; 
clear; 
res=50;  % resolution of discretization 
format shortG  
cs=input('Which case study? 1-1985; 2-1995; 3-2008; 4-2015; 5-2008 Pakistan  
'); 
if cs==1            %1985 case 
    C_A_ACT=7.66; 
    C_B_ACT=6.1;     
    LR=0.00486; 
    alpha=.249; 
    lambda=-(log(LR/alpha))/C_A_ACT; 
    mu=.00164;  % P_B=99% 
    P_A=0.03;           %user-defined probability of stolen weapon used against 
B  
    K_A=9447;            %negligible cost to A of attack on B with A's weapon 
    K_B=171488;          %cost of attack on most populous target in B: 1985 NYC 
    gamma=0; 
elseif cs==2                %1995 case 
    C_A_ACT=200; 
    C_B_ACT=61.1; 
    LR=0.0149; 
    alpha=.249; 
    lambda=-(log(LR/alpha))/C_A_ACT; 
    mu=-(log(0.75))/C_B_ACT;         %from 1997 expenditures 0.75 porosity 
    P_A=0.6;            %user-defined probability of stolen weapon used against 
B 
    P_B=0.75; 
    K_A=40996;           %from Odling-Smee's 2006 IMF paper 
    K_B=550618;         %cost of attack on most populous target in B: 1994 NYC 
    gamma=0; 
elseif cs==3    % 2008 case 
    C_A_ACT=297.3; 
    C_B_ACT=2673.3; 
    LR=0.00307; 
    alpha=.249; 
    lambda=-(log(LR/alpha))/C_A_ACT; 
    mu=-(log(0.05))/C_B_ACT; 
    P_A=0.3;            %user-defined probability of stolen weapon used against 
A  
    K_A=70818;          %cost to A of attack on B with A's weapon - Russia is 
part of IC 
    K_B=1836023;  
    gamma=LR;       %2008 Russia is not the only source of NW: Pakistan, China, 
new DPRK 
elseif cs==4            %2015 case 
    C_A_ACT=290.7; 
    C_B_ACT=1635; 
    LR=0.00347; 
    alpha=0.249; 
    lambda=-(log(LR/alpha))/C_A_ACT; 
    mu=-(log(0.05))/C_B_ACT; 
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    P_A=0.2;            %user-defined probability of stolen weapon used against 
B  
    K_A=75417;          %cost to A of attack on B with A's weapon - Russia is 
part of IC 
    K_B=2126830;         %cost of attack on most populous target in B: 2015 NYC   
    gamma=10*LR;    %2015 Russia is not the only source of NW: Pakistan (by 
far), DPRK (more now), India? 
elseif cs==5    % PAK case 
    C_A_ACT=100; 
    C_B_ACT=2673.3; 
    LR=0.002;   % or 8.26e-5? 
    alpha=1;    %18 years and mayb eonly 1 NW lost? 0.055 
    lambda=-(log(LR/alpha))/C_A_ACT; 
    P_A=0.9; 
    K_A=9931; 
    mu=0.00112; 
    K_B=253793; 
    gamma=10*LR;    %2008 Pakistan is not the only source of NW: Russia, DPRK, 
India? 
end; 
z=input('Zoomed in? 0-no; 1-yes  '); 
if z==0 
    if cs==1        %1985 case 
        c_A=linspace(0,100,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(0,500,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==2    %1995 case 
        c_A=linspace(0,1000,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(0,1000,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==3    %2008 case 
        c_A=linspace(0,5000,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(0,5000,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==4    %2015 case 
        c_A=linspace(0,10000,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(0,10000,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==5    % PAK case 
        c_A=linspace(0,5000,res);     % to see negative values, remove lines 
101 and 162   
        c_B=linspace(0,5000,res);     % to see negative values, remove lines 
114 and 165 
    end; 
else 
    if cs==1        %1985 case 
        c_A=linspace(0,20,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(0,500,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==2    %1995 case 
        c_A=linspace(300,600,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(0,500,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==3    %2008 case 
        c_A=linspace(250,500,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(1500,2500,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==4    %2015 case 
        c_A=linspace(250,350,res); % strategic costs for A  
        c_B=linspace(2700,2800,res); % strategic costs for B 
    elseif cs==5    %Pak case 
        c_A=linspace(100,150,res); 
        c_B=linspace(1550,1650,res); 
    end; 
end; 
act=input('Include actual expenses in green? 0-no; 1-yes  '); 
[C_A, C_B]=meshgrid(c_A,c_B); 
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C_A_UNC=(1/lambda)*(log(alpha*lambda*P_A*K_A));  % minimum strategic cost for A 
-- equation 2.3.3 
if C_A_UNC<0 
    C_A_UNC=0; 
end 
C_B_UNC=(1/mu)*log((mu*K_B)*((alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A_UNC))+gamma)); 
  
if C_B_UNC<0 
    C_B_UNC=0; 
end 
  
  
T_A_UNC=alpha*P_A*K_A*exp(-lambda*C_A_UNC);   % minimum threat cost for A 
T_B_UNC=K_B*exp(-mu*C_B_UNC)*((alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A_UNC))+gamma); 
TC_UNC=C_A_UNC+T_A_UNC+C_B_UNC+T_B_UNC;   %  minimum total cost of A and B 
separate 
  
% ----------- Tabulating C_A vs C_B vs TC ----------------- 
for i=1:res 
    for j=1:res 
        T_A(i,j)=P_A*K_A*alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A(i,j)); % threat cost for A 
        TC_A(i,j)=C_A(i,j)+T_A(i,j);  % strategic cost + threat cost for A 
        T_B(i,j)=K_B*(exp(-mu*C_B(i,j)))*((alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A(i,j)))+gamma); 
        TC_B(i,j)=C_B(i,j)+T_B(i,j); % strategic cost + threat cost for B 
        TC_AB(i,j)=TC_A(i,j)+TC_B(i,j); % total costs for A + B 
    end 
end 
surf(C_A,C_B,TC_AB); 
hold on 
view(135,30); 
xlabel('C_A [$M/yr]') 
ylabel('C_B [$M/yr]') 
zlabel('Total cost [$M/yr]') 
  
% ----------- Calculating correlated strategies ----------------- 
fun=@(x)x(1)+x(2)+P_A*K_A*(alpha*exp(-lambda*x(1)))+(exp(-
mu*x(2))*K_B*((alpha*exp(-lambda*x(1)))+gamma)); 
A = []; 
b = []; 
Aeq = []; 
beq = []; 
lb = [c_A(1),c_B(1)]; 
ub = [c_A(res),c_B(res)]; 
s_A = c_A(1)+((c_A(res)-c_A(1))/2); 
s_B = c_B(1)+((c_B(res)-c_B(1))/2); 
[x,fval]=fmincon(fun,[s_A,s_B],A,b,Aeq,beq,lb,ub);    
if x(1)<1e-3 
    x(1)=0; 
end 
if x(2)<1e-3 
    x(2)=0; 
end 
  
% ---------------- PRIME signifies UNCORRELATED strategies ------------- 
C_A_UNC; 
TC_A_UNC=C_A_UNC+T_A_UNC; 
C_B_UNC; 
TC_B_UNC=C_B_UNC+T_B_UNC; 
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TC_UNC; 
  
% ---------------- STAR signifies CORRELATED strategies ----------------- 
C_A_COR=x(1); 
T_A_COR=alpha*P_A*K_A*exp(-lambda*C_A_COR); 
if T_A_COR <= 1e-3 
    T_A_COR=0; 
end 
TC_A_COR=C_A_COR+T_A_COR; 
C_B_COR=x(2); 
T_B_COR=K_B*exp(-mu*C_B_COR)*((alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A_COR))+gamma); 
if T_B_COR <= 1e-3 
    T_B_COR=0; 
end 
TC_B_COR=C_B_COR+T_B_COR; 
TC_COR=TC_A_COR+TC_B_COR; 
  
C_A_ADJ=C_A_UNC; 
C_B_ADJ=C_B_COR+(C_A_COR-C_A_UNC); 
T_A_ADJ=alpha*P_A*K_A*exp(-lambda*C_A_COR);    % minimum threat cost for A 
if T_A_ADJ <= 1e-3 
    T_A_ADJ=0; 
end 
T_B_ADJ=T_B_COR; 
if T_B_ADJ <= 1e-3 
    T_B_ADJ=0; 
end 
TC_A_ADJ=C_A_ADJ+T_A_ADJ;   %  minimum total cost of A and B separate 
TC_B_ADJ=C_B_ADJ+T_B_ADJ;   %  minimum total cost of A and B separate 
TC_ADJ=TC_A_ADJ+TC_B_ADJ;   %  minimum total cost of A and B separate 
  
%------- strategy points ------- 
plot3(C_A_UNC,C_B_UNC,TC_UNC,'*r'); 
plot3(x(1),x(2),fval,'*c'); 
if act==1 
    plot3(C_A_ADJ,C_B_ADJ,TC_ADJ,'*g'); 
end 
T_A_ACT=P_A*K_A*alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A_ACT); 
TC_A_ACT=C_A_ACT+T_A_ACT; 
T_B_ACT=K_B*exp(-mu*C_B_ACT)*((alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A_ACT))+gamma); 
TC_B_ACT=C_B_ACT+T_B_ACT; 
TC_AC_ACT=TC_A_ACT+TC_B_ACT; 
TC_ACT=TC_A_ACT+TC_B_ACT; 
  
U_A=1-(TC_A_ADJ/TC_A_UNC); 
U_B=1-(TC_B_ADJ/TC_B_UNC); 
U_AB=1-(TC_ADJ/TC_UNC); 
  
ACT=[C_A_ACT;T_A_ACT;TC_A_ACT;C_B_ACT;T_B_ACT;TC_B_ACT;TC_ACT]; 
UNC=[C_A_UNC;T_A_UNC;TC_A_UNC;C_B_UNC;T_B_UNC;TC_B_UNC;TC_UNC]; 
COR=[C_A_COR;T_A_COR;TC_A_COR;C_B_COR;T_B_COR;TC_B_COR;TC_COR]; 
ADJ=[C_A_ADJ;T_A_ADJ;TC_A_ADJ;C_B_ADJ;T_B_ADJ;TC_B_ADJ;TC_ADJ]; 
f=figure('Position',[200 200 500 200]); 
d=[UNC,COR,ADJ, ACT]; 
cnames={'Uncorrelated','Correlated','Renegotiated','Actual'}; 
rnames={'C_A';'T_A';'TC_A';'C_B';'T_B';'TC_B';'TC'}; 
t=uitable('Parent',f,'Data',d,'ColumnName',cnames,'RowName',rnames); 
t.Position(3) = t.Extent(3); 
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t.Position(4) = t.Extent(4); 
alpaca=alpha*lambda*P_A*K_A; 
  
surplus = TC_UNC-TC_COR 
alpaca=alpha*lambda*P_A*K_A 
algum=mu*K_B*(alpha*exp(-lambda*C_A_UNC)+gamma) 
 
 
